Sources of political, financial and social capital in rural Colombia by Benson-Hernandez, Allison
1 
 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
Sources of political, financial and social capital in 
Rural Colombia 
 
 
Allison Benson-Hernandez 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of International Development of the London 
School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 
2019 
  
2 
 
Declaration  
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than 
where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of 
any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).  
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided 
that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior 
written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe 
the rights of any third party.  
I declare that my thesis consists of 49.504 words.  
Statement of co-authored work  
I confirm that Chapter 2 was jointly co-authored with Jean Paul Faguet and Maria del 
Pilar Lopez-Uribe. I contributed 70% of this work.  
  
3 
 
Acknowledgments 
I am greatly thankful to a number of people for their support throughout these years. Without 
them, this journey would not have been possible. I am thankful to my supervisors Jean Paul Faguet 
and Janne Tukiannen for their valuable guidance throughout this academic and personal process, 
and for influencing me to be a better scholar.  
My gratitude extends to several Professors and students at the LSE who provided valuable 
feedback since the beginning of this process. I am thankful to Teddy Brett, Mayling Birney, Elliot 
Green, Mavish Shami, Steffen Hertog, Diana Weinhold, Sandra Sequeira, Jonathan Weigel, 
Maria del Pilar Lopez, Michael Mbate, Max Gallien, Nikolai Schulz, Nelson Ruiz, Eduardo Melo 
and Maria Orduz.  
I am also thankful to scholars outside of the LSE. I am especially thankful to Fabio Sanchez for 
his encouragement to pursue this PhD and for providing prized insights and data access. My 
gratitude extends to Pablo Querubin, for inviting me to a very fruitful visit to New York 
University and for his useful academic guidance. I am also thankful to Mauricio Velazquez for 
hosting me at the Escuela de Gobierno at Universidad de los Andes.  
This research benefited from comments by conference and seminar participants of the Stanford-
LSE-Uniandes Conferences on Long Run Development in Latin America, the workshop on 
development in Latin America and Africa, and research seminars from the International 
Development, Government and Economics departments at the LSE, the faculty of economics of 
Universidad ICESI, the faculty or rural and environmental sciences at Universidad Javeriana, 
CEARN Banco de la República, DNP, Grupo de Diálogo Rural, FINAGRO, Banco Agrario and 
IC Foundation.  
I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Colombian Government and in particular of the 
National Planning Department for financing my studies and for giving me the opportunity to 
contribute to my country carrying out policy applied research.  
I am especially thankful to the communities of Betulia, Guadalupe, Sapuyes and Guaitarilla for 
hosting me during my fieldwork and for sharing their first-hand knowledge about the challenges 
of rural development in Colombia.  
This thesis is dedicated to my friends and family. Without your support I would have not endured 
this journey. Mum and Chris, thank you for believing in me and for offering your unconditional 
love. Daddy, you are my intellectual role model, and you are in my heart, always and forever. 
Cristian, thank you for sharing this experience with me and for encouraging me to be the best 
version of myself.  
  
4 
 
Sources of political, financial and social capital in Rural 
Colombia 
Abstract  
This thesis analyses dynamics of political, financial and social capital in rural contexts. It 
studies development outcomes through the analysis of the interrelations between the three 
sectors (state, market and civil society) and the institutions governing each. It builds on a 
territorial view of development, focusing on subnational analysis, and employs a 
pluralistic methodological approach, through the use of mixed methods. In the first paper, 
I analyse the relation between political institutions and distributive politics, in particular, 
the use of land as political capital. I study the case of Colombia during a process of 
institutional reform (consolidated in the drafting of a new constitution), which I 
characterize as a shift towards more inclusive institutions. This is defined as a shift 
towards a broader distribution of power (across political parties, branches of government, 
levels of government and societal actors) and towards a stronger and more effective state. 
Relying on panel data for over 1.100 municipalities during a 55-year period, I find 
evidence of a political land cycle: land allocations are systematically higher in electoral 
years relative to non-electoral ones. I show that this cycle is dependent on the political 
institutions in place, becoming smaller after the shift towards more inclusive institutions. 
The results point towards this being explained by incentive and capacity effects leading 
to a re-composition of distributive politics strategies from the allocation of targeted 
private benefits (like land) towards the strategic allocation of public goods.  
In the second and third papers, I focus on financial capital, in particular, access to 
agricultural credit, and social capital, materialized in the form of Rural Producer 
Organizations (i.e. farmers’ cooperatives and associations). I use novel data from 
Colombia to estimate logit, fixed-effects and differences-in-differences models. I find that 
RPOs increase access to agricultural credit at both the individual and local (municipality) 
level. The existence of positive general equilibrium effects implies that rather than there 
being crowding-out of credit (from RPO members to non-members), RPOs lead to 
aggregate increases in access to credit, constituting a tool for local financial development. 
I also show that the effects are heterogeneous: being positive for small farmers (through 
public credit) and for big farmers (through private credit), but not significant for medium 
ones. This appears to be the result of contextual conditions binding the effect of RPOs. In 
this case, the effect is conditioned by the structural segmentation of the credit market 
across sources and farmer type. 
In the third paper, I rely on a mixed methods analysis to provide a more comprehensive 
picture of the relation between RPOs and access to credit. I analyse the demand and 
supply side mechanisms through which RPOs reduce credit constraints. The analysis is 
based on 60 semi-structured interviews to key informants (organized and non-organized 
farmers, credit analysts and policy experts) and on four case studies (four municipalities 
in Colombia). The cases were selected following a novel methodology combining nested 
analysis and stratified random sampling. I find that RPOs increase the supply of credit by 
increasing the likelihood of banks approving credit requests through signals of project 
and farmer quality that reduce problems of imperfect information. RPOs also increase the 
demand for credit, not only via investment demands for projects of increased profitability, 
but also as they reduce transaction costs (through the sharing of information) and 
constitute a safety net, reducing risk credit constraints.  
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Introduction 
Rural development holds the key for some of the most pressing challenges the world faces 
today: lifting millions of people out of poverty and assuring food security amidst rapid 
population growth. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
estimates that economic growth from agriculture is 11 times more effective for poverty 
reduction than that of any other sector, and adds that this growth is the key for assuring 
that food production doubles before 2050, as needed in order to meet the demands of the 
growing population (FAO, 2015).  
These challenges entail, among others, increasing farmers’ access to financial capital that 
allows them to carry out profitable investments. Researchers estimate, for instance, that 
removing credit constraints in Peru would increase the value of agricultural output by 
17% (Ayalew, Deininger and Duponchel, 2014) and in Colombia, it would double the 
agricultural income (Leibovich et al., 2013). Enhancing rural development also requires 
exploiting the benefits that social capital and collective action organizations offer for 
overcoming market and state failures present in rural areas. There is evidence, for 
instance, that when farmers organize in cooperatives, associations and other organizations 
which materialize and replicate social capital, they have better access to information, 
technology and input and output markets (Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014; Conley and 
Udry, 2003; Bebbington, 1997; Narrod et al. 2009, Abebaw and Hail, 2013; Markussen 
and Tarp, 2014). Meeting the developmental challenges of rural areas requires as well 
improving the allocation of public resources, so that these are based on objective needs 
and welfare-maximization, constituting a source of inclusive growth rather than a source 
of political capital. The work of Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2016) shows for example, that the 
welfare effects of public goods, conditional cash transfers and other policy relief 
programs in Mexico improved as they became less clientelist and less discretionary.  
This thesis builds on the above reflections, studying dynamics of financial, social and 
political capital in rural Colombia. The thesis builds on institutional pluralist approaches 
to development, recognizing that a thorough understanding of the causes of development 
requires studying the interdependent relations between the three sectors (market, state and 
civil society) and the institutions governing each (Brett, 2009). This thesis builds as well 
on a territorial view of development: in the three papers, the analysis is carried out at the 
subnational level. Focusing on within country units of analysis, and exploiting a large 
number of observations across space and time, allows to account for historical, 
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institutional and cultural factors at the micro level, providing analytical depth and 
robustness, and generating insights into the nature of developmental divergences within 
countries. The thesis relies on a pluralistic methodological approach. Through the use of 
mixed methods, I synergistically combine the statistical analysis of Large-N aggregate 
data to draw general relationships, together with qualitative Small-N analyses that 
provides in-depth and contextually-based inferences. 
In the first paper, I focus on political capital. In particular, I analyse how political 
institutions affect distributive politics. The existing literature has focused mainly on the 
relation between democracy and distributive politics, studying for instance, the effect of 
regime type and of democratic maturity (Burgess et al., 2015; Brender and Drazen, 2005; 
Shi and Svensson, 2006; Akmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004; Streb and Torrens, 2013). I 
contribute to this literature by going beyond the focus on democracy and analysing the 
relation between distributive politics and the broader concept of inclusive political 
institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, 2016) define inclusive political institutions 
as those in which there is, first, a broad distribution of political power; and second, a 
strong and effective state. I elaborate on this somewhat abstract concept, further 
characterizing it as institutions in which there is a broad distribution of power among: i) 
political parties (i.e. the existence of multiparty competition); ii) levels of government 
(i.e. having political decentralization); iii) branches of government (i.e. there being an 
effective division of power); and iv) societal actors in general (i.e. the existence of 
participatory democracy). Regarding the strength and effectiveness of the state, I focus 
on the state´s fiscal and bureaucratic capacity to provide public goods. Building on this 
definition, I characterize as a shift towards more inclusive institutions, a structural 
institutional reform which took place in Colombia at the beginning of the 1990s, which 
was consolidated in the drafting of a new constitution. 
I analyse how this shift affected distributive politics, in particular, the strategic allocation 
of land in relation with the electoral cycle. For this analysis, I rely on subnational panel 
data for over 1.100 municipalities over a 55-year period. I estimate a political land cycle 
(PLC) through a fixed effects Poisson regression1. Data on land allocations is reported at 
the monthly level, so the PLC is estimated based on electoral years (i.e. the 12-months 
prior to elections) rather than on calendar ones. As Labonne (2016) and 
Akmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) show, high frequency data of this sort allows for a 
                                                             
1 As the outcome variable, the number of land allocations in a municipality i at year t, is a count variable 
and is censored at zero 
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cleaner identification of the political cycle. The timing of elections is fixed and pre-
determined by law, being an exogenous variable. The shift towards more inclusive 
institutions is also exogenous to land dynamics, specific rural claims or dynamics in a 
particular municipality.  
The results provide evidence of the use of land as a source of political capital. There is a 
political land cycle: land allocations are systematically higher in electoral years relative 
to non-electoral ones. Furthermore, this cycle is dependent on the political institutions in 
place: its magnitude is reduced by half after the shift towards more inclusive institutions. 
I further find that the reduction in the PLC is heterogeneous across space, being 
significantly stronger in “core” municipalities, that is, municipalities located in central 
areas, in which I show initial institutions were more inclusive and there was a stronger 
effective institutional shift. The results evidence that pre-existing institutions condition 
institutional change: where initial institutions were more inclusive, institutional change 
was enhanced, and where they were less inclusive, institutional change was blocked2. 
This paper also contributes to the literature on institutional change (Clark and Ghandi, 
2015; Haber and Menaldo, 2011; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005), by providing 
micro-level empirical evidence on institutional heterogeneity and institutional divergence 
within a country.  
I carry out further analyses to identify the specific mechanisms that explain why the PLC 
becomes smaller after the shift towards more inclusive institutions. The evidence points 
towards the reduction of the PLC being the result of a re-composition of distributive 
politics strategies: from the strategic allocation of private targeted benefits, to the strategic 
allocation of public goods. I show that while the PLC becomes smaller after the shift 
towards more inclusive institutions, the political cycle of spending on public goods 
becomes larger3.  
While unbundling the specific relations explaining the effects of broad institutional 
changes is difficult (Kroth, Larcinese and Wehner, 2016), I focus on specific incentive 
and capacity effects through the separate analysis of changes in political competition, 
                                                             
2 Being a core municipality increases the likelihood of experiencing a strong response to the institutional 
shift, measured as above average increases in political competition and in spending on public goods. This 
evidences that although the institutional reform took place at the national level, the effective response 
to it was heterogeneous across space, what depended on the pre-existing institutional conditions.  
3 The study of Drazen and Eslava (2010) shows that in addition of strategic timing in pubic good 
expenditure, there is geographical targeting to swing municipalities, and that this strategy generates an 
electoral payoff.  
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political accountability and fiscal and bureaucratic capacity across municipalities. I argue 
that the re-composition of distributive politics is the result of both changes in incentives 
and changes in capacities of politicians to mobilize voters via the strategic allocation of 
different types of goods. Before the shift towards more inclusive institutions, when both 
political competition and state capacity were weak, it was efficient to mobilize small 
segments of voters relying on patronage networks and distributing targeted private 
benefits like vacant land, which is easy and cheap to allocate.  
Once political competition increases (due to the introduction of multiparty elections) 
politicians have incentives to mobilize a broader and more heterogeneous set of voters, 
which is more effectively done through the strategic allocation of public goods. Diaz-
Cayeros, Stévez and Magaloni (2016) argue that the broad appeal of public goods 
explains why increases in political competition lead to a diversification of electoral 
investments towards public goods in Mexico. This argument is consistent with evidence 
on Colombia showing that increases in political competition have a positive impact on 
public service provision (Sánchez and Pachón, 2013). More broadly, it is consistent with 
theories of democracy increasing public good provision and expenditure (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003; Min, 2015; Kroth, Larcinese and Wehner, 2016). Consistent with 
this argument, I show that the decrease in the PLC was stronger in municipalities in which 
political competition (measured as the Effective Number of Competing Parties4) 
increased the most after the institutional shift.  
I posit that this incentive effect is re-enforced by increases in political responsiveness and 
accountability, which also derived from the institutional shift. In particular, the 
introduction of local elections, direct democracy mechanisms and the strengthening of 
executive constraints likely increased the accountability of politicians towards the 
demands of voters, who, as Faguet and Sánchez (2014) state, demanded improvements in 
public goods provision. In line with the above, I show that the reduction in the PLC was 
stronger in municipalities with higher levels of accountability5.  
Finally, I state that the re-composition of distributive politics strategies towards public 
goods requires not only the incentives, but also the capacity to do so. This, as allocating 
public goods (e.g. a school) is more complex and expensive than allocating targeted 
                                                             
4 The ENCP is estimated for presidential elections, using data from the Base Electoral, CEDE. 
5 Measured as the Index of accountability and transparency (from the Open Government Index of 
Attorney General´s office), which reflects the strength of the available mechanisms to strengthen state-
citizen relations and to reduce corruption.  
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private benefits (e.g. a land title). The institutional shift led to a significant increase in 
fiscal and bureaucratic capacity: Intergovernmental transfers and total public investment 
increased (especially investment on public goods), and training and technical support 
programs for local governments were strengthened (DNP, 2002). I show that in line with 
the above, the reduction in the PLC was stronger in municipalities in which the efficiency 
of public good provision was higher.  
Overall, these results evidence how the politically motivated allocation of resources 
depends on the political institutions in place. They also show how, by adapting to 
institutional conditions, distributive politics can persist even in democratic settings, being 
more pervasive than what expected based on the “mature democracy” argument (Brender 
and Drazen, 2003) or on traditional modernization theories (discussed in Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson, 2007). Furthermore, the results evidence the territorial dimension of 
distributive politics: the politically motivated allocation of resources is heterogeneous 
even within countries, as contextual conditions, and in particular, institutional conditions, 
vary across the territory. This implies that the potential solutions to distributive politics 
should be tailored to local contexts and to institutional differences at the micro level.  
In the second and third papers, I focus on two other types of capital: financial capital and 
social capital. During the past three decades, the role of social relations and social 
organizations has become central in the study of development. To describe these, 
academics have proposed concepts including social capital and collective action, which 
although difficult to define6, ultimately refer to how social relations enable cooperation 
and the pursuit of common objectives, allowing individuals to achieve outcomes difficult 
to achieve if they were acting on their own, or if the market or the state were acting on 
their own (Ostrom, 1990, Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Putnam, 1993; Bourdieu, 1986; 
Coleman, 1988).  
I focus on a key and common form of social capital in rural areas: Rural Producer 
Organizations (RPOs). These include agricultural cooperatives, associations and similar 
organizations through which farmers voluntarily invest effort and resources to pursue 
                                                             
6 Putnam (1993) defines social capital as the interrelationships that enable people to coordinate action to 
achieve desired goals, and argues that membership in social organizations is a form of social capital. There 
is an ongoing debate on what constitutes a good definition of social capital, on how to adequately 
measure it (Serra, 2011; Portes, 1998). There are also various definitions of collective action, with 
commonalities in that they refer to the involvement of a group of people, shared interests, and voluntary 
action to pursue those shared interests (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004). 
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common productive and commercialization objectives. Social organizations of this sort 
reflect and replicate social capital (Putnam, 1993). Different studies provide evidence on 
how RPOs increase access to input and output markets (Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014; 
Conley and Udry, 2003; Bebbington, 1997; Narrod et al. 2009). I contribute to this body 
of literature showing that RPOs also increase access to financial capital, in particular, to 
agricultural credit. Identifying alternative ways of increasing access to financial capital is 
a key challenge of rural development, as despite its well-known positive impact on 
production, productivity and poverty (Ayalew, Deininger and Duponchel 2014; Conning 
and Udry, 2007; Burgess and Pande, 2005), it remains limited throughout the developing 
world (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008),  
I quantitatively explore the relation between RPOs and access to agricultural credit in the 
second paper (co-authored with Jean Paul Faguet and Maria Lopez-Uribe). The relation 
is analysed at both the individual and municipality level. The individual level analysis 
relies on census data for over 2,3 million producers and estimates a Logit model. The 
municipality level analysis relies on novel panel data for over 15.000 municipality-year 
observations on credit allocations and RPO creations. Both fixed effects and difference-
in-differences models are estimated. The fixed effects model includes municipality, year 
and department-year fixed effects, as well as municipality and time varying controls. The 
differences-in-differences estimation is based on multiple treatment and control groups.  
The results show that RPO membership increases the likelihood of an individual 
accessing agricultural credit. This, however, does not imply that there are positive general 
equilibrium effects, as collective action could increase access for just some (i.e. organized 
farmers) while crowding-out resources available for other (i.e. non-organized farmers). 
As such, the developmental impact on financial access is unclear. The municipality level 
analysis focuses on this, evidencing that this form of collective action does constitute a 
tool for local financial development, as it does lead to aggregate increases on access to 
credit. The positive general equilibrium effects point towards the existence of spillover 
effects (from RPO members to non-members), at least when credit supply is not fixed.  
In addition to providing evidence on the positive general equilibrium effects, we show 
that the effect of collective action is heterogeneous. We analyse differential effects for 
credit granted to big, medium and small farmers, by both public and private banks. The 
results show that collective action increases access to credit for small farmers, but only 
through public credit. It also increases access to credit for big farmers, but only through 
private credit; in contrast, the effect is not significant for medium-scale farmers. We posit 
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that the heterogeneous effect of collective action is explained by binding contextual 
conditions. In this case, the binding condition is the structural segmentation of the credit 
market: private banks favour large credits, as fixed transaction costs and risk are 
perceived as lower. In turn, public banks favour credit for small farmers, as they have a 
dual mission of allocating financial resources and of promoting rural development (i.e. 
through serving vulnerable population). Under these conditions, medium-scale farmers 
are left in-between, financially underserved. The results of this paper evidence that 
collective action replicates, rather than counteracts the structural segmentation of the 
credit market. This distributional analysis constitutes another contribution, in particular 
to the literature on rural financial development (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008; Ayalew, 
Deininger and Duponchel, 2014; Carter and Olinto, 2003; Conning and Udry, 2005), 
which, as Banerjee et al. (2015) highlight, has seldom explored heterogeneous effects. 
This type of analysis is particularly relevant when studying highly fragmented markets 
such as the credit market, and is crucial for identifying strategies that allow a transit 
towards inclusive financial systems (United Nations, 2006). 
In the third paper, I build on the aforementioned econometric results, and through a mixed 
methods analysis, I provide a more comprehensive picture of the relation between RPOs 
and access to credit. In particular, I identify the demand and supply side mechanisms 
through which RPOs reduce credit constraints. To this end, I carry out a Small-N 
qualitative analysis consisting of four case studies (four municipalities) and over 60 semi-
structured interviews to organized and unorganized farmers, local banks and policy 
actors. For the case selection, I propose a methodology combining Lieberman´s (2005) 
approach for nested analysis with Fearon and Laitin´s (2008) stratified random case 
selection. The procedure is based on the main econometric model7 of paper two, from 
which I estimate residuals and categorize municipalities based on deciles of these. I then 
semi-randomly8 select the cases: two from the decile of lowest residuals (i.e. on-the-
regression-line cases) and two from the decile of highest residuals (i.e. off-the-regression-
line cases). I carry out differences-in-means tests for a large set of socioeconomic 
characteristics in order to discard the existence of systematic or extreme differences 
between the selected cases and the average municipality. I then carry out within and 
                                                             
7 The Fixed Effects model estimating the relation between RPOs in a municipality and the total number of 
credits allocated.  
8 I randomly order the municipalities and select the first to comply with a set of criteria following purposive 
sampling, for instance, that security conditions were not a threat, and that there were enough RPOs to 
interview. 
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across-case comparisons in order to identify common mechanisms, as well as reasons that 
explain the low fit of the econometric model in the off-the–line cases.  
The results indicate that collective action in the form of RPOs reduces credit constraints 
from both the demand and supply side. I classify the mechanisms according to whether 
they loosen price, quantity, transaction cost or risk credit constraints, following the 
categorization proposed in the literature (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008). I find that RPOs 
loosen quantity credit constraints (i.e. constraints stemming from the supply of credit 
being lower than its effective demand). This occurs as RPOs grant credit to their 
members, and as RPO members are able to access associative credit lines offered by banks 
directly to organizations and under preferential conditions. Furthermore, collective action 
increases the likelihood of banks approving individual credit requests. This, as RPO 
membership increases the creditworthiness of farmers through signals of project quality 
and farmer quality (i.e. screening of applicants), lessening problems of imperfect and 
asymmetric information. In addition to this, banks are able to reduce operational costs by 
offering and approving credits to RPO members in a block.  
I also find that this form of collective action increases the demand for credit, as through 
RPOs, farmers are able to engage in new, larger and more profitable projects which 
require investment. The profitability of projects increases as these organizations enable 
farmers to access inputs at lower prices (buying at scale), and ease access to markets 
(through joint direct commercialization). It also eases access to technical assistance and 
to other forms of government support. In addition to the above, I find that collective action 
reduces transaction cost constraints, further increasing the demand for credit. This occurs 
through the sharing of information on credit opportunities and the application process (i.e. 
RPOs are information hubs). Finally, RPOs reduce risk credit constraints, as they 
constitute a safety net, among others, providing emergency informal loans which can be 
used to meet formal credit obligations in cases of low liquidity.  
These mechanisms were found to be stronger in the on–the-regression-line cases, while 
they were weaker in the off-the-line ones9. The evidence points towards this being the 
result of the general weakness of RPOs in the off-the-line municipalities, which in turn, 
results from the way in which RPOs emerge. I find that in the on-the-line municipalities, 
                                                             
9 Off-the-line cases are those in which the model residuals are high, meaning that RPO dynamics do not 
explain credit dynamics as predicted. In the paper, I further discuss their nature and some systematic 
characteristics that can explain the low fit of the model: a larger number of RPO creation shocks, a lower 
dependence on the agricultural sector and low levels of land informality.  
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RPOs tend to emerge organically, as a bottom-up initiatives seeking collective, 
productive and long-term benefits. In contrast, in the off-the-line cases, RPOs tend to be 
created non-organically, as a result of top down external stimulus offering short term 
benefits (e.g. receiving resources from a specific public program which requires 
beneficiaries to be organized). Under these circumstances, RPOs are constituted without 
clear or common objectives and collective action rules, becoming weak organizations 
which offer limited benefits to their members, including those which can reduce credit 
constraints.  
The results evidence that the potential benefits of RPOs go beyond easing access to 
markets and technology; they also increase access to financial capital. This constitutes a 
contribution to the literature on collective action rural organizations (Desai and Joshi, 
2014; Vandeplas et al. 2013; Abebaw and Hail, 2013; Markussen and Tarp, 2014; 
Bebbington, 1997). The paper also contributes though the analysis of the heterogeneity 
in the nature of RPOs, and by providing evidence on how environments, incentives and 
rules affect the structure, functioning and potential impact of collective action 
organizations. Through this analysis, I like the literature on collective action with the 
literature on sociological organizational theory (Hannan and Freeman; 1977; Scott and 
Meyer; 1991; McPherson and Rotolo, 1996; Andrews, et al. 2010). 
In addition to the aforementioned thematic contributions of each paper, this thesis 
contributes as a whole in methodological terms. First, by evidencing the value of 
synergistically integrating quantitative and qualitative methods for gaining analytical 
leverage. As Gerring (2005) mentions, good social science research should focus not only 
on predicting a particular relation between two variables, but also on explaining why, 
how and when those variables are related. Through the use of mixed methods, I was able 
to: i) identify the mechanisms explaining the relation between the dependent and 
independent variables; ii) gain more confidence on the Large-N Analysis (what 
Lieberman (2005) terms Model-testing LNA); iii) improve the quality of theoretical 
conceptualizations (e.g. on how collective action materializes heterogeneously in Rural 
Producer Organizations and how the segmentation of the credit market operates); and iv) 
carry out the case selection in a more structured way. The proposed step-to-step 
methodology for case selection exploits the richness of quantitative data to rule out the 
existence of systematic differences between case alternatives, lessening threats of 
selection bias. Having a step-to-step case selection methodology is particularly relevant 
for studies with a large number of potential cases is large, as in subnational analyses (in 
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this case, there were 1.100 potential cases). Furthermore, the proposed nested analysis 
approach evidences that Small-N Analyses profit from relying on both on-the-line cases 
(to carry out further analysis, in particular, to identify underlying mechanisms) and on 
off-the-line cases (to structurally search for heterogeneity which can explain the low fit 
of the LNA). 
Under a research design perspective, this thesis also contributes by evidencing the value 
of carrying out “one-country, Large-N” analyses (Faguet, 2012; Kroth, Larcinese and 
Wehner, 2016). The use of subnational data over long periods of time allows to control 
for historical, institutional and cultural factors that typically bedevil inferences made on 
small samples and on a fixed moment in time. Furthermore, as Arias (2015) notes, 
country-level studies focusing on specific institutions throughout time and space can 
provide analytical richness and context-specificity that allow for a better understanding 
of the mechanisms of causality between institutions and development outcomes.  
Finally, this paper contributes to the policy agenda of Colombia, in which rural 
development in this country constitutes a first order challenge. This, not only for reducing 
poverty levels (currently of 40% in rural areas) and for assuring food security to its 
population, but also for advancing the peace building agenda (set after the signing of a 
peace agreement with guerrilla group Las Farc in 2016). This agenda aims at tackling the 
structural conditions which contributed to the onset of an armed conflict of over 50 years, 
of which rural poverty and inequality (especially land inequality) are central ones 
(Comisión Histórica del Conflicto y sus Víctimas, 2015).  
Addressing the “historic debt with rural areas” (as several academic and policy leaders 
refer to), entails improving the distribution of land. This requires allocating land 
following objective and welfare maximizing considerations, rather than using it as a 
source of political capital. Addressing this historic debt also requires generating a double 
inclusion (productive and social) (Ocampo and Gómez, 2015), through increases in the 
productivity of agriculture, which remains substantially lower than the Latin American 
average (0,2% vs 1,9%) (Arguello, Torres and Quintero, 2014). One of the main ways to 
enhance productivity growth is to increase access to financial capital (currently, only 11% 
of farmers access credit in a given year, Agrarian Census, 2013). Political and market 
approaches alone will not suffice to assure rural development. This also requires the 
engagement of the third sector, civil society, as an active actor in development. Social 
capital and organizations such as RPOs have the potential not only of increasing access 
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to input, output and financial markets, but also to rebuild social cohesion and empower 
local communities.  
These rural development challenges are not particular to Colombia. Countries throughout 
the developing world require improving the efficiency of resource allocations such as 
land, so that they constitute productive assets rather than political capital. They also 
require novel strategies for increasing access to financial capital which allows farmers to 
carry out profit maximizing investments, and they require as well unleashing the potential 
of social capital and collective action organizations to ease access to markets and to 
strengthen social cohesion. Thorough answers to these developmental challenges require 
inputs from research analysing the complex interrelations across the market, state and 
civil society sectors, and of the institutions governing each. This is better achieved 
through methodological approaches that integrate quantitative and qualitative data, and 
that focus on the territorial dimension of development.    
20 
 
References (introduction) 
 
Abebaw, D. and Haile, M. (2013). The impact of cooperatives on agricultural technology 
adoption: Empirical evidence from Ethiopia. Food policy, Vol. 38, pp. 82-91. 
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2012) Why Nations Fail, New York: Crown.  
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2016). Paths to inclusive political institutions. 
Unpublished 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. (2005). The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, 
Institutional Change, and Economic Growth. The American Economic Review, Vol. 95, 
No. 3 pp. 546-579  
Andrews, K; Ganz, M; Baggetta, M; Han, H; and Lim, C. (2010). “Leadership, 
Membership, and Voice: Civic Associations That Work”. American Journal of Sociology, 
Vol. 115, No. 4, pp. 1191–1242 
Argüello, R., Torres, E., and Quintero, L. (2014). Propuesta para incentivar inversión en 
proyectos agropecuarios. Bogotá: CRECE. 
Arias, L. (2015). Political institutions and economic development. In Ghandi, J. and Ruiz-
Rufino, R. (eds), Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions. New York, 
NY, Routledge. 
Banerjee, A., Karlan, D. and Zinman, J. (2015). Six Randomized Evaluations of 
Microcredit: Introduction and Further Steps. American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics, Vol, 7, No. 1. pp 1–21 
Bebbington, A. (1997). Social capital and rural intensification: local organizations and 
islands of sustainability in the rural Andes.The Geographical journal. Vol 163, No.2, pp. 
189-197  
Bebbington, A. and Perreault, T. (2003). Social capital, development and access to 
resources in highland Ecuador. Economy Geography, Vol 75, No.4, pp. 395-418 
Boldrin, M., Levine, D. and Modica, S. (2012). A Review of Acemoglu and Robinson’s 
Why Nations Fail. Available at http://www.dklevine.com/general/aandrreview.pdf 
Bourdieu, P. (1986). “The forms of Capital”, in J.G Richardson, Handbook of theory and 
research for the sociology of education. Greenwood press, pp. 241- 258.   
Bowles, S. and H. Gintis (2002) “Social Capital and Community Governance”. The 
Economic Journal, Vol 112. F419–F436. 
Brender, A. and A. Drazen (2005), Political budget cycles in new versus established 
democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics Vol. 52, No.7, pp. 1271–1295. 
Brett, E. (2009) Reconstructing Development Theory, London, Palgrave-Macmillan. 
Burgess, R. And Pande, R. (2005). Do Rural Banks Matter? Evidence from the Indian 
Social Banking Experiment. American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No.3, pp. 780-795 
Clark, T. and Ghandi, J. (2015). Studying institutions. In Ghandi, J. and Ruiz-Rufino, R. 
(eds), Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions. New York, NY, 
Routledge. 
21 
 
Coleman, J.S. (2000). “Social Capital in the creation of human capital”. The American 
Journal of Sociology 94 (S95).  
Comisión histórica del conflicto y sus víctimas (2015). Contribución al entendimiento del 
conflicto armado en Colombia.  
Conley, T. and Udry, C. (2010). Learning about a new technology: Pineapple in Ghana. 
American Economic Review, Vol. 100, No.1, pp. 35–69 
Conning, J. and Udry, C. (2005). Rural financial markets in developing countries in 
Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 3, Chapter 56. 
Diaz-Cayeros, A., Estevez, F., & Magaloni, B. (2016). The political logic of poverty 
relief: electoral strategies and social policy in Mexico. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
DNP (2002). Evaluación de la decentralización municipal en Colombia: Balance de una 
década.  
Faguet, J. and Sánchez, F. (2014). Decentralization and access to social services in 
Colombia. Public Choice. Vol. 160, No. 1/2, pp. 227-249 
Faguet, J.P. (2012). Decentralization and Popular Democracy: Governance from Below 
in Bolivia. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 
FAO (2015). The State of Food Insecurity in the World.  
Fearon, J. and Laitin, D. (2008). Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Methods. In The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. Eds. Box-Steffensmeier, J, Brady, H. and 
Collier, D. 
Gerring, J. (2005). Causation: A Unified Framework for the Social Sciences. Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, Vol.17, No.2, pp. 163–198.  
Guirkinger, C. and Boucher, S. (2008). Credit constraints and productivity in Peruvian 
agriculture. Agricultural Economics, vol 29, pp.295-308. 
Haber, S. and Menaldo, V. (2011). Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism: A 
reappraisal of the resource curse. American Political Science Review, Vol. 105, No. 1, 
pp. 1-26. 
Hannan, M. and Freeman, J. (1977). “The population ecology of organizations”. 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol, 82, pp. 929-964 
Junguito, R., Perfetti, J.J. and Becerra, A. (2014). Desarrollo de la Agricultura 
Colombiana. Cuadernos Fedesarrollo No. 48.  
Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson, S. (Eds.). (2007). Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of 
Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Kroth, V. Larcinese, V. and Wehner, J. (2016). A better life for all? Democratization and 
Electrification in Post-Apartheid South Africa. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 78, No. 3.  
Leibovich, J. (2013). Propuesta de clasificación de los productores agropecuarios por 
parte de FINAGRO. USAID, Programa de Políticas Públicas. 
Lieberman, E. S. (2005). Nested analysis as a mixed-method strategy for comparative 
research. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No.3, pp. 435-452.  
22 
 
Markussen, T. and Tarp, F. (2014). Political connections and land-related investment in 
rural Vietnam. Journal of Development Economics, Vol.110, pp. 291-302  
McPherson, J. and Rotolo, T. (1996). “Testing a dynamic model of social composition: 
diversity and change in voluntary groups”. American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, No. 
2, pp. 179-202 
Meinzen-Dick R, Di Gregorio M, McCarthy N. (2004) Methods for studying collective 
action in rural development. Agricultarl Systems, Vol. 82, No. 3, pp. 197–214. 
Michelini, J.J (2013). Small farmers and social capital in development projects: Lessons 
from failures in Argentina's rural periphery. Journal of rural studies. Vol. 30, pp. 99-109  
Misión para la transformación del campo (2016). Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 
Colombia. 
Narrod, C., Roy, D., Okello, J., Avendaño, B, Rich, K. and Thorat, A. (2009). Public–
private partnerships and collective action in high value fruit and vegetable supply chains. 
Food Policy, Vol. 34, No.1, pp. 8–15 
Ocampo, J. (2017). Latin America’s Mounting Development Challenges, in Esteban 
Pérez Caldentey and Matías Vernengo (eds.), Why Latin American Nations Fail: 
Development Strategies for the Twenty-First Century, Oakland: University of California 
Press. Chapter 6, pp. 121-140. 
Ocampo, J. and Gómez, N. (2015). Inclusión social y productiva de los habitantes rurales 
In Equidad: Perspectivas para Colombia, FES 50 años, Cali: Fundación para la Educación 
Superior (FES). Pp. 30-54. 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons, Cambridge, CUP 
Portes A. (1998). Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology. 
Annual Review of Sociology; Vol. 24, pp. 1-24 
Putnam, R. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. 
Princeton University Press.  
Sánchez, F. and Pachón, M. (2013). Decentralization, Fiscal Effort and Social Progress 
in Colombia at the Municipal Level, 1994-2009: Why Does National Politics Matter? 
Scott, W. R. and Meyer, J. (1991). “The Organization of Societal Sectors: Propositions 
and Early Evidence”. In: Powell, W. and DiMaggio, P. (eds). The new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis. University of Chicago Press.  Pp. 108-140. 
Serra, R. (2011). The Promises of a New Social Capital Agenda. The Journal of 
Development Studies. Vol. 47, No.8. 
United Nations (2006). Building Inclusive Financial Sectors for Development, New 
York, United Nations. 
Uphoff, N. and Wijayaratna, N. (2000). Demonstrated Benefits from Social Capital: The 
Productivity of Farmer Organizations in Gal Oya, Sri Lanka. World Development ,Vol. 
28, No.11,  pp. 1875–1890  
Vandeplas, A., Minten, B. and Swinnen, J. (2013). Multinationals vs. cooperatives: the 
income and efficiency effects of supply chain governance in India. Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 64, No.1, pp 217-244 
23 
 
Verhofstadt, E. and Maertens, M. (2014). Smallholder cooperatives and agricultural 
performance in Rwanda: do organizational differences matter? Agricultural Economics 
Vol. 45, No.1, pp. 39–52 
World Bank (2007). World Development Report. Agriculture for Development. 
Washington D.C 
  
24 
 
Chapter 1 
From Targeted Private Benefits to Public Goods: Land, Patronage and 
Political Institutions in Colombia 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyses how changes in political institutions affect distributive politics. It studies the 
case of Colombia during a period of reform in which the distribution of political power was 
broadened across political actors, levels of government and branches of government, and in 
which the effectiveness of the State increased through fiscal and administrative reforms. I rely on 
over 55.000 municipality-year observations to analyse the relation between the electoral cycle 
and the targeting of private benefits, in particular, land.  I find evidence of a political land cycle 
(PLC) and of it being dependent on the political institutions in place: after the institutional shift, 
the magnitude of the PLC was reduced by half. This reduction was heterogeneous across space, 
being stronger in municipalities in which initial institutions were more inclusive (enhancing, 
rather than blocking institutional change). I explore the mechanisms explaining the reduction in 
the PLC and find evidence pointing towards it being the result of a re-composition of distributive 
politics: from targeted private benefits, towards the strategic allocation of public goods. The 
results show that while the PLC became smaller after the institutional shift, the political cycle of 
spending on public goods significantly increased. This re-composition likely results from joint 
incentive and capacity effects. I argue that increases in political competition and political 
accountability increased the incentives to mobilize voters via the strategic allocation of public 
goods which can appeal to a broader and more heterogeneous set of voters. Furthermore, the 
shift significantly increased fiscal and bureaucratic capacity to provide public goods, giving 
politicians the required capacity to re-compose their voter mobilization strategies. Consistent 
with the argument, I find that the reduction in the PLC was significantly stronger in municipalities 
in which political competition increased the most and in which political accountability and 
efficiency in public good provision were highest. Overall, the results show that distributive 
politics strategies transform, rather than disappear with improvements in institutional quality. 
 
Key words: Distributive politics, electoral cycles, institutions, political institutions, land 
reform, targeted benefits, public goods, Colombia. 
 
JEL: D72, D73, H410, H420, L33, Q15 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The allocation of public resources is often affected by electoral interests, which can 
deviate these from optimal targeting based on objective needs or rights. The literature on 
distributive politics shows, for instance, that allocations of public resources can be 
strategically targeted towards certain groups of people or localities, following ideological, 
partisan or ethnic considerations (for a review see Golden and Min, 2013). There is also 
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evidence that allocations can be strategically timed, generating political budget and 
business cycles (for reviews see Dubois, 2016; Mandon and Cassals, 2018).  
Some studies analyse how contextual conditions, and in particular, political institutions, 
affect distributive politics. This strand of the literature has focused especially on the issue 
of democracy. The work of Burgess et al. (2015) shows for instance, that the strategic 
allocation of road expenditure in Kenya is dependent on regime type: periods of autocracy 
saw co-ethnic favouritism, while the effect disappeared during democratic ones. Other 
studies analyse the effect of democratic maturity, finding that political budget cycles are 
less prevalent in mature democracies, arguably as voters become more informed and 
experienced, punishing the electoral manipulation of resources (Brender and Drazen, 
2005). There is also evidence that government transparency, media freedom, and in 
general, checks and balances associated with stronger democracies, reduce the capacity 
of politicians to manipulate resources (Shi and Svensson, 2006; 
Akmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004; Streb and Torrens, 2013) 10.  
This paper goes beyond the traditional focus on democracy by analysing the relation 
between distributive politics and the broader concept of inclusive political institutions. 
Institutions refer to the rules, norms and customs (or more broadly, the “rules of the 
game”) which structure human interaction (North, 1990; Levi and Menaldo, 2015). The 
work of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012, 2016) focuses on the role of political institutions, in particular, on how institutions 
that are more “inclusive” are more conducive to development. Their work emphasizes on 
two aspects of institutions that make them more or less inclusive: first, having a broad 
distribution of power, and second, a state with capacity. 
Other authors refer to similar concepts for depicting systems in which political relations 
are more progressive, pluralistic and democratic. For instance, North, Wallis and 
Weingast (2009) refer to “open access orders”. Overall, broad concepts such as these are 
difficult to define axiomatically (Boldrin, Levine and Modica, 2012). To address this, I 
further elaborate on the concept of “inclusive”, explicitly defining the dimensions 
according to which political institutions are considered more or less inclusive. I 
characterize inclusive political institutions as those in which there is a broad distribution 
                                                             
10 Other studies have focused on variations of political institutions within democracies. For example, 
Persson and Tabellini (2003) analyse differences in political budget cycles in countries with different 
electoral rules (proportional representation vs. majoritarian) and between government systems 
(parliamentary vs. presidential).  
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of power among: i) political parties (i.e. the existence of multiparty competition); ii) levels 
of government (i.e. having political decentralization); iii) branches of government (i.e. 
there being an effective division of power); and iv) societal actors in general (i.e. the 
existence of participatory democracy); and in which the state has fiscal and bureaucratic 
capacity to provide public goods11.  
Based on the above, I characterize an institutional reform which took place at the 
beginning of the 1990s in Colombia, when the drafting of a new constitution consolidated 
a process of political reform which opened the political system and strengthened the 
state12, marking a shift towards more inclusive political institutions. I analyse the effect 
of this institutional shift on the nature of distributive politics. In particular, on the strategic 
allocation of land in relation with the electoral cycle. The analysis relies on subnational 
data for over 1.100 municipalities between 1960 and 2014. For the analysis, the timing of 
elections is exogenous, as it is fixed and pre-determined by law. As will be further 
discussed, the timing of the institutional reform is also exogenous to land reform 
dynamics and to particular municipality traits.  
I find evidence of a political land cycle (PLC): the number of land allocations is 
systematically higher in electoral years relative to non-electoral ones. I further find that 
the PLC is dependent on the political institutions in place: its magnitude is reduced by 
half after the shift towards more inclusive institutions. Moreover, the reduction in the 
PLC is heterogeneous across space, being significantly larger in “core” municipalities, 
that is, municipalities located in central areas, in which initial institutions were more 
inclusive. I show that in these municipalities, initial institutional conditions enhanced, 
rather than limited effective institutional change. This result is consistent with previous 
studies showing that institutional change depends on the pre-existing institutional context 
(Clark and Ghandi, 2015; Haber and Menaldo, 2011; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 
2005; Heybey and Murrel, 1999).  
I analyse the underlying mechanisms that explain the post shift reduction in the PLC. The 
evidence points towards this being the result of a re-composition of distributive politics, 
from targeted private benefits (in this case, land) towards the strategic allocation of public 
                                                             
11 In this analysis I do not address other dimensions of state capacity, such as having the monopoly of 
violence or enforcing laws.  
12 As will be further discussed, the institutional reform did not specifically change land allocation rules. 
Furthermore, the reform was exogenous to particular municipality characteristics and to land specific 
dynamics. In this sense, it was exogenous.  
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goods. I show that while the post shift period saw a decrease in the PLC, there was an 
increase in the political cycle of spending on public goods13. I argue that this re-
composition of distributive politics away from particularistic goods and towards public 
goods, results from both incentive and capacity effects. The incentive effect derives from 
increases in political competition brought along by the introduction of multiparty 
competition. While one could expect political competition to overall increase distributive 
politics (i.e. elections become more threatening, increasing the need to mobilize voters 
via distributive politics), the effect most likely depends on the type of resource to be 
allocated. In particular, I argue that political competition weakens the incentives to 
mobilize voters via targeted private benefits (like land), which can only be allocated to a 
restricted group of voters; and in contrast, it strengthens the incentives to mobilize voters 
via strategic allocations of public goods, which appeal to a broader and more 
heterogeneous set of voters. This goes in line with the findings of Diaz-Cayeros, Stévez 
and Magaloni (2016) showing that political competition in Mexico lead to a 
“diversification of electoral investments” towards public goods. Consistent with the 
above, I show that the reduction in the PLC was significantly stronger in municipalities 
in which political competition14 increased the most.  
The incentives to mobilize voters via different types of resources should not only depend 
on political competition, but also on how responsive and accountable politicians are to 
the demands of voters, and on what these demands are. In the Colombian case, there is 
evidence that the institutional shift increased responsiveness and accountability of 
politicians to voter demands, which mainly consisted of improvements in public goods 
provision (Faguet and Sánchez, 2014). This occurred not only through the introduction 
of local elections, but also through the introduction of participatory democracy and the 
strengthening of executive constraints, which further increased political responsiveness 
and accountability. Consistent with the above, I show that the reduction in the PLC was 
stronger in municipalities in which the levels of accountability and transparency were 
higher15; that is, those in which the incentives to respond to voter demands to allocate 
public goods, were stronger. 
                                                             
13 Implying that spending on public goods is not determined by fully programmatic (i.e. non-discretionary 
and universal) criteria, but also by political ones. 
14 Measured as the Effective Number of Competing Parties (ENCP) 
15 I measure this through the index of accountability and transparency (from the Open Government Index 
of Attorney General´s office), which reflects the strength of the available mechanisms to strengthen state-
citizen relations and to reduce corruption 
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I argue that the re-composition of distributive politics towards public goods requires not 
only the incentives, but also the capacity (fiscal and bureaucratic) to do so. Public goods 
are more expensive and complex to provide than targeted private ones (e.g. building a 
hospital or school is more expensive and complex than signing a land title certificate). In 
the Colombian case, the institutional reform significantly increased fiscal resources 
(especially for public goods investments) as well as bureaucratic capacity (through 
training and technical assistance programs) (DNP, 2002). In line with the argument, I  
show that the decrease in the PLC was stronger in the municipalities which had a higher 
efficiency in public good provision16.   
The results in this paper are robust to alternative estimation strategies and model 
specifications, including different distributional assumptions, including time trends, 
additional controls and excluding outliers. Furthermore, I discard alternative explanations 
for the reduction in the PLC. I show that the reduction is not explained by increases in 
land dispossession associated to the escalation of the armed conflict (which could reduce 
the demand for land and the return of land patronage), or by negative economic shocks 
associated with the process of economic liberalization. I also discard the reduction being 
the result of resource exhaustion or of modifications in the land reform law. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it links the literature on 
distributive politics with that on institutions and development, showing that political 
cycles are dependent on how inclusive political institutions are. While previous studies 
show that political business and budget cycles are highly context dependent (Eibl and 
Lynde-Mangueira, 2017; Klomp and de Haan, 2013), most of these studies analyse cross-
country differences such as regime type or democratic maturity (Brender and Drazen, 
2003; Shi and Svensson, 2006; Mandon and Cazals, 2018), while fewer focus on within-
country variations in political institutions (Akmedov and Zhuavskaya, 2004; González, 
2002; Labonne, 2016). I further show that electoral cycles are conditional on local 
political institutions. Subnational analysis of distributive politics, such as the one carried 
out in this paper, generate stronger and deeper causal inferences, allowing to control for 
cultural, historical and macro institutional traits that complicate causal inference in cross 
country studies. 
                                                             
16 The efficiency measure comes from the Integral Performance Index of the National Planning 
Department (DNP), and refers to the provision of a maximum level of output (in health, education and 
public services) given a level of input. 
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Another contribution to the literature on distributive politics is specifying the incentive 
and capacity mechanisms that explain the transformation of voter mobilization strategies. 
As highlighted by Kroth, Larcinese and Wehner (2016), studies focusing only on changes 
in regime type (e.g. using dichotomous measures or composite indexes of democracy) are 
usually unable to identify the specific dimensions that account for the effects of interest. 
By analysing subnational level variations in political competition, accountability and 
fiscal and bureaucratic capacity, I am able to disentangle some of the mechanisms 
explaining the changes in distributive politics strategies. The results in this paper evidence 
the resilience of distributive politics, suggesting it is a more persistent practice than what 
expected based on the mature democracy (Brender and Drazen, 2003) or traditional 
modernization theories (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). The results are rather consistent 
with qualitative studies from the literature on clientelism, showing this can be an enduring 
feature of politics, persisting even in modern and democratic settings (Roniger, 2004).  
Another contribution of the paper is showing that the nature of distributive politics 
depends on the resource´s traits. While previous studies document how distributive 
politics strategies depend on contextual conditions; fewer focus on how particular 
characteristics of a resource shape them (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez and Magaloni, 2016; 
Albertus 2013). I develop an analytical framework based on three analytical categories 
(allocation type, costs and value) for analysing how a resource’s traits condition its 
political use. Relying on this framework, I characterize land as a patronage17 resource. In 
doing so, I contribute to the emerging literature on the political economy of land reform 
(Albertus et al, 2016; Albertus, 2015; Boone, 2009, 2010; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 
2010, Kopas, 2018). 
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on institutional change (Clark and Ghandi, 
2015; Haber and Menaldo, 2011; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005; Heybey and 
Murrel, 1999), by providing micro-level empirical evidence on how aggregate 
institutional changes spread across space conditioned by heterogeneity in pre-existing 
institutions, what leads to institutional divergence even within countries. 
The remaining of this article is structured as follows: the next section discusses the 
distributive politics of land. I then describe the setting, in particular, the Colombian land 
reform program and the nature of the institutional reform. The fourth section details the 
                                                             
17 Defined following Stokes (2009), as the proffering of public resources while in office, in exchange for 
electoral support 
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methodological approach and the fifth section discusses the results. Section six presents 
the robustness tests, and section seven examines alternative explanations. The last section 
concludes. 
1.2 The distributive politics of land 
Access to land (and thus, land reform) is key for rural development: it has a positive 
impact on income (Keswell & Carter, 2014), productivity (Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak, 
2002) intergenerational mobility (Galán, 2018), poverty (Besley and Burgess, 2000; 
Faguet, Sánchez and Villaveces, 2018) and inequality (Besley, Leight, Pande, and Rao, 
2013). In addition to being a valuable resource in an economic sense, land also has a 
social value. Thiesenhusen (1995) states for instance, that access to land grants status and 
builds peasant identity. This paper focuses on another value of land: its political value.  
Before discussing the empirical evidence on the use of land as a political asset, it is worth 
reflecting on the specific characteristics of land, and how these determine the potential 
cost and benefits of using it a patronage resource. The literature on distributive politics 
has analysed how contextual characteristics condition the political usage of a resource, 
but has given less attention to how the specific traits of a resource condition it. Albertus 
(2013) analyses, for instance, differences based on how reversible a transfer is and on the 
potential long-term benefits it can generate to the recipient. Drazen and Eslava (2010) 
study differences in how visible a resource is. 
Despite the above, there has not been a systematic analysis of how a resource’s traits 
determine the cost and benefits of its political usage. To this end I elaborate a conceptual 
framework based on analytical categories (allocation type, costs and value), which 
synthetizes discussions from the distributive politics literature, and adds to them. This 
framework can be used to characterize any type of patronage resource. In Table 1.1, I 
characterize land.  
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Table 1.1 Land as a patronage resource 
Allocation 
type  
Type of good:  Private - particularistic. Land is a rivalrous and excludable good, granted to a particular individual (rather than to a certain group 
of individuals or geographic constituency). 
Visibility: Low. The allocation is only visible to the individual recipient. As a result, voting spillovers are potentially low (relative to for example, 
the allocation of a school, which is visible to the whole community). 
Discretionality. High. Rules of who is subject of receiving land are usually discretionary. When there are formal allocating criteria (e.g. being 
landless), these are set subjectively, and can be by-passed by bureaucrats or politicians.  
Constraints: Medium. There are no formal constraints on land allocations, in contrast to for instance, fiscal rules constraining public spending. 
However, there is a physical constraint: the geographical stock of land.  
Durability: Permanent. A land title does not run out, in contrast to for example, a cash transfer or credit allocation. 
Reversibility: Non-reversible (in contexts of secure property rights), in contrast to for example, a job. 
Signal potential: Unclear. The competence signal (Rogoff, 1990) of allocating land is weaker than that of more complex allocations (e.g. building 
a road). The preference signal (Drazen and Eslava, 2010) is not clear, as allocating land could signal right wing preferences (e.g. granting property 
rights) or left wing ones (e.g. redistribution). 
Cost Fiscal: Low for distributive land reform (i.e. allocating public vacant land). Redistributive land reforms which do not require buying land but 
rather expropriating it, also have a low fiscal cost. Note that because of the small impact on budget deficit, the punishment from fiscal conservative 
voters (Brender and Drazen, 2005) should be low. The administrative process can entail a fiscal cost, albeit low.  
Economic: Low. Distributive land reform should not entail economic costs, as land is to be used for productive purposes. As such, there is no 
disruption of production, as in the case of redistributive land reforms, in which there can be a reduction in production or productivity from 
relocating land from large landholdings in favour of small ones (Albertus et al. 2016). 
Political: Low. Distributive land reform does not entail politically costly measures such as expropriation. 
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Value 
Economic: High. Land is the main productive asset for agriculture, increasing productivity and income (Keswell and Carter, 2014; Banerjee, 
Gertler and Ghatak, 2002). Moreover, its value tends to appreciate over time.  
Social: High. Access to land entails a payoff in terms of peasant identity and peasant mobilizatio (Thiesenhusen, 1995) 
Political (for the politician): Potentially high 
- Turnout: Possible increase. Accessing property rights increases turnout through a “symbolic effect” of rights recognition that legitimizes 
claim-making and engagement in politics (conditional on weak presence of state) (Kopas, 2018). 
- Ideological position shift: Possible. There is evidence of voter shift to the right in Mexican land beneficiaries (De Janvry et al. 2014), as 
access to property right is associated with pro-market behaviour.  
- Reciprocity: Unclear. Land allocations are a one-off permanent transfer which can lead to a credible commitment problem (the voter not 
voting for the party in future elections). However, given the high value it generates for the recipient, and its durability, land could generate 
a strong and lasting commitment. Moreover, reciprocity can be achieved and sustained through provisions of complementary services (like 
credit, Albertus et al. 2016), or through a “credible punishment” strategy, in which there is a threat of taking land away.   
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The above characterization evidences the attractiveness of land as a patronage resource: 
it is highly valued by voters and it has a low allocation cost (it is easy to target and to 
distribute). However, land allocations face physical limits, and a credible commitment 
problem. Given these opposing traits, it is not obvious whether land allocations can be 
used or not for distributive politics.  
Previous studies show, however, that land is granted following political interests. For 
instance, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2010) show that land allocations in West Bengal are 
affected by the electoral cycle; and Albertus, Magaloni, Weingast and Diaz-Cayeros 
(2016) show the analogous for the case of Mexico. Other studies provide evidence on the 
strategic allocation of land based on partisanship. Albertus (2015a and 2015b) shows that 
land was strategically allocated to core supporters during military autocracies in 
Venezuela and Chile. There is also evidence of land being used for rewarding Magube´s 
supporters in Zimbabwe (Boone and Kriger, 2010) and of land being used for patronage 
in Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Boone, 2009; Boone, 
2011). I now discuss the relation between land and politics in the Colombian case. 
1.3 Setting 
1.3.1 Land and politics in Colombia 
Land reform in Colombia has mainly consisted of public land distribution. During the last 
century, the national government allocated over 23 million Hectares of public vacant 
lands (baldíos) to farmers18, what represents almost 40% of the country’s productive land. 
The allocations aimed at expanding the agricultural frontier and at reducing poverty as 
well as social tensions resulting from land grievances. This paper analyses another 
relevant, yet understudied, purpose of land reform: cultivating political support.  
Figure 1.1 shows the dynamics of land allocations throughout the study period (1960-
2014), evidencing a high variance throughout time, and a coincidence of allocation peaks 
and electoral years (marked on the x-axis).  
                                                             
18 Redistributive land reform has been marginal, as elites have been able to block initiatives posing threats 
to the existent land tenure (Le Grand, 1988; Zamosc, 1986; Machado, 2012; Albertus and Kaplan, 2012). 
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Figure 1.1 Number of land allocations across time 
 
Source: Incoder.   
Variations in land allocations come from both the demand and supply sides. The program 
is in principle demand-driven: a person goes to the regional office of the land agency19 to 
request the formal allocation (i.e. the land title, which is a one-off permanent transfer) of 
a plot of public vacant land. The supply effect comes from the agency having 
discretionary power to determine whether or not to allocate the requested land. This 
decision is taken by a regional committee with representatives from the land agency and 
from peasant organizations in the country, and is then validated by the national office of 
the land agency (Albertus, 2019). In theory, this decision should be made according to 
fixed and public rules established in the land reform law; in practice, political 
considerations can relegate these distributional rules. For example, in an effort to make 
allocation criteria stricter, Law 160 of 1994 determined that land could only be granted 
to poor landless peasants, and established a maximum size of land to be allocated in each 
area of the country. However, a recent study showed these criteria are often not met, partly 
due to a lack of technical capacity and partly due to a lack of political will (Proyectamos 
Colombia, 2015). Deininger (1999) states that the selection of beneficiaries of the 
Colombian land program has often been arbitrary and ad hoc, de facto being based on 
political pressure. 
Hundreds of disciplinary processes have taken place due to corruption in land allocations, 
and dozens of bureaucrats have been sanctioned for illegally allocating baldíos to 
                                                             
19 Currently Agencia Nacional de Tierras, previously Incoder and previously Incora. 
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individuals with no rights to receive them, including political cronies, paramilitaries, 
enterprises and large landowners (Procuraduría General de la Nación, 2015).  
Another source of discretion in land allocations comes from their timing. The land agency 
decides how long an approval process takes (it can take up to two years, Proyectamos, 
2015). It also decides when and in which areas to promote the program and to focalize its 
limited bureaucratic capacity (e.g. through titling campaigns). As a recent evaluation 
shows, about a quarter of the land requests are the consequence of politicians or public 
officials motivating people to do so (Proyectamos, 2015)20.  
The political interference on land allocations is facilitated by the operational structure of 
the land agency, and in particular, by how regional managers are appointed21. These are 
appointed by the national office, based on a short list of candidates proposed by local 
politicians. As mentioned by an expert in land reform interviewed22 for this paper: 
“clearly the Governor is not going to carry out written tests, he is going to name those 
who granted him votes”. To which he added “indeed, a gamonal, a landowner, could 
colonize some (public vacant) land, exploit it and then go to the regional manager, who 
was probably his friend, and he gave the title to him (…) clearly there is a direct 
relationship between elections and political issues, and the granting of public lands”.  
This statement is consistent with what land experts in Colombia have long denounced23. 
Machado (2001), for instance, asserts that the least favoured by land reform in Colombia 
have been peasants, as it has rather benefited rich landowners, as well as “innumerable 
public officials cowering in corrupt practices and cronyism, as well as the political class 
in many regions”. Recent evidence shows how the well organized and politically 
connected “agrarian bourgeoisie” has been the presumptive winner of the baldío 
allocation program in Colombia (Albertus, 2019). The work of Saffon (2015) also 
highlights how large landowners have leveraged their political power to obtain public 
                                                             
20 Albertus and Kaplan (2012) also mention that the regional focalization of land reform efforts was also 
affected by decisions taken in the Agrarian Reform Committee, in which landed elites and even 
congressmen participated.  
21 Referring to regional managers of Incoder. It is also worth noting that elite capture of land titling 
programs can also occur for other reasons. For example, Sitko, Chamberlin and Hichaambwa´s (2014) 
study of Zambia argues that land titling not only favours individuals with direct relations with the state, 
but also those with “the knowledge and economic capacity to navigate complex and convoluted 
bureaucratic systems”.   
22 The interviewee requested to remain anonymous. Interview carried out in Bogotá – July 2016. 
23 It is also consistent with investigations showing, for instance that Incoder´s bureaucracy was granted as 
quotas to local politicians involved in parapolítica in different areas of the country (Mondragón, 2008, 
Procuraduría General de la Nación, 2015). 
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lands since the mid-19th century. As Mondragon (2001) concludes “land reform is linked 
indissolubly to patronage, trafficking of votes and violence”.  
As will be further discussed in the next subsection, during the period of study, the 
ideological platforms across political parties were similar and even coordinated, and party 
structures have significantly weakened throughout time. As such, in this context, the 
political land cycle is not expected to be solely existent under one party or another. This 
is specially so as the land reform program has a distributive rather than a re-distributive 
nature, lessening ideological concerns. In West Bengal, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2010) 
show similar evidence, discarding a relation between pre-electoral land allocations and 
the control of left parties. 
1.3.2 Political institutions in Colombia  
Political institutions changed profoundly during the period analysed in this paper (1960-
2015). The drafting of a new Constitution in 1991 consolidated a process of political 
reform that made institutions more inclusive. Before this shift, political power was 
narrowly distributed. There was a closed bipartisan system ruled by the hegemonic 
Liberal and Conservative parties. These two parties even established a formal power 
sharing agreement (the National Front, NF), which consisted of the alternation of 
presidential power every four years and of an equal division of parliamentary seats, 
ministerial posts and the judiciary24. The NF was formally in place between 1958 and 
1974, although de facto, many of its practices remained in place for years; for instance, 
partisan parity was extended until 1978 and was practiced informally until 1986 (Bejarano 
and Pizarro, 2005).  
Power was not only narrowly distributed across political parties, but also, and more 
generally, across society. The Colombian system was a restricted representative 
democracy with few direct participation mechanisms25. Power was also narrowly 
distributed across branches of government: the executive concentrated power, among 
others, appointing justices and ruling by decree and under a state of siege26. There was 
                                                             
24 During the NF, political competition was restricted, but it existed: anti-National Front candidates did 
run, albeit obtaining marginal vote shares, except in 1970 when an anti-National Front candidate (Gustavo 
Rojas Pinilla) nearly won the elections. Distributive politics remained relevant for this intraparty 
competition, and also as a strategy to assure legitimacy in a low turnout context (Galindo-Silva, 2015). 
25 Participation mainly took place through formal party structures, or informally through protest 
26 Or emergency/exceptional state, which conferred the President extra powers, for instance putting 
constitutional rules on stand-by. Palacios (1995) documents its systematic use and the authoritarian 
repercussions it had.  
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also a high concentration of power across levels of government, in a highly centralized 
system in which the elected president named governors, who in turn, named mayors.  
In addition to political centralization, there was a high degree of fiscal centralization: the 
central government controlled most of the public budget. Finally, the Colombian state 
had an overall weak capacity, especially regarding the provision of public goods. As an 
illustration, school enrolment rate was 41%, and health coverage in rural areas was lower 
than 10%.  
The institutional shift  
The beginning of the 1990s saw a profound institutional change; one of the few deep 
shifts in power the country has ever experienced (Robinson, 2016)27.The drafting of a 
new constitution consolidated a shift towards more inclusive institutions, following a 
process of political opening and decentralization that began shortly before28. The demand 
for a change was generalized and broad. There was a national consensus regarding the 
need of a profound institutional change leading to the opening of democracy, the creation 
of a more inclusive economic model, the strengthening of public institutions and the 
resolution of the armed conflict (Serpa, 2013). The claim for change was strengthened by 
a massive student movement (Séptima Papeleta) and by the peace negotiations held at 
the time with guerrilla groups, especially with the urban guerrilla M-19, which explicitly 
pressured for institutional changes during the peace negotiations, including the drafting 
of a new constitution. 
Overall, the demand for change was nationwide, being exogenous to particular 
municipality dynamics. The demand for change was also exogenous to land issues or to 
peasant/rural specific claims. Furthermore, the new constitution and its associated laws 
did not directly modify land allocation rules. For instance, of the 380 new constitutional 
articles, only one (Article 64) relates to land, corresponding to a broad declaration of the 
responsibility of the state in providing peasants progressive access to land and other 
services in order to improve their quality of life. I now discuss the main components of 
the institutional shift. 
                                                             
27 While fiscal and administrative state capacity increased, the coercive capacity of the State did not. Note 
that the reforms did not materialize homogeneously throughout the country. As Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2016) mention, Colombia remained in some ways, a “paper Leviathan”, unable to exercise complete and 
effective power over all of its citizens across all of its territory. 
28 With the expansion of local fiscal powers and the introduction of local elections, held for the first time 
in 1988.  
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Broadening the distribution of power across political parties 
The new constitutional framework broadened the horizontal distribution of power. 
Multiparty competition was established through an open electoral system with few 
institutional barriers to entering the political competition (e.g. reducing the requirements 
for the creation of new parties, Bejarano and Pizarro, 2005). Furthermore, candidates 
were allowed to run for office without the support of a party, and partial public financing 
was introduced for campaigns and for the operation of parties. These reforms significantly 
increased political competition. For instance, the number of parties more than tripled 
between 1990 and 199829. 
Broadening the distribution of power across societal actors 
In a more general sense, the distribution of power across societal actors was broadened. 
There was a shift from a restricted representative democracy, to a participatory one. Direct 
participation mechanisms were introduced, including referendums, popular consultations, 
revocation of mandate, open town meetings, municipal planning councils and Local 
Administrative Juntas. These mechanisms aimed at strengthening civic political 
participation and at increasing political accountability.  
Broadening the distribution of power across levels of government 
The shift also broadened the vertical distribution of power, specifically across levels of 
government. This was done through the introduction of mayoral and governor elections30. 
Political decentralization was accompanied by fiscal and administrative decentralization, 
a process in which local governments gained responsibilities, especially regarding the 
provision of public goods.  
Broadening the distribution of power across branches of government 
The reforms also broadened the distribution of power across branches of government. 
Checks and balances to constrain the power of the president were strengthened. Among 
others, a strong and independent Constitutional Court was created, and judicial oversight 
                                                             
29 From less than 4 to almost 20. Estimations based on Base electoral CEDE 
30 The first mayoral elections were held in 1988 for a period of two years. The period was extended to 
three years in 1991 and to four years in 2004. Governor elections were held for the first time in 1992.   
 
39 
 
and the role of Congress were strengthened (one example was reducing the majority 
required to override executive economic bills) (Cárdenas, Junguito and Pachón, 2008).   
Increasing the capacity of the state 
The second component of the shift towards more inclusive institutions was increasing 
state state, especially its fiscal and bureaucratic capacity to provide public goods. The 
reforms aimed at increasing expenditure responsibilities and fiscal resources, as well as 
at reducing vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances through fiscal decentralization and 
through increases in intragovernmental transfers that would enable improvements in 
public goods provision. Total public investment doubled between 1993 and 199831. The 
increase in fiscal capacity was accompanied with an increase in administrative capacity. 
Local governments received training and technical assistance (DNP, 2002), and stricter 
procedures of meritocratic recruitment and promotion of civil servants were introduced 
(Cárdenas, Junguito and Pachón, 2008). The reforms not only increased fiscal and 
bureaucratic capacity, but also established how resources were to be employed, 
determining that a certain share of public income had to be destined to public services 
including education, health and housing.  
These reforms allowed public service delivery to rapidly and effectively improve: health 
coverage in rural areas increased from 10% to 70% between 1992 and 2011, and school 
enrolment rate raised from 41% in 1986 to 88% in 2011. The next figures evidence the 
sharp and rapid changes that took place.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
31 Partly due to a re-composition of spending away from infrastructure and direct subsidies. 
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Figure 1.2 Total public investment 
Real thousand million COP 
 
 
Source: DNP. Confis. Modelo de neteo DAF – Umacro. 
 
Figure 1.3 School enrolment rate 
 
 
Source: DNP and Ministry of Education, DANE. Rate estimated based on total population, as 
information on population per age groups is not available 
 
 
0
5
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
2
5
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002
.2
.2
2
.2
4
.2
6
.2
8
.3
1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
41 
 
1.4 Estimation Strategy 
In order to identify how electoral interests (in particular, the timing of elections) affect 
the allocation of land, I estimate Equation 1.1: 
𝐿𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 = 𝑓( 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐸𝑡  +   𝛽2 𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑆𝑡  +   𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡)  Eq. 1.1 
𝐿𝑇 is the number of land titles allocated in municipality i in period t (the size dimension 
of land allocations is addressed in the additional results section in the Annex). Data on 
land titles comes from Incoder and covers the period 1960-2015. The variable of interest 
is 𝐸𝑡, an electoral dummy that allows us to identify if land allocations are systematically 
higher in electoral years relative to non-electoral ones. 𝐸𝑡 takes the value of one a year 
prior to elections. Profiting from the monthly frequency of the data, 𝐸𝑡  is defined relative 
to the month during which presidential elections are held (May)32, that is, the panel is 
built based on electoral years (May to April), rather than on calendar ones. As Labonne 
(2016) and Akmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) show, high frequency data allows for a 
cleaner identification of the political cycle, constituting an advantage of this paper relative 
to most studies employing calendar and yearly data.   
The electoral dummy (Et) is exogenous, as the timing of elections is fixed and pre-
determined by law. Note that the analysis focuses on elections for the executive 
(presidential races). This takes into account that the land allocations are carried out 
through a national program and thus, strategic considerations likely mainly respond to the 
national executive´s political interests. It is less probable that legislative elections affect  
land allocation dynamics; nonetheless, if this was the case, these elections take place a 
couple of months before presidential ones, and thus the electoral dummy would capture 
both effects. Now, despite the program being national, local elections could also affect 
land allocations. This effect would not be captured by 𝐸𝑡, as local elections have an 
independent electoral calendar (they take place in the middle of the presidential term). 
The above is addressed in the robustness tests section, in which a separate estimation for 
the local PLC is carried out.  
In order to analyse how the institutional shift affected the PLC, 𝐸𝑡 is interacted with a 
post shift dummy (𝑃𝑆𝑡)33. As discussed earlier, the shift was exogenous to land allocation 
                                                             
32 A couple of races took place a month prior or after May.  
33 As mentioned before, the shift towards more inclusive institutions began briefly before the new 
constitution, which consolidated and formalized the institutional change. To account for the first changes, 
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dynamics: it did not respond to land-related or rural-related specific claims, nor to specific 
traits of any particular municipality. This makes 𝑃𝑆𝑡 an exogenous variable
34.  
Equation 1 controls for a set (X) of municipality time-varying characteristics that can 
affect LT, including lagged population and rainfall shocks35. Additional covariates are 
included as a robustness test (for a subset of years for which additional information is 
available). The equation also includes a municipality fixed effect (𝜇𝑖) which captures time 
invariant observed and unobserved characteristics that affect LT (e.g. geographic 
characteristics like area and altitude). It also controls for fixed variables such as historic 
land conflicts and the average age of land titles granted before the 1961 land reform law, 
which as shown in Sánchez and Villaveces (2016), are determinants of land allocations 
in Colombia. The municipality fixed effect also controls for variables which vary slightly 
over time, such as land quality, inequality and geographical variations in political 
preferences. A year fixed effect (𝛿𝑡) is also included, capturing changes that occur during 
a given period and affect all municipalities, for instance, the macroeconomic cycle. The 
last term in the equation is the error (𝑒𝑖,𝑡), clustered at the municipality level in order to 
control for potential serial and spatial correlation36. Descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 1.A2 in the Annex. 
The model is estimated through a conditional fixed effect Poisson regression, as the 
number of LT allocated in municipality i during period t is a count variable (i.e. non-
negative and integer), and is censored at zero (as not all municipalities receive land titles 
in every period)37. 
                                                             
PS is defined as post 1988, the year during which local elections were introduced. Results are robust when 
defining PS as post 1991. 
34 Institutional changes are not exogenous on aggregate, as they depend on initial institutional conditions, 
as will be further discussed, and as it is discussed in theories of This relates as well with theories of 
endogenous institutional change (Przeowrski, 2015). However, in this case, the institutional change was 
exogenous to particular municipality land dynamics.  
35 This variable is constructed based on deviations from historical month-municipality average rain levels, 
relying on IDEAM data. 
36 Serial correlation and other time structure issues are addressed in the robustness test section, 
estimating models including a lagged dependent variable and time trends. 
37 Estimation through a Negative Binomial yields robust results, as discussed in the robustness tests 
section.  
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1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Main results 
The main results are presented in Table 1.2. They show that the allocation of land is 
affected by political considerations, in particular, by the timing of elections. The number 
of land allocations is systematically higher in electoral years relative to non-electoral 
ones; that is, there is a political land cycle. Furthermore, this cycle is dependent on the 
political institutions in place: its magnitude is reduced by half after the institutional shift 
(the Incidence Rate Ratio38 drops from 8.8 to 4.3). The results are robust to the inclusion 
of controls (Column 2). 
Table 1.2 - The Political Land Cycle 
Dependent Variable: Number of Land Titles allocated (LT) 
  (1) (2) 
Pre Electoral year (E) 2.099*** 2.173*** 
 [0.140] [0.141] 
E* Post Shift -0.723** -0.708** 
  [0.176] [0.178] 
Log-Likelihood -528826.96  -516351.34  
Observations  56,430 55,510 
Number of Municipalities 1,026 1,025 
Municipality FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Municipal Controls NO YES 
Mean Land Titles 8.234 8.234 
Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect Poisson model. Robust standard errors in 
brackets.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include lagged population and lagged 
rainfall shocks.  
 
The finding that the PLC weakens after the shift towards more inclusive institutions is 
consistent with the literature on distributive politics, showing that the politically 
motivated allocation of resources is weaker in contexts of mature democracies (Brender 
and Drazen, 2003; Mandon and Cazals, 2018; Akmedov and Zhuavskaya, 2004) and of 
mature bureaucracies (Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci, 2017). 
 
                                                             
38 IRR for a Poisson models is the exponential of the coefficient. In this case, it indicates how many times 
larger the number of land allocations is in electoral years relative to non-electoral ones.  
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1.5.2 Heterogeneous effects: Initial institutions and institutional change 
 
I now analyse whether the effect of the institutional shift (which was a national level 
reform) was heterogeneous across municipalities with different initial institutional 
conditions. I build on the institutional literature positing that institutional changes do not 
act in a vacuum, but interact with the pre-existing institutional context (Clark and Ghandi, 
2015; Haber and Menaldo, 2011; Heybey and Murrel, 1999), and more specifically, by 
how inclusive initial institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005). 
 
I analyse heterogeneity in initial institutions at the subnational level. To this end, I build 
on Fergusson et al.´s (2017) study of Colombia, discussing the existence of two types 
municipalities with structurally different institutional traits: core municipalities (or 
central areas) have more inclusive institutions, whereas periphery municipalities (or 
isolated areas), have less inclusive ones39. Core and periphery municipalities can be 
identified through different approaches. Montenegro-Helfer (2017) focuses on population 
density (i.e. disperse isolated areas have small populations), while Fergusson et al. (2017) 
rely on poverty, displacement and other socioeconomic data, as periphery municipalities 
lag on these traits. 
 
I identify the core and the periphery directly analysing the location of municipalities. I 
define core municipalities as those located close to department capitals (at a distance 
shorter than the within department average). This definition can be understood as a 
measure of exposure to inclusive institutions, which are centralized in capital cities (i.e. 
public agencies, central police offices, central markets, etc. are located there). These 
institutions do not always have a reach on faraway areas, especially considering the 
Colombian geography and the precarious road infrastructure. This approach is consistent 
with Robinson´s (2016) argument regarding the fractal nature of the periphery in 
Colombia, where there is not just one core and one periphery, but rather many cores and 
many peripheries throughout the territory.  
To illustrate differences in initial institutions, I run difference in means tests between core 
and periphery municipalities for various variables. To measure how broad the initial 
division of political power was, I analyse differences in the Effective Number of 
                                                             
39 The core-periphery contrast relates to Gibson´s (2013) theory of subnational authoritarianisms, 
highlighting how in developing countries, it is common to find a coexistence of regimes (norms, rules and 
practices) within the same territory. 
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Competing Parties (ENCP)40, as well as in the share of municipalities in which the anti-
bipartisan political party ANAPO won the presidential elections of 197041. I measure 
initial fiscal capacity as initial property tax revenues, and initial bureaucratic capacity for 
public good provision as initial school enrolment rates. I also measure state capacity 
through a historical variable indicating the presence of Spanish colonial settlements, 
which as Fergusson et al. (2017) show, proxies for state capacity as the location of the 
Colombian state follows path dependency from the colonial one. A final measure is an 
indicator of bipartisan violence during La Violencia period, relating to coercive capacity. 
The results on Table 1.3 show that core municipalities had more inclusive initial 
institutions, under all of the analysed dimensions.  
Table 1.3 Differences in initial institutions – Periphery and Core 
    Periphery Core  Difference 
Distribution  
of political 
power 
Effective Number of Competing Parties (ENCP) 1.677 1.738 *** 
Strong political competition (Anapo- 1970) (% 
mun.)  
42.5 47.5 *** 
State 
capacity 
Property tax revenue (1964) 3.734 4.571 ** 
School enrolment rate (1964) 31.85 35.01 *** 
Spanish colonial settlement 1500s (% mun.)  34.14 38.8 *** 
 Bipartisan violence (1948-1953) (% mun.)  19.5 8.4 *** 
Others 
Population  11,172 16,715 *** 
Distance to Department capital  126 63.4 *** 
  No. Municipalities  499  619    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Information on property tax revenue and school enrolment rate in 1964 
was provided by Orduz (2019), digitized from the 1964 national census. ENCP and population averaged 
during the pre-shift period, with information from CEDE. Spanish colonial settlements is a dummy 
indicating whether there was a colonial settlement in the 1500s, and bipartisan violence is a dummy 
indicating whether there was political violence during the period of La Violencia. Information on both 
variables comes from the municipal panel of CEDE. Distance to department capital also published in the 
municipal panel of CEDE 
 
I now analyse how initial institutions condition institutional change. I estimate a Probit 
model for the likelihood of a municipality experiencing a strong response to the national 
level institutional shift. I focus on two aspects: a strong (stronger than average) increase 
in political competition and a strong increase in social spending. The results on Table 1.4 
show that being a core municipality (i.e. having more inclusive initial institutions) 
                                                             
40 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑃𝑖 =
1
∑ 𝑃𝑖
2𝐾
𝑘¿1
 where 𝑃 𝑖s the vote share of each party. Estimated for the pre-shift period. 
41 These were the only elections in which third party competition was meaningful during the pre-shift 
period 
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increases the likelihood of experiencing a strong increase in political competition and a 
strong increase in social spending. The results further evidence that this compound 
measure of institutional inclusiveness is more important than independent measures of 
initial political competition or initial state capacity. 
Table 1.4 Likelihood of experiencing a strong response to the national shift 
Dependent variable: Likelihood of  
 
High increase in 
political 
competition 
(1) 
High increase 
in social 
spending 
(2) 
Core municipality 0.242*** 0.057* 
  [0.033] [0.034] 
Strong political competition (Anapo- 1970) 0.042 -0.005 
 [0.034] [0.033] 
Bipartisan violence (1948-1953) 0.045 0.038 
  [0.049] [0.048] 
Spanish colonial settlement (1500s) 0.025 -0.090*** 
 [0.034] [0.034] 
Log-Likelihood -618.19544 -636.06445    
Observations 932 926 
Regressions estimated through a Probit model. Robust standard errors in brackets.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Information from Panel Municipal CEDE and base electoral CEDE. Strong political competition 
is a dummy that indicates whether the third party ANAPO had a higher than average vote share in the 1970 
elections. Spanish colonial settlements is a dummy indicating whether there was a colonial settlement in 
the 1500s. This is a proxy for state capacity. Bipartisan violence is a dummy that takes the value of one if 
there was violence during La Violencia period.  
 
These results evidence how initial institutions condition effective institutional change: 
where initial institutions were more inclusive (the core), institutional change was 
enhanced; and where they were less inclusive (the periphery), institutional change was 
limited42. These findings are consistent with those of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2005), showing that institutional change (related to the protection of private property) 
derived from transatlantic trade in imperial Europe was stronger in countries in which 
initial institutions were more inclusive (measured as those in which initial checks and 
balances on the monarchy were stronger). 
                                                             
42 This is consistent with Fergusson et al.´s (2017) work highlighting how Colombian elites have few 
incentives to launch real state-building projects in the periphery, as preserving its backwardness is 
instrumental: it allows to continue with the extraction of political and economic rents.  
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Following a similar line of argument, I now show that the effect of the institutional shift 
on the PLC was stronger in core municipalities. To this end, I estimate the PLC separately 
for core and periphery municipalities. Estimating political cycles on subsamples is a 
common approach in the literature (Eible and Lynge-Mangueira, 2017; Labonne, 2016; 
Efthyvoulou, 2012; Shi and Svenson, 2006). In this case, it is preferred to the alternative 
of including triple interactions which make interpretation difficult and introduce problems 
of multicolinearity (e.g. five sets of interactions in one sole equation).  
The results, presented on Table 1.5, evidence that the pre-shift PLC was smaller in the 
core (i.e. areas with more inclusive institutions), and that the post-shift reduction in the 
PLC was stronger; that is, where the institutional shift acted more strongly, the reduction 
in the PLC was stronger. The E*Post Shift coefficients are statistically different in both 
subsamples 43.   
Table 1.5 The PLC – Municipalities in the periphery and the core 
Dependent Variable: Number of Land Titles allocated (LT) 
  Periphery Core 
Pre Electoral year (E) 2.537*** 1.936*** 
 [0.186] [0.193] 
E* Post Shift -0.509* -0.857*** 
  [0.285] [0.186] 
Log-Likelihood -284663.82 -226304.59 
Observations 24,563 30,947 
Number of Municipalities 453 572 
Municipality and year FE YES YES 
Municipal Controls YES YES 
Test of coefficient equality (E*Post shift) – P-value 0.061 
Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect Poisson model. Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include lagged population and lagged rainfall shocks. 
Post shift IRR is 2.9 in the core vs. 7.6 in the periphery. 
 
 
 
                                                             
43 The results are the same when using an alternative measure of core municipalities: those located at a 
distance from Bogota below the national mean. Results estimated separately for each region are also 
consistent with the core – periphery hypothesis. The reduction in the PLC is significant in central areas of 
the country (Andean and Orinoquia) but is not significant in the periphery (Caribbean, the Pacific and the 
Amazon).   
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1.5.3 Mechanisms: the re-composition of distributive politics  
 
I now explore the mechanisms that explain the reduction in the political land cycle. I focus 
on both the incentives and the capacity of politicians to mobilize voters via strategic 
allocations of different resources. The results point towards the reduction in the PLC 
being the result of a re-composition of distributive politics: from the strategic allocation 
of targeted private benefits (in this case, land), to the strategic allocation of public goods. 
I argue that before the shift, when political power was narrowly distributed and state 
capacity was weak, it was efficient to mobilize voters relying on patronage networks to 
allocate small numbers of targeted private benefits, and in particular, land, which as 
previously discussed, is easy and cheap to target and allocate, and is highly valued by 
voters. I argue that this equilibrium was modified after the institutional shift, which 
generated both the incentives and the capacity to re-compose voter mobilization 
strategies, orienting them less towards targeted private benefits, and more towards public 
goods44.  
Stronger incentives to mobilize voters via public goods 
As previously mentioned, one of the most significant changes derived from the 
institutional reform was the introduction of a multiparty system, which significantly 
increased political competition45. The relation between political competition and 
distributive politics is not straightforward. One could expect political competition to 
strengthen distributive politics: if elections become more threatening, there are stronger 
incentives to strategically allocate resources seeking electoral support.  
However, this effect most likely depends on the type of resource to be allocated. More 
specifically, I posit that political competition should increase the incentives to mobilize 
voters via the strategic allocation of public goods, rather than through targeting private 
benefits like land. This argument is in line with that of Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and 
Stévez (2016), who show that increases in political competition in Mexico led to a 
“diversification of electoral investments” towards public goods. The authors argue that 
when a party´s core base of support is not sufficient to win elections (as in contexts of 
                                                             
44 This does not imply that land and public goods are substitute goods (e.g. allocating more land implies 
allocating less public goods), but rather that because of changes in incentives and capacities, voter 
mobilization strategies shift towards certain resources and away from others.  
45 On average, the Effective Number of Competing Parties (ENCP) increased from 1.712 to 2.463.  
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strong political competition), politicians have incentives to mobilize support from other 
groups of voters (with varying political preferences), what is more easily done through 
investments in public goods, which appeal to a broader and more heterogeneous set of 
voters. Furthermore, in competitive systems with a large number of political parties, the 
coordination costs of allocating targeted private benefits through patronage networks and 
political intermediaries can increase (as the demand for them increases, de Haan and 
Klomp, 2013). This constitutes another relative advantage of allocating public goods 
rather than private ones. 
Evidence for the Colombian case is consistent with the above. For instance, Sánchez and 
Pachón (2013) show that increases in political competition have a positive impact on 
public service provision. More broadly, this argument is consistent with studies showing 
that democracy increases public good provision and expenditure (Kroth, Larcinese and 
Wehner, 2016; Min, 2015; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). It is worth discussing the 
opposing findings of Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004). The authors find that localities in 
India in which elections can be won with a narrower margin (i.e. where there is multiparty 
competition) politicians favour private benefits rather than public goods. This differs from 
the Colombian case, in which to win presidential elections, cross-cleavage coalitions are 
often needed. In any case, as Ferguson, Larreguy and Riaño (2018) mention, the relation 
between political competition and public good provision is plausibly non-monotonic. 
In order to analyse the relation between political competition and the distributive politics 
of land, I estimate the PLC on two sets of municipalities: those which experienced a low 
(below average) increase in political competition, and those which experienced a high 
one. Increases in political competition are measured as the difference between the post 
and pre shift average Effective Number of Competing Parties, based on data from the 
electoral database of CEDE. Note that this analysis separates the sample based on 
outcomes of the institutional reform. While this generates problems for identifying causal 
links, in this case the aim is precisely to illustrate differential effects of the reform, seeking 
to illuminate the mechanisms acting. 
Table 1.6 presents the results. Consistent with the aforementioned argument, they 
evidence that the reduction in the PLC is stronger in the municipalities that experienced 
a high increase in political competition; that is, those with stronger incentives for re-
composing voter mobilization strategies away from targeted private goods and towards 
public ones. The post-shift coefficients in both samples are statistically different. 
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Table 1.6 The PLC – Municipalities with a low and high increase in political 
competition 
Dependent Variable: Number of Land Titles allocated (LT) 
 Increase in political competition 
Low  
(1) 
High 
 (2) 
Pre Electoral year (E) 2.047*** 2.251*** 
 [0.206] [0.197] 
E* Post Shift -0.709*** -1.136*** 
  [0.190] [0.259] 
Log-Likelihood 
-
248628.12  -231831.92   
Observations  26,147 25,273 
Number of Municipalities 481 466 
Municipality and year FE YES YES 
Municipal Controls YES YES 
Test of coefficient equality (E*Post shift) – P-value 0.089 
Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect Poisson model. Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include lagged population and lagged rainfall shocks. 
The post shift Incidence Rate Ratios are 0.95 and 0.85. 
 
 
There are additional traits of political institutions likely affecting the incentives to 
strategically allocate certain type of resources. In particular, incentives should be affected 
by how responsive and accountable politicians are to the demand of voters, and on what 
these demands are. Both political responsiveness and accountability improved after the 
institutional reform. First, through the introduction of local elections, which as the 
literature on decentralization states, aims at bringing voters closer to politicians (Faguet, 
2012; Treisman, 2007). Political responsiveness and accountability likely increased as 
well through the introduction of direct participation mechanisms (e.g. open town 
meetings, public consultations, referendums), and through the strengthening of executive 
constraints that limited the ability of politicians to do as they wish (including 
manipulating the allocation of resources at their own convenience). Empirical evidence 
for Colombia backs the above. The work of Faguet and Sánchez (2014) documents how 
after the process of political reform and decentralization, politicians became more 
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responsive to the demands of voters. They further argue that voter´s primary demand was 
increasing the provision of public goods46.  
Based on the above line of argument, we should find the reduction in the PLC to be 
stronger in municipalities with stronger political accountability. To test this, I rely on 
information from the index of transparency and accountability of the Attorney General’s 
Office47, which reflects the strength of mechanisms to strengthen state-citizen relations 
and to reduce corruption. I estimate the PLC on municipalities with high and low 
transparency and accountability. The results in Table 1.7 show that indeed, the reduction 
in the PLC is only significant in municipalities with a high level of accountability and 
transparency; that is, those that should have experienced stronger incentives to re-
compose their distributive politics strategies away from targeted benefits and towards 
demanded public goods48. 
Table 1.7 The PLC –  
Municipalities with low and high accountability and transparency 
Dependent Variable: Number of Land Titles allocated (LT) 
 Accountability and transparency 
Low  
(1) 
High 
(2) 
Pre Electoral year (E) 2.411*** 2.053*** 
 [0.209] [0.181] 
E* Post Shift -0.145 -1.248*** 
  [0.277] [0.174] 
Log-Likelihood  -244063.8  -266713.6  
Observations  24,308 31,092 
Number of Municipalities 448 574 
Municipality and year FE YES YES 
Municipal Controls YES YES 
Test of coefficient equality (E*Post shift) – P-value 0.000 
Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect Poisson model. Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include lagged population and lagged rainfall shocks. 
                                                             
46 There are additional traits of political institutions likely affecting the composition of distributive politics. 
For example, Persson and Tabellini (2000) state that systems of proportional representation provide more 
public goods and less targeted benefits that majoritarian systems. 
47 The transparency and accountability index is part of the Open Government Index. This information is 
only available for the post period, so it is measured as a high ex post average, rather than as a pre and 
post shift increase. Nonetheless, persistence in this institutional trait is likely.  
48 Although the reforms to increase accountability took place at the national level, effective institutional 
change is likely heterogeneous across municipalities (i.e. according to whether initial institutions enhance 
or limit the scope for change), as discussed in the previous subsection. 
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High is defined as being above the national mean (averaged 2000-2014). The post shift IRR for 
the high category is 0.88. 
 
The above results are in line with the literature on distributive politics showing that in 
general, in contexts of greater transparency and accountability, the political manipulation 
of resource allocation is lower as voters are able to detect and punish it (Alt et al. 2014; 
Shi and Svensson, 2006). However, the scope of this mechanism arguably has a demand-
side component. For example, voters might punish the manipulation of certain goods less 
than others. In this case, the reforms generating greater transparency could make some 
types of distributive politics (e.g. the PLC) less attractive, while making others more 
attractive (e.g. public goods which are demanded broadly by voters).  
Increased capacity to provide public goods 
The re-composition of voter mobilization strategies away from targeted private benefits 
and towards public goods requires not only the incentives, but also the capacity (fiscal 
and bureaucratic) to do so. While increased fiscal and bureaucratic capacity should 
increase the ability to provide any type of good, the effect should be stronger for public 
good provision, which are more reliant on bureaucratic capacity, and on fiscal resources 
(Fergusson, Larreguy and Riaño, 2018). Indeed, allocating a land title has a low fiscal 
cost and is a simple bureaucratic process, relative to building a hospital or connecting 
houses to the water or electric system. 
The capacity argument implies that the PLC should have decreased more in municipalities 
with a stronger fiscal and bureaucratic capacity to provide public goods. To test this, I 
estimate the cycle comparing municipalities with a low and a high efficiency in public 
good provision. The efficiency measure comes from the Integral Performance Index of 
the National Planning Department (DNP)49, and refers to the provision of a maximum 
level of output (in health, education and public services) given a level of input. Table 1.8 
shows that, consistent with the argument, the reduction in the PLC is only significant in 
the municipalities with a high efficiency in public good provision; that is those with a 
higher capacity to mobilize voters via public goods.  
 
 
                                                             
49 The Integral Performance Index is a composite measure (scale of 0 to 100) of efficiency, efficacy, 
compliance with legal requirements and management (DNP, 2013). Information is only available for the 
post period, thus it is measured in average levels, rather than in pre and post changes.  
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Table 1.8 The PLC –  
Municipalities with low and high efficiency in public good provision  
Dependent Variable: Number of Land Titles allocated (LT) 
 Public good 
 provision efficiency 
Low  
(1) 
High 
 (2) 
Pre Electoral year (E) 2.145*** 2.173*** 
 [0.211] [0.185] 
E* Post Shift -0.232 -1.557*** 
  [0.236] [0.181] 
Log-Likelihood -278659.83  -232773.75  
Observations  27,105 28,405 
Number of Municipalities 504 521 
Municipality and year FE YES YES 
Municipal Controls YES YES 
Test of coefficient equality (E*Post shift) – P-value 0.000 
Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect Poisson model. Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include lagged population and lagged rainfall shocks. 
High is defined as being above the national mean (averaged 2000-2014). 
As further tests, I estimate the PLC comparing municipalities with a low and a high level 
of bureaucratic capacity, relying on information from the World Bank on the total number 
of public agencies per capita in a municipality. I also compare the cycle across 
municipalities with a low and a high increase in spending on public goods, based on 
information from the municipal panel of CEDE. Consistently, the results in Tables 1.A3 
and 1.A4 in the Annex show that the decrease in the PLC was stronger in the 
municipalities with a stronger bureaucratic and fiscal capacity.  
The political cycle in public good spending  
To provide further evidence on the re-composition of distributive politics, I now show 
that while the post shift period saw a decrease in the PLC, it saw an increase in the 
political cycle of spending on public goods. Table 1.9 shows that the effect of the electoral 
cycle on public good spending is positive and that it becomes larger after the institutional 
shift. In Column 2, I show that the effect is significantly stronger for spending on public 
goods than for less visible types of spending, in particular, current spending (salaries and 
other administrative inputs). 
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Table 1.9 The Political Budget Cycle –Spending on public goods 
Dependent Variable: (Log) spending 
  
Spending on 
public goods 
Current 
spending 
Pre Electoral year (E) 0.462*** 0.125*** 
 [0.042] [0.009] 
E* Post Shift 2.634*** 0.633*** 
 [0.068] [0.028] 
Lag spending 0.404*** 0.497*** 
 [0.011] [0.019] 
Observations 28,700 29,149 
Number of Municipalities 1,097 1,097 
Municipality and year FE YES YES 
Municipal Controls YES YES 
R-Squared 0.869 0.842 
Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect model. Robust standard errors in brackets.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include lagged population and lagged rainfall shocks. Public 
spending on public goods per capita in real terms. Public spending on public goods is equivalent 
to spending on net formation of fixed capital (e.g. schools) plus associated spending (e.g. school 
material). There is a public good spending cycle in pre local electoral years as well, of a similar 
magnitude. 
The previous results are consistent with the work of Drazen and Eslava (2010) showing 
that spending on public goods in Colombia is affected by the electoral cycle50 and that  
these targeted expenditures are stronger in swing municipalities (i.e. allocations also 
follow geographical targeting). These authors argue that the strategic expenditure in 
public goods is an attractive strategy because these are highly visible and can benefit 
specific (yet large) groups of voters. Overall, these results evidence that public good 
allocations are also strategically targeted following political considerations, rather than 
being fully programmatic goods (i.e. universally allocated irrespective of geographic 
location, partisan affiliation or other political considerations, Golden and Min, 2013)51.   
 
                                                             
50 This study focuses on local elections for the period 1987 to 2002.  
51 It is worth noting, as these authors do, that the classification of goods as programmatic, patronage, 
pork barrel or clientelist is not-straightforward, as there are various definitions for each of these terms, 
and as the classification entails a deep knowledge of local contexts to determine the true nature of 
allocations.  
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1.6  Robustness tests 
 
In order to check for the robustness of the results to the estimation method, I run six 
alternative models. In column (1) of Table 1.10, I estimate a dynamic fixed effects 
Poisson model, including a lag of the dependent variable as a regressor. This approach is 
common in the political budget cycle literature, as it captures the dynamics of the 
dependent variable more parsimoniously52. In column (2) I estimate a Poisson model 
logging the number of land titles to incorporate some of the level changes that occurred 
in land titling after the 1990s. I also estimate the model including a region-specific time 
trend (column 3), to control for heterogeneous time dynamics across regions, capturing 
for instance, different geographical limits to the agricultural frontier (Albertus, 2019). In 
the last two columns I allow for alternative distributional assumptions in the count data, 
using a Negative Binomial and a standard FE model. The results are qualitatively 
unchanged in all of the specifications. 
Table 1.10 Robustness to alternative estimation strategies 
  
Dynamic 
Poisson 
(1) 
Log 
Poisson 
(2) 
Poisson – Region 
time trend 
(3) 
Negative 
Binomial 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
Pre Electoral year (E) 2.012*** 1.402*** 2.184*** 2.036*** 8.913*** 
 [0.131] [0.081] [0.198] 
[0.155] [0.845] 
E* Post Shift -0.788** -0.585*** -1.664*** -0.817*** -4.749*** 
  [0.152] [0.069] [0.268] [0.186] [1.076] 
Lagged land titles 0.005***     
  [0.0004]   
  
Log-Likelihood -476480.08 - 51959.04  -441616.4   -110721.43  N.A 
Observations 55,510 55,510 54,370 60,224 60,224 
Number of Municipalities 1,025 1,025 994 N.A 1,117 
Municipality FE YES YES YES N.A YES 
Year FE YES YES NO YES YES 
Municipal Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include lagged 
population and lagged rainfall shocks. The number of observations in log Poisson is low because 
it drops zeros. Cubic time trend is interacted with the five regions in Colombia.  
                                                             
52 This is more important in budget variables with a high serial autocorrelation than in land allocation, 
which exhibits a high volatility. Dynamic models are often estimated with GMM as the lag introduces bias. 
However, in this case, the number of time periods is large (T=55), and thus the bias should be marginal 
(Beck and Katz, 2011). Considering this, I estimate a regular FE model.   
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Now, to test for the robustness of the results to omitted variable bias, I estimate the PLC 
including additional covariates for the sub-period (1999-2014), for which additional 
information is available. These include transfers from the central and departmental 
government, in order to control for public investment in the agricultural sector and others, 
as this could affect the demand for land. I also control for local tax revenues as a measure 
of the dynamism of the local economy, capturing, for instance, specific price shocks that 
affect municipalities differently53. As a proxy for poverty, I include subsidized health 
coverage, and to account for changes in local state capacity, I include the Municipal Fiscal 
Performance Index. As shown in Table 1.11, the results are robust to the inclusion of 
additional controls. 
Table 1.11 Robustness to additional covariates 
Dependent Variable: Number of Land Titles allocated    
  (1) (2) (3) 
Pre Electoral year 1.324** 1.234*** 0.853*** 
 [0.230] [0.231] [0.259] 
Population   0.000 0.000 
    [0.000] [0.000] 
Rainfall shocks   0.014 0.011 
    [0.018] [0.018] 
Lag Local fiscal revenue     -0.137 
      [0.393] 
Lag National transfers     -0.251 
      [0.666] 
Lag Subsidized health coverage share     0.280 
      [0.196] 
Lag Municipality Fiscal Performance Index     0.006 
      [0.005] 
Log-Likelihood -92607.767 -91638.207  -86106.681 
Observations 12,660 12,559 11,298 
Number of Municipalities 844 844 834 
Municipality and year FE YES YES YES 
Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect Poisson model. Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Local fiscal revenue and national transfers in real per capita 
terms. Information comes from Panel municipal CEDE. Covariates are lagged to lessen potential 
simultaneity, nonetheless, regressors can be endogenous; thus, the results should be interpreted 
with caution. Information comes from Panel Municipal CEDE.  
 
Despite the allocation of land being carried out through a national program, local elections 
could affect the timing of allocations. To test for this, I estimate the PLC including a 
dummy for local elections rather than for presidential ones. Local elections are held 
between presidential races (in October). Note that this specification does not include an 
                                                             
53 This would capture coffee price shocks, which Albertus (2019) show affect the allocation of land in 
Colombia.  
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interaction with the post shift dummy, as local elections only take place during the post-
shift period54. The results in Table 1.12 show that local elections do affect the allocation 
of land. However, the effect is significantly lower than that of presidential races (IRR of 
2.8 vs 8.8), suggesting that the effect captured by the original electoral dummy for 
presidential races is the relevant one to focus on. As an additional test, I run the main PLC 
estimation excluding two years during which both presidential and local elections took 
place (1990 and 1994). The results (presented in Table 1.A5 in the Annex) hold, 
indicating that the main effect is not driven by these special cases. 
Table 1.12 The local political land cycle 
Dependent Variable: Number of Land Titles allocated 
  (1) 
Pre Local Electoral year (LE) 1.015*** 
 [0.192] 
Log-Likelihood -209904.07  
Observations 26,226 
Number of Municipalities 980 
Municipality FE YES 
Municipal Controls YES 
Note: Estimated on the post period. Elections take place between presidential elections, in 
October. Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect Poisson model. Robust standard errors in 
brackets.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
I also test for the robustness to exclusion of outliers. Table 1.A6 in the Annex presents 
the results excluding municipalities that have an extreme number of land titles allocated 
for the whole period of study, as well as excluding municipality-year observations with 
abnormally high land allocations. The results remain unchanged in both. Finally, I 
exclude elections one by one55, and rule out that the effects are driven by a particular race. 
Overall, the robustness tests provide confidence of the political land cycle, as well as of 
the effect of the institutional shift.  
1.7 Ruling out alternative explanations 
I now analyse whether other dynamics could explain the observed reduction in the PLC. 
I first explore the possibility that the reduction is due to the escalation of the armed 
conflict during the 1990s, which displaced rural inhabitants and forced them to abandon 
                                                             
54 Elections take place in October. The first elections were held in 1988, the second in 1990 (together with 
presidential ones).  
55 Results available upon request. 
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over 7 million hectares of land (URT, 2010). The surge in violence and in tenure 
insecurity could have reduced the demand for land allocations. It could also have reduced 
the expected return of land patronage or even the agency´s ability to operate in a region 
(i.e. reducing the supply of land patronage).  This, rather than the shift in political 
institutions, could explain the reduction in the PLC.  
If this were the mechanism acting, we should find the PLC to have decreased more in the 
municipalities which experienced more land dispossessions. To test this, I run the main 
estimation on two sets of municipalities: those with a low (below average) and with a 
high number of land dispossessions per capita. Information comes from the Land 
Restitution Unit. Table 1.13 shows that the post shift reduction in the PLC in both groups 
of municipalities is similar in magnitude and is not statistically different. This result 
indicates that this is not the mechanism behind the reduction in the PLC. The results are 
consistent when relying on another measure of violence (increases in the per capita 
number of violent attacks from armed groups)56.  
Table 1.13 The PLC -Municipalities with high and low land dispossessions 
Dependent variable: Number of Land Titles allocated 
Land dispossessions 
Low 
 (1) 
High 
(2) 
Pre Electoral year (E) 2.252*** 2.104*** 
 [0.219] [0.189] 
E* Post Shift -0.775*** -0.663*** 
 [0.174] [0.286] 
Log-Likelihood -302315.24 -210827.24 
Observations 43,339 12,171 
Number of Municipalities 800 225 
Municipality and year FE YES YES 
Municipal Controls YES YES 
Test of coefficient equality (E*Post shift) – P-value 0.521 
Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect model. Robust standard errors in brackets.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include lagged population and lagged rainfall shocks.  
A second potential explanation for the reduction in the PLC could be the agricultural 
crisis of the beginnings of the 1990s. The economic liberalization process (apertura 
económica) liberalized trade, eliminating protectionist policies such as price controls, 
tariffs, quotas and state commercialization (Ocampo, 2017). These measures particularly 
harmed the agricultural sector (Ocampo and Perry, 1995), significantly decreasing 
                                                             
56 Information comes from the Human Rights Office of the vice-presidency. 
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agricultural GDP57. This negative economic shock could have decreased the demand for 
land allocations, as well as the potential return of land patronage58. 
In order to test for this, I categorize municipalities into two groups: those with a high and 
with a low exposure to the economic liberalization. A municipality is considered to have 
had a high exposure if it produced at least two of the products which were hit the most by 
the apertura económica. These include cotton, wheat, rice, barely, sugar, soy and maize 
(Ocampo and Perry, 1995; Padilla, 2005). Information comes from the Agriculture 
Evaluations from the Ministry of Agriculture59. 
If this were the mechanism acting, we should see the reduction in the PLC to be stronger 
in the municipalities with a higher exposure to the economic liberalization. The results in 
Table 1.14 show this was not the case, as the coefficients are not statistically different 
between groups60. 
Table 1.14 The PLC - Municipalities with high and low exposure to the economic 
liberalization 
Dependent variable:  
Exposure to  
economic liberalization 
Low 
 (1) 
High 
(2) 
Pre Electoral year (E) 2.301*** 2.102*** 
 [0.222] [0.174] 
E* Post Shift -0.964*** -0.608*** 
 [0.230] [0.226] 
Log-Likelihood -193861.77 -318742.8    
Observations 25,858 29,652 
Number of Municipalities 475 550 
Municipality FE YES YES 
Municipal Controls YES YES 
Test of coefficient equality (E*Post shift) – P-value 0.122 
Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect model. Robust standard errors in brackets.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include lagged population and lagged rainfall shocks. Post 
shift IRR are 5.4 and 4.4. 
                                                             
57 Aggravated by a decrease in international prices (Ocampo and Perry, 1995). 
58 The recent work of Albertus (2019) shows that land allocations are indeed affected by trade shocks, in 
particular, by the price of coffee.  
59 This information is only available after 2007, however, land suitability and land use should not change 
dramatically within a relatively short period of time, and as such, areas with the potential to produce 
these products should remain relatively constant. Note that because of this limitation in data, I do not use 
a threshold on tons or area cultivated, but rather whether a product is cultivated in a certain municipality. 
60 Furthermore, as Ocampo and Perry (1995) note, a sectoral reform (plan de reactivación) in 1994 was 
carried out to face the agricultural sector, with new tools such as the Incentivo de Capitalización Rural.  In 
this sense, the crisis was not a structural long term change, as was the change in political institutions.  
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Another potential explanation for the reduction in the PLC is that it resulted from specific 
changes in the land reform law, rather than from broader changes in political institutions. 
A new land reform law (Law 160) was approved in 1994. This law defined stricter criteria 
for land titling (at least in paper), and shifted the government´s efforts towards market 
based land reform61. Both aspects could have reduced the demand for baldío allocations 
as well as the supply of land patronage. Aggregate land allocations did decrease after the 
implementation of Law 160. However, aggregate reductions do not imply reductions in 
the PLC (i.e. allocations around elections). To test for this alternative explanation, I 
estimate the PLC excluding post 1994 elections (i.e. those affected by the new land reform 
law). Column 1 in Table 1.15 shows that the results hold: the PLC decreased after the 
institutional shift (although the coefficient is smaller, it remains significant). As a related 
test, in Column 2, I run the results excluding the period of lowest aggregate land 
allocations (1995 to 2004). Again, the results hold.  
Table 1.15 Excluding elections on sub-periods of low land allocations 
Dependent Variable: Number of Land Titles allocated (LT) 
  
Excluding elections 
post 1994 
(1) 
Excluding elections during 
the low aggregate allocation 
period 
(2) 
Pre Electoral year (E) 2.176*** 2.175*** 
 [0.141] [0.141] 
E* Post Shift -0.189*** -0.707*** 
  [0.093] [0.178] 
Log-Likelihood -459168.77 -501973.64 
Observations  50,021  5,318 
Number of Municipalities 1,016 1,022 
Municipality and year FE YES YES 
Municipal Controls YES YES 
Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect Poisson model. Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
I consider one last alternative explanation for the reduction in the PLC. Rather than a re-
composition of distributive politics between targeted private benefits (land) and public 
goods, there could have been a re-composition of distributive politics from one type of 
targeted private benefit to another. This could happen, for instance, if there was resource 
exhaustion (i.e. if vacant land was running out, voters would have to be mobilized via 
                                                             
61 Granting a subsidy for the plot of land the farmer has directly negotiated with a buyer. This form of land 
reform remained marginal. 
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another private good). However, the resource exhaustion hypothesis is unlikely, as land 
allocations increased significantly after 2010, reaching 1970s levels. One targeted private 
benefit that could have replaced land patronage is agricultural credit. However, Benson 
et al. (2019) do not find evidence of a political cycle in agricultural credit62. A re-
composition towards direct subsidies is also unlikely, as several of these were dismantled 
with the economic liberalization63. Similarly, it is unlikely that the results are explained 
by a re-composition towards Conditional Cash Transfers, as these began to be granted a 
decade after the institutional shift. Furthermore, there are no reasons to think the 
institutional shift led to a re-composition of distributive politics within targeted private 
benefits, as the reforms were rather oriented towards increasing public good provision.  
Before concluding, I discuss one additional analysis carried out. I analyse the class 
dimension of distributive politics, differentiating the PLC according to who were the 
recipients of land. To this end, I classify land titles within each municipality as small and 
large64. As social class in rural areas is largely configured by type of land access, small 
plots are likely allocated to peasants, whereas large land plots are likely allocated to large 
agricultural producers. The results evidence that the PLC is significantly stronger for 
small plots (see table 1.A7 in the Annex). This is consistent with standard theories of 
distributive politics arguing that politicians favour small allocations due to their 
cost effectiveness (Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). It also suggests that politicians consider it a better 
strategy to buy rural political support directly from the mass of voters (peasants), rather 
than targeting resources towards local elites (large agricultural producers) in exchange of 
them acting as political brokers through patron client relations with their workers (Scott, 
1972; Baland and Robinson, 2008).  
1.8 Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence of how political institutions affect distributive politics. It 
studies the case of Colombia during a period of institutional change in the distribution of 
political power was broadened and state capacity increased. I analyse the effect of this 
                                                             
62 The Incentive de Capitalización Rural (ICR) is tied to credit, and thus there is no evidence of a cycle in 
ICR either. Note as well that the public bank (Caja Agraria) suffered a crisis during the 90s, making it 
unlikely that land patronage was replaced by credit patronage at the time.  
63 Unfortunately, I cannot test for this, as information on direct subsidy allocation at the municipality level 
before and after the institutional shift is not available. 
64 Comparing their size with a reference plot size (AUF) within each municipality. For details on this see 
the Annex. 
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shift on the strategic allocation of a targeted private benefit (land) across time. I find that 
the number of land allocations is systematically higher during electoral years, that is, there 
is a political land cycle. This cycle depends on the political institutions in place: after the 
institutional shift, its magnitude is reduced by half. These results evidence that electoral 
cycles are highly context dependent and rarely have fixed magnitudes and contents, as 
highlighted by Franzese and Jusko (2006). 
I further show that despite the shift being a national level reform, the response to it was 
heterogeneous across space. Effective institutional change was stronger in core 
municipalities, corresponding to those located in central areas, in which initial institutions 
were more inclusive. This evidences that pre-existing institutions condition effective 
institutional change. In particular, where initial institutions were more inclusive, 
institutional change was enhanced, while where they were less inclusive, institutional 
change was limited. In line with this, I show that the reduction in the PLC was stronger 
in core areas. These results evidence the high degree of heterogeneity in distributive 
politics even within a country, as contextual conditions, and in particular, institutional 
conditions, vary across the territory. Future research relying on subnational data on micro 
level institutions is needed in order to advance our understanding of the territorial 
dimension of both institutions and distributive politics. 
Regarding the mechanisms explaining the reduction in the PLC, the evidence points 
towards this being the result of a re-composition of distributive politics from targeted 
private benefits (in this case, land) towards the strategic allocation of public goods. I show 
that while the post shift period saw a decrease in the PLC, it saw an increase in the cycle 
of spending on public goods. This evidences that the allocation of public goods does not 
fully respond to programmatic considerations, but also to political ones. This is in line 
with research showing that public spending in Colombia is strategically targeted not only 
across time, but also across (Drazen and Eslava, 2010), and with the study of  Thachil 
(2011) documenting how the BJP in India has been successful in winning the support of 
voters through the strategic provision of public goods in a context in which governments 
fail to universally provide them. Overall, the results show that improvements in 
institutional quality lead to a transformation of distributive politics, rather than to its 
disappearance. This result goes in line with those of the literature on clientelism 
highlighting its systemic resilience (Roniger, 2004) and its increasing use to pursue the 
delivery of public goods, as opposed to individual ones (Gay, 1998). It is worth noting 
that the political interference in public good spending, does not imply that there is a 
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negative impact on the welfare of voters. Indeed, one could expect this form of 
distributive politics to be less harmful than others such as private benefit allocations. In 
any case, the developmental implications of different distributive politics strategies 
require further research, ideally relying on micro (individual level) data. 
I analyse the incentive and capacity effects likely explaining the re-composition of 
distributive politics. The incentive effect relates to political competition increasing the 
attractiveness of mobilizing voters via public goods. As these can appeal to a broader and 
more heterogeneous set of voters, they are an attractive strategy when the core base of a 
party is not sufficient to win elections (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Stévez, 2016). I show 
that consistent with the above, the decrease in the PLC is stronger in areas in which 
political competition increased the most after the introduction of multiparty competition. 
I argue that the incentive effect is re-enforced through increases in political accountability 
and responsiveness derived from the introduction of local elections, direct democracy 
mechanisms and the strengthening of executive constraints. Consistent with the above, I 
show that the reduction in the PLC was only significant in municipalities with higher 
levels of accountability and transparency. 
The effective re-composition of distributive politics requires not only the incentive effect, 
but also a capacity effect. This, especially as public goods are costlier and more complex 
to deliver than targeted private benefits. I find evidence supporting the capacity effect: 
the reduction in the PLC was stronger in municipalities with a higher capacity to allocate 
public goods, measured as a high efficiency in public good provision. 
Future research is required to evaluate the electoral payoff of the PLC, as well as how 
patterns of service provision and the composition of distributive politics affect voting 
outcomes. For example, does it pay electorally to re-compose distributive politics from 
particularistic benefits to broad public goods? 
Another area of future research is analysing how party politics mediate the effects of the 
political cycles and their response to institutional reforms. A particularly interesting 
aspect to analyse is how the introduction of local elections affects the political cycle 
through alignment between tiers of government. This would provide a better 
understanding of who pulls the levers of manipulation. Issues of government alignment 
have been shown to be relevant in explaining distributive politics (Corvalan, Cox and 
Osorio, 2018; Brollo and Nannicini, 2012).  
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Another area of research worth exploring is the demand-side of the composition of 
distributive politics. For instance, understanding when and why voters would change their 
type of demands for one type of good or the other. This area of research would profit from 
qualitative methods. Finally, further research could assess the impact of the institutional 
shift on actual service provision (which in developing countries does not necessarily map 
into expenditure) as well as on other governance and fiscal outcomes, including fiscal 
openness fiscal discipline and pro-spending biases (De Renzio and Wehner, 2017).  
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Annex 1 
Table 1.A1 Political institutions - before and after the shift towards more inclusive 
institutions 
  Pre shift: Narrow distribution 
of power 
Post shift: Broader distribution 
of power 
Across 
Political 
parties 
Closed bipartisan system 
  
Power sharing agreement between 
the two hegemonic parties, 
formalized in the National Front 
- Alternation of presidential power 
and division of parliament, 
ministerial posts and the judiciary  
Open multiparty system 
  
- Ease of requirements for the creation 
of new parties 
- Partial public financing for all 
parties and movements 
- Australian secret ballot 
Across 
societal 
actors 
Restricted representative democracy 
 
Participation mainly through party 
structures, or informally through protest 
Participatory democracy 
 
Introduction of direct democracy 
mechanisms (popular consultations, 
referendums, revocation of mandate, 
open town meetings, municipal planning 
councils, Local Administrative Juntas, 
public committees)  
Across levels 
of 
Government 
Political centralization 
  
President named Governors, who named 
Mayors  
Political decentralization 
  
Introduction of local democracy: 
Mayoral and Governor direct elections   
Across 
branches of 
Government 
Power concentrated in the Executive  
  
- Appointed Justices 
- Ruled under state of siege 
- Legislative supermajority required 
to override economic bills 
  
Strengthening of executive 
constraints, the Judiciary and the 
Legislative 
  
- Creation of the Constitutional Court 
- Strengthening judicial oversight  
- Strengthening of the role of 
Congress 
 Pre shift: Weak and inefficient state 
Post shift: Stronger and 
more efficient state 
Fiscal 
capacity 
Fiscal centralization and weak local 
capacity 
- Central Government concentrated 
80% of revenues. 
- Transfers to local governments 
0,5% GDP 
- Municipalities had low fiscal 
autonomy 
Fiscal decentralization and increased 
fiscal capacity 
  
- Established % income to be 
transferred to municipalities 
- Municipalities allowed to raise local 
taxes 
- Established % income to invest in 
public services.  
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Bureaucratic 
capacity 
Centralized, weak bureaucratic 
capacity 
 
 
 
-     - School enrollment rate 22% 
- -- Health coverage in rural areas: 10% 
  
Administrative decentralization and 
increased bureaucratic capacity 
  
- Municipalities were given the 
responsibility for public service 
provision 
- Implementation of programs for 
increasing local administrative 
capacity (ESAP, PDI) 
- Formalization of procedures of 
meritocratic recruitment and 
promotion of civil servants 
 
Table 1.A2 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Total Population 60,588 19,538 42,413 66 990,179 
Poverty (UBN Index)  5,560 57.924 24.133 3.040 100 
Abnormal rain (cms) 61,111 1.169 1.246 0 67.384 
Bipartisan violence 1948-1953 (% mun)  61,050 0.133 0.340 0 1 
Spanish colonial settlements 61,050 0.368 0.482 0.000 1 
Distance to Department capital below department mean (% mun)  61,447 0.554 0.497 0.000 1 
Average plot size  59,895 58.394 218.512 0.975 5,896 
Land titles (1901-1960) 61,160 48.483 146.960 0.000 2,423 
Land titles (municipality -year) 61,435 8.212 30.106 0.000 765 
Large land titles (municipality -year) 61,435 1.126 6.430 0 228 
Small land titles (municipality -year) 61,435 7.087 27.576 0 765 
Local fiscal revenue (per capita) -COP  
32,759 0.048 0.089 0 3.457 
National transfers (per capita) - COP  32,759 0.076 0.132 0 10.652 
Integral Performance Index (IPI)  60,335 63.717 9.737 28.173 85.782 
IPI - Service delivery efficiency 60,335 50.669 9.899 16.852 79.564 
OGI - Transparency and Accountability  60,280 53.744 15.849 2.250 91.350 
Number of public organizations (per 100.000 inhabitants)  58,300 1.819 1.698 0 30.070 
Education coverage 1964 47,467 0.337 0.151 0.045 1.454 
Property tax per capita 1964 - COP 41,580 87491 332469 5.771 5393083 
ENCP 14,183 2.112 0.776 1 5.586 
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Figure 1.A1 Year Fixed effects coefficient plot  
 
Table 1.A3 The Political Land Cycle –  
Municipalities with low and high number of public agencies 
Dependent Variable: Number of Land Titles allocated (LT) 
 Public good 
 provision efficiency 
Low  
(1) 
High 
 (2) 
Pre Electoral year (E) 2.227*** 1.819*** 
 [0.157] [0.305] 
E* Post Shift -0.712*** -1.456*** 
  [0.199] [0.299] 
Log-Likelihood -409422.27 - 92320.445   
Observations 35,920 17,573 
Number of Municipalities 663 322 
Municipality and year FE YES YES 
Municipal Controls YES YES 
Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect Poisson model. Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include lagged population and lagged rainfall shocks. 
High is defined as being above the national median.  Test of coefficient equality (E*Post shift): 
P-value = 0.013. 
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Table 1.A4 The Political Land Cycle –  
Municipalities with low and high increase in spending on public goods 
Dependent Variable: Number of Land Titles allocated (LT) 
Increase in spending  
on public goods 
Low  
(1) 
High 
 (2) 
Pre Electoral year (E) 1.993*** 2.841*** 
 [0.158] [0.277] 
E* Post Shift -0.575*** -1.079*** 
  [0.211] [0.257] 
Log-Likelihood -388960.9  -124150.15  
Observations 38,120 17,325 
Number of Municipalities 700 320 
Municipality and year FE YES YES 
Municipal Controls YES YES 
Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect Poisson model. Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include lagged population and lagged rainfall shocks.  
Increase in real per capita public good spending between pre and post period (pre period starting 
1984 as information is not available for earlier years). High is defined as being above the national 
median. Test of coefficient equality (E*Post shift): P-value = 0.049. 
 
Table 1.A5 The PLC – Excluding the elections in which both presidential and local 
races take place 
  (1) 
Pre Electoral year (E) 2.172*** 
 [0.141] 
E* Post Shift -0.709*** 
  [0.179] 
Log-Likelihood -497812.92 
Observations 53,323 
Number of Municipalities 1,022 
Municipality FE YES 
Municipal Controls YES 
Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect Poisson model. Robust standard errors in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include lagged population and lagged rainfall shocks. 
Estimated excluding 1990 and 1994 elections.  
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
Table 1.A6. Robustness to exclusion of outliers 
Dependent Variable: Number of Land Titles allocated 
 
Excluding 
 municipality outliers 
(1) 
Excluding municipality-
year outliers 
(2) 
Pre Electoral year (E) 2.180*** 2.167*** 
 [0.141] [0.143] 
E* Post Shift -0.703*** -0.685*** 
 [0.178] [0.178] 
Log-Likelihood -507085.07 -507220.76 
Observations 55,503 55,345 
Number of Municipalities 1,025 1,022 
Municipality and year FE YES YES 
Municipal Controls YES YES 
Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect model. Robust standard errors in brackets.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include lagged population and lagged rainfall shocks. 
Municipality year outliers are those over 600 titles per year, three outliers. Municipality outliers 
are those with average yearly land allocations of over 142, 18 outliers.  
 
Additional results: The class dimension of distributive politics 
These results relate to who were the recipients of strategic land allocations, focusing on 
the class of recipients (small farmers or large agriculture producers). To identify this,  I 
rely on information on plot sizes, taking into account that in rural areas, social classes are 
largely configured through type of land ownership. This allows to map plot type on to 
voter type: within a municipality, smaller titles are potentially allocated to small peasants, 
while larger titles are potentially allocated to large agricultural producers. Through this 
analysis I am able to study the class dimension of distributive politics, which as Golden 
and Min (2013) highlight, has received scarce attention in the literature, plausibly as 
identifying the class of a recipient is difficult (compared to, for example, identifying their 
ethnicity) 65. 
I identify small and large plots within each municipality. Each land allocation is 
categorized as either a 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 corresponding to those 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑈𝐴𝐹𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  or as a 
                                                             
65 Kloomp and de Haan (2013b) study differences in the political cycle of agricultural support among 
developed and developing countries, arguing that the differences reside in that in the former, agricultural 
producers are a reduced and powerful interest group, whereas in the latter, farmers are the mass of 
voters. This is indirectly, a study of class and distributive politics. A related work studies the differences in 
public good vs private benefit provision in Nepal as a function of land tenure structure. They find that 
landed elites (patrons) are favoured with private goods, whereas tenants or workers (peasants) and 
favoured with public goods (Joshi and Mason, 2011). 
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𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑇𝑖, 𝑡 if 𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 > 𝑈𝐴𝐹𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  The UAF (Unidad Agropecuaria Familiar) is a reference 
plot size, estimated based on agro-ecological conditions in each area66. Table 18 shows 
that the PLC is heterogeneous across type of plot/beneficiary. Before the shift to more 
inclusive political institutions, the PLC for small titles was significantly higher than the 
PLC for large ones. After the shift, the small PLC is reduced by half, while the large PLC 
becomes negative. 
Table 1.A7 – The PLC for small and large titles 
Dependent variable:  
 
Small titles 
(1) 
Large titles 
(2) 
Pre Electoral year (E) 2.499*** 1.267*** 
 [0.173] [0.186] 
E* Post Shift -0.570*** -2.748*** 
 [0.183] [0.242] 
Log-Likelihood -475834.37 -68130.261 
Observations 54,853 30,584 
Number of Municipalities 1,013 563 
Municipality FE YES YES 
Municipal Controls YES YES 
Mean Land Titles 7.087 1.126 
Regressions estimated through a Fixed Effect model. Robust standard errors in brackets.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include lagged population and lagged rainfall shocks.  
 
That the PLC is stronger for small allocations is consistent with standard theories of 
distributive politics arguing that politicians favour small allocations due to their 
cost effectiveness (Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). It also suggests that politicians consider it a better 
strategy to buy rural political support directly from the mass of voters, rather than 
targeting resources towards local elites (large agricultural producers) hoping they 
mobilize their workers votes, acting as political brokers through patron client relations 
(Scott, 1972; Baland and Robinson, 2008). Targeting the PLC towards small farmers 
could also result from a “clientelistic social inclusion” as it was called at the time (Urrutia 
Montoya, 1990). In addition to this, targeting the peasant class could serve for appeasing 
political opposition, essential in a context of revolutionary threat (Lopez-Uribe, 2018) 
and posterior guerrilla threat (Albertus and Kaplan, 2012).    
                                                             
66 Technically defined as the amount of land which is needed for a household to generate working income 
plus a small profit. I use the municipality average of UAF. Data comes from municipal panel of CEDE. For 
a small number of municipalities with missing information, the department average is inputed.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Increasing Access to Agricultural Credit: The Heterogeneous Effects 
of Collective Action  
 
Co-authored with Jean Paul Faguet 67 and Maria del Pilar Lopez-Uribe68 
 
 
Collective action allows individuals to overcome market and state failures, something 
particularly relevant in the rural sector and in a highly imperfect market such as 
agricultural credit. This paper employs data on over 2,3 million rural producers in 
Colombia as well as novel subnational panel data for over 15.000 municipality-year 
observations to analyze the relation between collective action and access to agricultural 
credit. We find that collective action in the form of Rural Producer Organizations (RPOs) 
only increases the likelihood of an individual accessing agricultural credit, and 
furthermore, it increases access to credit at the aggregate (municipality level); that is, 
there is a positive general equilibrium effect, rather than a crowding-out of credit 
between RPO members and non-members. We also find that the effect is heterogeneous 
according to the type of credit (source and size). For credit granted to small farmers, 
there is an aggregate positive effect, but only via access to public credit. For credit 
granted to big farmers, the effect is also positive, but this time, through private credit. In 
contrast, for medium-scale farmers, there are no aggregate increases in access to credit. 
The heterogeneity in the results appears to be driven by the structural segmentation of 
the credit market across farmer type and sources, which is replicated, rather than 
counteracted by the collective action effect. This evidences how the potential impact of 
collective action on development outcomes is dependent on contextual conditions. 
 
Key words: rural financial development, agricultural credit, credit constraints, collective action, 
rural producer organizations, Colombia, 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
During the past three decades, researchers and policy makers have become increasingly 
interested on how social relations and social organizations contribute to development. 
One aspect that has received particular attention is collective action (CA), or action taken 
together by individuals pursuing a common objective. Through collective action, 
individuals are able to address problems and achieve outcomes they could not achieve if 
they were acting on their own, or if the state or the market were acting solely (Ostrom, 
1990, Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Putnam, 1993). Collective action is particularly relevant 
                                                             
67 Department of International Development and Government, London School of Economics 
68 Department of Economics, Universidad de Los Andes 
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in the rural sector, as through it individuals and communities overcome market and state 
failures that arise because of structural conditions including the dispersion of population 
and markets, the seasonality of production, the vulnerability to weather conditions and 
the prevalence of weak property rights (ILO, 2015).  
Collective action can materialize in different forms. In rural areas, one key and common 
materialization are Rural Producer Organizations (RPOs). RPOs are organizations such 
as agricultural cooperatives and associations, in which farmers voluntarily participate and 
invest time, effort and resources to improve their production and commercialization 
opportunities. There is evidence that RPOs increase production, efficiency and income 
(Desai and Joshi, 2014; Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014; Vandeplas et al. 2013)69. Studies 
have also shown that RPOs constitute information hubs through which farmers share 
information and best practices (Abebaw and Hail, 2013; Markussen and Tarp, 2014), and 
show that through vertical and horizontal integration, these organizations ease access to 
input and output markets (Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014; Conley and Udry, 2003; 
Bebbington, 1997; Narrod et al. 2009). 
This paper analyses whether in addition to increasing access to input and output markets, 
collective action can increase access to the financial market, in particular, to agricultural 
credit. Previous studies provide evidence for the positive impact of agricultural credit (i.e. 
credit used for productive purposes) on outcomes including production, productivity and 
poverty (Ayalew, Deininger and Duponchel 2014; Conning and Udry, 2007; Burgess 
and Pande, 2005). Despite the above, financial access throughout the developing world 
remains limited (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008), highlighting the relevance of exploring 
alternative ways to increase access to credit. 
We study the case of Colombia and rely on micro-level data for over 2,3 million farmers 
to estimate the individual level effect of collective action measured as RPO membership 
on access to agricultural credit. We find that this form of collective action increases the 
likelihood of a farmer accessing credit by 2,5 times. This result is consistent with studies 
showing that individual access to credit increases through social relations, measured as 
participation in community meetings and vertical informal social networks (Dufhues et 
al. 2013; Okten and Osili, 2004), participation in farmer and women unions (Markussen 
                                                             
69 The above has encouraged policy makers in different countries to actively promote and support RPOs, 
as is the case of Senegal (Arcand and Wagner, 2016), South Africa (Lyne and Collins, 2008) and Colombia 
(Gomez et al. 2016). 
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and Tarp, 2014) 70 or as trust and social collaterals (Karlan, 2007; Cassar, Crowley and 
Wydick, 2007).  
That collective action increases access to credit for some individuals does not imply that 
there are positive general equilibrium effects. CA could increase access for just some 
farmers (i.e. RPO members) while crowding-out resources available for others (i.e. non-
members). Therefore, the aggregate developmental impact on local financial access is 
unclear. A first contribution of our paper is exploring the general equilibrium effects of 
collective action, analysing its impact on aggregate (municipality level) credit provision. 
For this analysis, we employ novel data on RPO creation and credit allocation for over 
1.100 municipalities during a 15-year period, and estimate a Fixed Effects model. 
Through a “one-country, Large-N analysis” (Faguet, 2012) we are able to analyse the 
aggregate and dynamic impact of collective action while controlling for historical, 
institutional and cultural factors that typically bedevil inferences made on small samples 
and on cross-country or cross-section observations.  
Our results provide evidence of positive general equilibrium effects. Collective increases 
access to credit at the local level, on both the extensive margin (total number of credits) 
and the intensive margin (total value of credits). This points towards the existence of 
positive spillover effects (from RPO members to non-members), at least in contexts in 
which the supply of credit is not fixed. We then disaggregate data by credit source (public 
and private banks) and by recipient type (big, medium and small farmers), and find that 
the aggregate effect of collective action is heterogeneous. For small farmers, it is positive, 
but only via increased access to public credit. For big producers, the effect is also positive, 
but this time through access to private credit. In contrast, the effect is not significant for 
medium-scale farmers.  
Our results point towards this heterogeneity being explained by contextual conditions that 
bind the effect of collective action. In this particular case, the binding condition is the 
structural segmentation of the credit market across farmer type and sources. Commercial 
banks tend to favour credit for big farmers as fixed transaction costs and risk are perceived 
as lower. In turn, public banks tend to favour credit for small farmers following their dual 
mission of allocating financial resources and of promoting rural development (i.e. by 
targeting vulnerable population). Under this situation, medium-scale farmers are left in-
                                                             
70 While related, this study provides restricted evidence, as it relies on a survey of a small number of 
households (2.000) and in a particular area (12 provinces) in Vietnam. 
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between, with restricted access to credit. The results in this paper show that the effect of 
collective action replicates, rather than counteracts this sorting of credit. Analysing 
heterogeneous effects is a second contribution of our paper. As noted in Banerjee et al. 
(2015), the literature on access to credit does not provide strong evidence on distributional 
effects 71. 
A third contribution of the paper is exploring the mechanisms through which collective 
action increases access to credit. We analyse the effect of RPO membership on both the 
demand side (i.e. the likelihood of credit request) and the supply-side (i.e. likelihood of 
credit approval conditional on request). We find that the demand side effect is two times 
stronger than the supply side one. These mechanisms are further explored in Benson 
(2020) through a mixed method analysis nesting the quantitative results presented in this 
paper, with qualitative evidence gathered through four case studies and over 60 semi-
structured interviews. Benson (2020) finds that RPO membership increases the supply of 
credit through several mechanisms. First, as it enables farmers to access special credit 
lines (associative credit) offered by banks specifically to RPOs and under preferential 
conditions. Second, as RPOs provide in-house credit to their members. And third, as RPO 
membership increases the likelihood of banks approving individual credit requests by 
constituting signals of both farmer quality and project quality, increasing creditworthiness 
and reducing problems of imperfect and asymmetric information. The author also finds 
that collective action increases the demand for credit as organized farmers are able to 
engage in new, larger and more profitable projects which require investment. The 
increased profitability of projects relates to RPOs easing access to quality inputs, 
technical assistance, commercialization contracts and government support. In addition to 
this, the author finds that CA increases the demand for credit through reductions in 
transaction cost constraints, as through RPOs farmers access information about credit 
opportunities. Lastly, RPOs reduce risk constraints, as they constitute a safety net, for 
instance, providing emergency loans used to pay for formal credit obligations in situations 
of low liquidity. Overall, these results show that through developing rural associativity, 
it is possible to develop rural financial markets. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two describes the conceptual 
framework. Section three discusses the context of Colombia, section four provides details 
                                                             
71 Some studies have analysed differences between formal and informal sources of credit (Giné, 2011, 
Boucher and Guirkinger, 2007, 2008), but few focus on heterogeneous effects within formal sources (i.e. 
public and private credit) and on heterogeneity in recipient type.  
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on the data, and section five on the empirical strategy. The results are presented in the 
sixth section, and section seven includes the robustness tests. Section eight discusses the 
mechanisms, and the last section concludes.   
2.2 Conceptual framework  
 
2.2.1 Collective Action and rural development 
 
Social relations and the collective action that they enable affect development outcomes, 
something particularly relevant in the rural sector, where market and state failures are 
salient. Previous studies show for example, that collective action allows farmers to face 
adverse climatic conditions and achieve better than average harvests (Uphoff and 
Wijayaratna, 2000). In her seminal work, Ostrom (1990) shows that it is through 
collective action that rural communities most effectively manage common resources, and 
that voluntary collaboration and mutual enforcement are viable strategies for promoting 
development.  
Collective action can materialize in informal and formal ways. We focus on a formal, 
common and key materialization of collective action in rural areas: Rural Producer 
Organizations72. Empirical studies carried out in Latin America, Africa and Asia show 
that RPOs have a positive impact on income, production and efficiency (Desai and Joshi, 
2014; Vandeplas et al. 2013; Fisher and Qaim, 2012). These positive effects arise, among 
others, as RPOs allow the exploitation of economies of scale (Nilsson, 2001; Valentinov, 
2007), ease the adoption of technology, improved inputs and new crops (Verhofstadt and 
Maertens, 2014; Conley and Udry, 2003), and increase the sharing of information and 
best practices (Abebaw and Hail, 2013; Conley and Udry, 2003). There is evidence that 
RPOs increase access to markets (Bebbington, 1997; Narrod et al., 2009) and strengthen 
the links between local communities and the government (Markussen and Tarp, 2014; 
Bebbington and Perreault, 2003).  
Despite these benefits, only some farmers join RPOs. This can result from a lack of 
information about the potential benefits of these organizations, as well as from the costs 
of participation, which can be higher than the expected return. Benson (2020) finds that 
farmers restrain from joining RPOs because they are not able to pay for membership fees 
and perceive high travel and opportunity costs of attending meetings (e.g. stopping to 
                                                             
72 In the Colombian case, census data shows that RPOs are the most common social organization in rural 
areas. Other organizations include women, sports, political and civic organizations. 
83 
 
work in the crops or household activities). There are also non-trivial coordination and 
transaction costs, including negotiating divergent interests among members, making 
collective decisions, monitoring compliance with rules and solving conflict (Vitaliano, 
1983; Ostrom, 1990). These costs evidence that collective action is not a universal or 
cost-free alternative for enhancing rural development. Understanding the potential of 
collective action as a developmental tool requires gaining a more in-depth understanding 
of the nature of collective action organizations, of the heterogeneous effects they generate 
and on how their impact is conditioned by the context.  
2.2.2 The imperfect agricultural credit market 
Accessing agricultural credit is key for rural development. As previous evidence shows, 
access to credit lowers poverty and increases productivity, output and income (Burgess 
and Pande, 2005; Echavarria et al. 2017; Ayalew, Deininger and Duponchel, 2014). 
Despite this, most farmers in the developing world continue to have limited or no access 
to formal credit. Banerjee and Duflo’s (2006) study of 13 developing countries shows that 
only 6% of the funds that poor households borrow come from formal sources. In 
Colombia, only 11% of farmers report accessing credit in a given year (CNA, 2016). In 
addition to this, as discussed in Giné (2011) farmers who do access credit, usually receive 
fewer resources than those requested. As such, they remain credit constraint at the 
intensive margin. 
While microfinance has introduced new credit opportunities into rural areas, 
microfinance institutions do not provide the full range of products needed by vulnerable 
households. Furthermore, the impact of microcredit on developmental outcomes like 
poverty remains uncertain (Banerjee et al. 2015; United Nations, 2006). Moreover, formal 
agricultural credit (i.e. credit granted by commercial and public banks for productive 
purposes) offers better conditions: lower interest rates, longer terms and larger credits 
(Giné, 2011; Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008). For instance, in Colombia, a recent survey 
shows that 92% of farmers prefer to finance their investment through credit from banks 
or cooperatives rather than through the more expensive informal sources (Econometría 
and M. Consultores, 2014).  
The agricultural credit market is characterized by being imperfect due to information and 
enforcement problems that lead to moral hazard and adverse selection (Conning and 
Udry, 2009; Boucher et al. 2009). Information is costly to access in rural areas where 
population and production units are dispersed, and physical and technological 
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infrastructure is precarious. Moreover, when financial institutions have access to 
information (e.g. on the experience of the producer or the return of productive project to 
be financed), the information does not provide certainty, as output and revenue are 
vulnerable to weather conditions and to fluctuations in international commodity prices 
and exchange rates. Furthermore, most farmers lack the human capital required to go 
through the credit application process, which requires filling out forms and certificates. 
State failures also affect the rural financial market. One example is weakness of property 
rights, which make assets like land unsuitable for collateralization (Conning and Udry, 
2005, ILO, 2015). The imperfections of the credit market have detrimental effects for 
development, as lacking access to capital prevents individuals from undertaking desired 
productive investments (Boucher et al. 2009). Empirical evidence shows for instance, that 
credit constraints in Peru reduce the value of agricultural output by 26% (Guirkinger and 
Boucher, 2008).  
Another characteristic of the rural credit market is that it is highly fragmented. This means 
that different types of farmers (big, medium, small) are sorted across different sources of 
credit. This sorting occurs not only across formal and informal sources, but also within 
formal ones (e.g. across public and private credit) (Giné 2011, Conning and Udry, 2005). 
Private banks tend to favour big farmers, as the fixed approval and disbursement costs 
are lower for high-value credits, and as large produces are perceived as more 
creditworthy, among others, because they are engaged in productive projects which are 
intensive in fixed capital that can be used as collateral, reducing credit risk (United 
Nations, 2006). Our fieldwork results further show that incentive schemes for credit 
analysts in private banks generate a bias towards allocating high-value credits, as their 
goals are set on the value of credit resources allocated, rather than on the number of credits 
allocated. Some private banks even set minimum credit sizes.  
On the other hand, public banks tend to favour credit allocations towards small farmers. 
This stems from normative considerations (i.e. the mission of public banks is not only 
being financial intermediaries, but also promoting rural development) as well as from 
public regulations (e.g. subsidized interest rates) favouring small farmers. This sorting of 
credit more broadly reflects the typical segmentation of agricultural production between 
small subsistence producers and large agroindustry exporters.  
The fragmentation of the credit market has relevant implications for development. First, 
as the available financing conditions (requirements and interest rates) affect a farmer’s 
decision on how, what and how much to invest and to produce (Conning and Udry, 2005). 
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Second, as different sources offer different additional benefits (e.g. complementary 
guarantees, payment schemes), conditioning the developmental impact of credit in each 
case. 
2.2.3 Collective Action and Agricultural credit 
 
Can social relations, and in particular, collective action, help farmers and communities 
access agricultural credit? The literature on microfinance provides evidence on how 
social relations affect informal credit dynamics. Studies show, for instance, that 
individuals with stronger social connections to other microfinance group members have 
higher repayment rates and higher savings (Karlan, 2007). There is also evidence that 
trust and trustworthiness arising from social relations increase group loan repayment 
(Cassar, Crowley and Wydick, 2007; Karlan, 2005). Fewer studies have analysed the 
impact of social relations on formal agricultural credit. The studies of Dufhues et al. 
(2013) and Guirkinger and Boucher (2008) show that social networks (vertical and 
between neighbours) reduce credit constraints, and there is evidence that participation in 
village committees and social organizations can increase the likelihood of an individual 
accessing credit (Okten and Osili, 2004; Markussen and Tarp, 2014). 
That participation in collective action organizations increases access to credit at the 
individual level does not imply that there are positive general equilibrium effects. This, 
as credit granted to RPO members could crowd-out credit available for non-members. 
General equilibrium effects will depend on how flexible the supply of credit is, as well as 
on whether there are positive spillover effects of collective action from RPO members to 
non-members (e.g. diffusion of information, imitation and capacity transfer from 
members to non-members or offering commercialization opportunities to non-members). 
We address this issue in our analysis. Before discussing the methodology employed to do 
so, we present information on the setting of the study.  
2.3 Setting 
 
2.3.1 The agricultural credit market in Colombia 
Increasing access to credit is a key policy challenge in Colombia. Not only to increase the 
economic growth of the agricultural sector, which has been below 2% during the last 20 
years (Junguito, Perfetti and Becerra, 2014), but also to reduce rural poverty of around 
40% (DANE, 2018). Despite its developmental potential, only a small share of 
Colombian farmers’ access agricultural credit. According to the agrarian census of 2013, 
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only 11% of rural producers access credit in a given year, while Cadena and Quintero 
(2015) estimate the rate of financial access in 25%, being below other countries in the 
region.  
Credit allocation has significantly increased during the last decade: the number of credits 
granted per year increased by 6 times between 2002 and 2015, while the real value of 
these increased by 25 times. Credit is allocated throughout the whole country (see Maps 
2.A1 and 2.A2 in Annex) 73. The average size of credits varies significantly by farmer 
type. For small farmers, it is $8 million COP, for medium ones $60 million COP and for 
big ones $526 million COP74. During the period of study (2002-2015) credit allocated to 
small farmers represented 84% of all credits (and 23% of total resources). This is 
consistent with the fact that 89% of all farmers in Colombia are small. Credit to medium-
scale farmers represented 14% of all credits (and 34% of resources), while credit for big 
producers represented 2% of credits (and 43% of resources)75. Figure 2.1 shows the 
increase in the value of credits granted during these years (panel A), especially to big 
farmers, as well as the increase in the number of credits (panel B), especially to small 
farmers. It also evidences that the number of credits granted to medium producers (and 
their value) have not increased significantly.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
73 Note that there exist no mechanisms of credit targeting in Colombia to particular regions or types of 
farmer. We analyse whether there is evidence of a political budget cycle in the provision of credit by 
comparing credit allocated in electoral and non-electoral years, and find no evidence for this. 
74 Credit is categorized according to size of farmer, which is defined by FINAGRO according to the value of 
capital owned. Small farmers are those whose capital is worth less than $93 million COP (USD 34.370), 
and medium size farmers are those whose capital is worth less than $3,467 million COP (USD 1.28 million). 
These differences are associated with the type of product produced by each type of farmer, which have 
different investment needs. For example, big producers tend to produce sugar, rice and palm oil, which 
require high capital investments. 
75 While credit resources are highly concentrated among big farmers, their access rate is lower than that 
of small and medium farmers (12% vs. 9%) (CNA, 2016), suggesting that big farmers are able to self-
finance. 
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Figure 2.1 Real value and number of credits granted by type of producer 
 
Source: Finagro 
The majority (65%) of credits are granted by the public bank, while private banks 
allocated 20% of all credits76. Private credits are on average larger than public ones, 
although interest rates are similar as the government regulates both (e.g. setting interest 
rate ceilings)77. The processing time and requirements do vary, what affects credit 
demand, as processing time and closeness to bank branches drive the preference of 
farmers over sources of credit (Benson, 2020). Figure 2.2 shows the dynamics of credit 
allocation by source. It evidences that while the increase in the value of credits (total 
resources) was higher for private credit, the increase in the number of credits allocated 
was higher for public credit.  
                                                             
76 Commercial banks in Colombia are forced by law to invest a fixed share of their check and savings 
accounts in TDAs (Agricultural Development Titles). These resources are managed by Finagro, a second 
level bank, and are transferred to the public Agricultural Bank (Banco Agrario) to finance its credit 
allocations. Commercial banks have the alternative of granting agricultural credits directly, which 
substitute for the forced investment requirements. Public loan guarantees are another important policy 
tool, covering 88% of credits and acting as an incentive for credit supply and demand. Private credit 
includes agricultural microcredit granted by financial institutions (starting 2015).  
77 Interest rate ceilings favouring small farmers (interest rates: 12% vs. 13% for medium and 14,6% for 
big). This aims at counteracting the natural tendency of the market to charge higher interest rates for 
small loans (Banerjee and Dufflo, 2010). The market interest rate for small credits is lower in the public 
bank than in commercial banks, while for larger credits, banks can offer more competitive interest rates. 
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Figure 2.2 Real value (panel A) and number (panel B) of credits granted by source 
 
Source: Finagro 
The remaining share of credits are granted by financial and credit cooperatives78. It is 
worth noting that financial cooperatives differ from agricultural cooperatives. The first 
are solely financial institutions and operate similarly to banks, while the second are aimed 
at collective production and/or commercialization. It is also worth noting that cooperative 
credit constitutes a small share of all credits and that it offers less beneficial conditions 
than public or credit banks. This, as interest rates are not regulated, and as the 
geographical presence of financial cooperatives is reduced.79  
2.3.2 Collective action in rural Colombia 
Little is known about RPOs in Colombia, to the extent that we are the first study to 
calculate the number of existing organizations (for details on the calculation, refer to the 
data section). We build a database relying on novel data on RPOs, and find that between 
2002 and 2015, over 27,000 RPOs were created and formally registered80 throughout the 
country (see Map 2.A3 and 2.A4 in the Annex). We find that exit rates are much lower 
                                                             
78 Estimation based on data from the Agricultural Census, as cooperative credit under Finagro conditions 
(and thus included in Finagro data) constitutes a marginal share.  
79 For a detailed description of credit conditions and benefits across sources, see Table 2.A1 in the Annex. 
80 RPOs register with the Chambers of Commerce. The registry process is not costly, but requires members 
to fill out forms, establish their own statutes, among others.  
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than entry rates: the average number of RPOs cancelled per year is equivalent to 5% the 
average number of RPOs created81.  
RPOs tend to focus on the production of a particular product, the most common being 
coffee, fruits, cocoa, cattle ranching and milking82. Our fieldwork results evidence that 
RPOs operate at a very local level (vereda), and that RPO members are usually similar in 
size and agricultural activity. As discussed in Benson (2020), there is a high heterogeneity 
in the functioning and success of RPOs, what is related to the way in which the 
organizations emerge: successful RPOs tend to be created organically, as bottom-up 
initiatives with production and long-term objectives. In contrast, less successful RPOs are 
created inorganically, as short term vehicles for accessing sporadic benefits offered by 
top-down external sources (e.g. accessing resources from a public programs targeted 
towards organized farmers).  
According to the agrarian census, 10% of rural producers in Colombia are members of 
RPOs. Participation rates across farmer size are similar: 10% for small, 11% for medium 
and 12% for large83. As further analysis, we estimate a Logit model of the predictors of 
RPO participation, and find that the main predictors of RPO participation are having 
commercial activity, receiving technical assistance and having agricultural machinery84.  
Regarding the relation between credit allocation and collective action, in Figure 2.3 we 
show credit dynamics separately for two types of municipalities based on their levels of 
collective action. Collective action is measured as the number of RPOs per capita in a 
municipality, and high (low) refers to being above (below) the national average. The 
figure evidences that municipalities with high levels of collective action have higher 
access to credit (both on the extensive and the intensive margin) and that the difference 
relative to low collective action municipalities increases throughout time. This provides 
descriptive evidence of the relation that will be formally analysed in the next sections.  
                                                             
81 There can be underreporting of cancellations. However, RPOs are legally required (by Decree 019 of 
2012) to update their registry annually, and thus we have information on the last update date, allowing 
us to identify whether RPOs are active.  
82 The categorization of products is based on the RPOs that include the product in the organization’s name 
(around a third of the RPOs). Based on individual level data from the Census, we find that 69% of members 
engage in agricultural commercial activity, 19% in livestock production, while fishery and forestry account 
for less than 3%. There are no significant differences in the rate of RPO participation according to activity.  
83 Note that these size categories are not comparable to the small, medium and big farmers’ credit 
categories, which are defined based on capital, not plot size.  
84 Farmers do not report accessing credit as a principal reason for joining RPOs Results available upon 
request 
90 
 
Figure 2.3 Average value and number of credits allocated, by level of collective 
action 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on information from RUES, INCODER and CEDE.  
 
2.4 Data 
 
The individual level analysis is based on census data for over 2,3 million rural 
producers85. Data comes from the Agrarian Census of 2013, and includes self-reports of 
RPO membership, access to credit, farmer age, size (based on plot size), education level, 
access to health, ethnic background, ownership of agricultural machinery and access to 
technical assistance.  
The municipality level analysis relies on secondary data from various sources. 
Information on credit comes from Finagro and includes the total number and value of 
credits granted per year at the municipality level. Credit data is disaggregated according 
to farmer type (small, medium and big86), and source (public bank, private banks). It does 
                                                             
85 Census data refers to agricultural productive units, UPA (which is the unit of analysis in the CNA). UPA 
is the unit of organization for production under one producer’s charge. Only 4% of UPA are composed by 
more than one household. For simplicity, we use the term producers instead of UPAs.  
86 Finagro classification based on the value of assets of the farmer. Small farmers are those whose capital 
is worth less than $93 million COP (USD 34.370), and medium size farmers are those whose capital is 
worth less than $3,467 million COP (USD 1.28 million).  
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not include credit granted by financial cooperatives, as this information is not reported87. 
Data on the number of RPOs per municipality is novel. We built it relying on microdata 
from the Unique Registry of Solidarity Enterprises (RUES) from Confecamaras, in which 
all social organizations are required to register by law88. Relying on an algorithm 
combining organization name, type and economic activity, we identified 27.000 RPOs, 
from a universe of 260.000 social organizations.  
Data on local economic and social conditions was obtained from the municipality panel 
of the Centre for Research in Economic Development (CEDE). Information on homicide 
rates comes from the Ministry of Defence. Data on intragovernmental transfers and local 
tax revenues comes from DNP. Data on weather conditions comes from IDEAM, based 
on which we built a variable of weather shocks (measuring strong deviations from 
historical month-municipality average rain levels). Summary statistics are presented in 
Table 2.A2 in the Annex.  
2.5 Empirical strategy  
This section details the econometric strategy for analysing the relation between collective 
action, in the form of RPOs, and access to agricultural credit. The individual level analysis 
is based on a Logit model. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether an 
individual has access to credit. The independent variable is a dummy indicating whether 
a farmer is member of an RPO. Socioeconomic controls include age, gender, level of 
education, access to machinery, access to technical assistance, and participation in other 
social organizations.  
The municipality level analysis is based on a fixed effect panel model for 1,100 
municipalities between 2002 and 2015, as described in Equation 2.1: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2  𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 +  𝛾𝑑,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   (2.1) 
The dependent variable 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 corresponds to the number of credits granted per capita
89 in 
municipality 𝑖 during year 𝑡. This outcome variable measures access to credit at the 
                                                             
87 It does include credit granted by financial cooperatives regulated under Finagro conditions, but this is a 
marginal share of credits. There is no information on credit granted by suppliers, money lenders or other 
sources either. 
88 Social organizations in Colombia must register in the RUES (with a cost of 0.7% of their patrimony), and 
update their registry annually. RPOs have incentives to do so, as this is required if they want to for 
example, access credit or benefit from a public program. Nonetheless, there can be underreporting of 
RPOs created.  
89 For the dependent and independent variables, per capita refers to rural population  
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extensive margin. As a second outcome variable, we measure access to credit at the 
intensive margin, with 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 being the real value of credits allocated per capita in a 
municipality. The independent variable is 𝐶𝐴 (Collective Action), measured as the 
number of RPOs per thousand rural inhabitants in municipality i in year t.  There is no 
panel data for the number of farmers participating in RPOs. This information is only 
available for the census year. As a robustness test, we run a cross section analysis with 
this alternative measure90 of CA. 
Equation 2.1 includes a vector (𝑋) of observable municipality characteristics that vary in 
time and affect credit provision. These include transfers from the central and departmental 
government, controlling for public investment in the agricultural sector and others, which 
can affect credit dynamics. We also include local tax revenues to control for the 
dynamism of the local economy, accounting for instance, for price shocks that affect 
municipalities differently. We control as well for the number of homicides per capita as 
a measure of insecurity, conflict and risk (this variable also relates to the strength of state 
presence). Finally, we control for weather shocks which can directly affect the demand 
for investment. The last term in the equations is ϵit. The standard errors are clustered at 
the municipality level to control for potential serial and spatial correlation. 
The specification includes a municipality fixed effect (μi) that controls for time invariant 
municipality characteristics, for example, distance to the capital city (market integration), 
trust, entrepreneurial culture and other underlying municipality characteristics. This fixed 
effect also controls for variables that do not vary significantly over short periods of time 
(e.g. land quality, inequality, education levels, strength of economic institutions). We 
include as well a time fixed effect (𝛿𝑡) controlling for aggregate variations that occur 
during a given period and affect all municipalities (e.g. macroeconomic cycles). Finally, 
we include a department-time fixed effect (𝛾𝑟,𝑡) which controls for aggregate variations 
that occur during a period and affect all municipalities within a department (e.g. a natural 
disaster or a department economic shock). To account for further endogeneity concerns, 
in the robustness test section, we estimate the results relying on two additional models 
(differences in differences).  
                                                             
90 The number of RPOS does not reflect RPO size or success. However, there is no consensus on the impact 
of RPO size on RPO success: while big RPOs generate benefits to more farmers, the costs of collective 
action and the incentives to free ride might be higher.  
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2.6 Results  
2.6.1 Individual level analysis 
The results of the Logit model are presented in Table 2.1. They evidence that collective 
action, measured as RPO membership, increases the likelihood of a farmer demanding a 
credit by 2,5 times. The result is robust to the inclusion of controls (Column 2). We also 
estimate the effect on the likelihood of credit supply conditional on demand91 (Columns 
3 and 4). The coefficient for the supply side effect is positive and robust, but the effect is 
half the size (1,2 times) of the demand-side effect. The results further evidence that RPO 
membership is a strong predictor of access to credit: the magnitude of its effect is larger 
than that of other farmer characteristics, including gender, age, ethnicity, education, 
owning agricultural machinery, participating in other social organizations or accessing 
the subsidized health system (a proxy for poverty).  
Table 2.1 Logit model – Individual access to credit 
  
Probability of  
credit demand 
Probability of credit supply 
 conditional on demand 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
           
RPO member 0.927*** 0.833***  0.177*** 0.171*** 
 [0.029] [0.030]  [0.032] [0.033] 
Received Technical Assistance 0.870*** 0.752***  0.301*** 0.265*** 
 [0.029] [0.026]  [0.029] [0.029] 
Commercial activity 1.497*** 1.050***  0.632*** 0.523*** 
 [0.032] [0.031]  [0.033] [0.047] 
Owns agricultural machinery 0.597*** 0.482***  0.143*** 0.144*** 
 [0.024] [0.024]  [0.028] [0.030] 
Community organization member 0.052 0.094*  -0.159*** -0.145*** 
 [0.051] [0.054]  [0.051] [0.056] 
Male  0.298***   0.077*** 
  [0.017]   [0.026] 
Above average age  -0.102***   -0.213*** 
  [0.012]   [0.021] 
Finished primary  0.005   -0.225*** 
  [0.016]   [0.023] 
Private health   -0.245***   -0.006 
  [0.024]   [0.030] 
Ethnic background  -0.445***   -0.033 
  [0.115]   [0.115] 
Constant -3.863*** -3.338***  1.298*** 1.514*** 
 [0.045] [0.045]  [0.044] [0.054] 
      
                                                             
91  There are some differences in the number of credits approved reported by Finagro and by the census 
data.  
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Observations 2,259,298 1,068,983  250,230 155,910 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the municipality level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are 
based on self-reports of credit request and access during 2013. The number of observations for the likelihood of credit 
supply conditional on demand is lower, as it is estimated only for producers who requested credit. The estimates in 
columns 2 and 4 have lower number of observations given that the additional controls are not reported for all producers. 
A small share of agricultural productive unites (UPA) had more than one head (leader). For these, age is the average 
age, while finished primary and access to private health, were coded as one if the individual variables for at least one 
of the heads took the value of one.  
 
2.6.2 Municipality level analysis 
 
Table 2.2 presents the results of the municipality level analysis. Columns 1 to 3 show the 
effect of collective action on the extensive margin of credit access (total number of 
credits), while Columns 4 to 6 show the effects on the intensive margin (total value of 
credits). The results evidence that collective action measured as the number of RPOs per 
capita, has a positive and statistically significant effect on both margins. The effects are 
robust to the inclusion of different sets of controls. In our preferred specification, which 
includes only exogenous controls (Columns 2 and 4), the coefficients are equivalent to 
0.02 standard deviations for the total number of credits, and 0.06 for the value of credits. 
The greater increase in the value of credits granted, implies a positive effect of CA on the 
average size of credits allocated.  
Table 2.2 FE estimations – Total number and value of credits 
Dependent variable:  
Number of credits  
(per capita) 
Value of credits  
(per capita) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RPO (per thousand rural 
inhabitants) 1.204** 1.146** 1.679** 0.600*** 0.315** 0.502*** 
 [0.563] [0.574] [0.687] [0.189] [0.123] [0.165] 
Rain shock (cms)  0.002** 0.001*  0.000 0.000 
  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.000] [0.000] 
Lag Local fiscal revenue (per 
capita)   -3.036***   0.921** 
   [1.168]   [0.363] 
Lag National transfers (per 
capita)   14.601***   -0.082 
   [2.919]   [0.491] 
Lag Homicides (per capita)   -1.130***   -0.019 
   [0.271]   [0.028] 
Constant 7.455*** 3.760* -4.838* 0.670*** 0.243** 0.013 
 [1.812] [2.122] [2.768] [0.040] [0.108] [0.293] 
       
Observations 15,615 14,373 11,980 15,615 14,373 11,980 
R-squared 0.421 0.436 0.443 0.284 0.217 0.220 
Number of Municipalities 1,117 1,115 1,077 1,117 1,115 1,077 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Department-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the municipality level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All 
monetary variables in real terms. Homicides per capita in logs. Estimations exclude the five principal cities 
in the country. Specifications with only municipality fixed effects, with municipality and year fixed effects, 
and with region-year fixed effects generate consistent results. 
 
The former results evidence the existence of positive general equilibrium effects. This 
implies that rather than just a re-composition of credit provision between RPO members 
and non-members, collective action generates aggregate increases in credit, being an 
instrument for local financial development. The existence of positive general equilibrium 
effects implies that the supply of credit is flexible, and as such, an increase in access to 
credit of members does not crowd-out resources available for non-members92. General 
equilibrium results also suggest that collective action in the form of RPOs generates 
spillover effects, that is, these organizations also generate benefits to non-members and 
the community in general. Our fieldwork results evidence, for instance, that some RPOs 
allow non-members to commercialize their products through them. We also find that there 
is informal sharing of information between members and non-members, and that RPOs 
generate jobs, increasing the dynamism of the local economy. Furthermore, we find that 
RPOs are engaged in social activities such as fixing roads, which can open market 
opportunities increasing the demand for credit, as well as the willingness of banks to 
supply credit. Finally, we find that RPOs empower communities to raise their voices for 
political demands, bringing resources and new projects to the municipality, what can also 
increase the aggregate demand for credit. 
2.6.3 Heterogeneous effects by type of producer and credit source 
We now present the results differentiating credit granted to small, medium and big 
farmers, and by the public or private banks. The results in Table 2.3 show that CA has a 
positive aggregate effect on credit granted to small farmers (both on the number and value 
of credits), but solely via increases in public credit. For big producers, the effect is also 
significant at both margins, but only through increases in private credit. In the case of 
medium-scale producers, neither the extensive or intensive margin effects are statistically 
significant.  
 
                                                             
92 Our fieldwork results corroborate this: all bank directors and analysts interviewed agreed that banks 
have surplus resources. 
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Table 2.3 FE estimations – Number and value of credits by type of producer and source 
 
Number of credits (per capita) Value of credits (per capita) 
  
Public credit Private credit Public credit Private credit 
 Big  Medium Small Big  Medium Small Big  Medium Small Big  Medium Small 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
RPO (pc) 0.007 0.005 1.094** 0.064* 0.015 0.053 -0.003 0.003 0.017* 0.366** -0.018 -0.002 
 [0.013] [0.039] [0.527] [0.036] [0.041] [0.047] [0.002] [0.006] [0.009] [0.153] [0.011] [0.002] 
Rain shock (cms) -0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 1.094*** 1.178*** 3.686* 0.238* 0.363*** 0.211** 0.029*** 0.036*** 0.061*** -0.045 0.002 0.007* 
 [0.182] [0.097] [1.893] [0.133] [0.129] [0.106] [0.007] [0.009] [0.014] [0.095] [0.023] [0.004] 
             
Observations 15,455 15,455 15,455 15,455 15,455 15,455 15,455 15,455 15,455 15,455 15,455 15,455 
R-squared 0.481 0.360 0.400 0.125 0.196 0.272 0.036 0.398 0.590 0.096 0.252 0.228 
No. Municipalities 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Department-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the municipality level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All monetary variables in real terms. Estimations exclude the five 
principal cities in the country. Specifications with only municipality fixed effects, with municipality and year fixed effects, and with region-year fixed effects generate very 
similar results.  
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The results showing that the general equilibrium effect of CA is positive for small and big 
farmers but not for medium ones are non-trivial. One could expect the effect of collective action 
to be insignificant for big farmers, as these already face loose credit constraints. For instances, 
big producers can easily proof their creditworthiness (as they have high levels of income and 
assets) and have the human and financial capital required to cover the transaction costs of credit 
(e.g. obtaining financial certificates, land rights certificates). Under such conditions, the effect 
of collective action could be irrelevant for further reducing credit constraints. For small 
farmers, one could also expect the effect of collective action to be non-significant, if the credit 
constraints that these farmers face are too stringent (e.g. lacking land or other assets required 
as collateral), in which case the effect of CA would not be enough to effectively increase access 
to credit. In contrast to these hypothesis, we show that CA has a positive effect on both types 
of farmers, while there is no effect for medium farmers. 
A first explanation for the above could be heterogeneity in the type of farmer that participates 
in RPOs, and thus exploits its benefits. If his was the case, we should find RPO participation 
rates of small and big farmers to be significantly higher than those of medium-scale farmers. 
This is not what we find, as participation rates are similar across farmer types (10% for small, 
11% for medium and 12% for large).  
We rather argue that the heterogeneous results stem from contextual characteristics binding the 
effect of collective action. In this case, the binding contextual condition is the structural 
segmentation of the agricultural credit market across farmer type and credit sources. As was 
discussed in Section 2, private credit tends to be biased towards big producers, whereas public 
credit tends to be biased towards small ones, leaving medium farmers as “the missing middle” 
(United Nations, 2006). We now discuss this in more detail.  
Small farmers  
To further analyse the heterogeneous effects, we estimate the individual level Logit models by 
size of farmer. Tables 2.A3 and 2.A4 in the Annex show that for small farmers, RPO 
membership increases the demand for all sources of credits (public, private and cooperative), 
but the effect is strongest for public credit. Census data further shows that among the small 
farmers that participate in RPOs, 20% have access to public credit, whereas only 5% access 
private credit and 4% cooperative credit (CNA, 2016). The above implies that while collective 
action increases the demand for credit, small farmers continue to meet this demand via public 
credit. This is likely the result of public credit being cheaper (i.e. offering lower interest rates 
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than commercial banks), and of it entailing lower transaction costs. Our fieldwork results 
evidenced that for accessing public credit, small farmers only have to certify access to land 
(ownership or tenancy) and comment on how they plan to use the credit resources. The public 
bank agent then fills out the request forms for them, what reduces transaction costs. In contrast, 
when a small farmer requests a private credit, he has to present a fully detailed productive 
project (structured by a certified agronomist), and a full financial report (certified by an 
accountant). He also has to pay for the agronomic revision of the productive project. Transport 
and opportunity costs are also higher for accessing private credit, as not all municipalities have 
private bank branches: in almost half of the Colombian municipalities, the public bank is the 
only present financial institution. RPO membership can do little to reduce these structural 
conditions. This evidences how contextual conditions bind the effect of collective action.  
The results on Table 2.A3 and 2.A4 also show that collective action generates a supply-side 
effect, which is only significant for small farmers.  We cannot test whether the supply effect 
acts only through public credit, as information on the conditional approval of credit is not 
disaggregated by source. However, this is likely the case, for reasons aforementioned (the 
incentive, risk and cost-related negative bias of banks against small credits). Again, this result 
suggests that collective action replicates rather than counteracts the segmentation of the credit 
market (i.e. the effect of collective action is not sufficient to counteract the structural supply-
side credit constraints that small farmers face for accessing private credit).  
Why should we worry about small farmers continuing to be constrained from accessing private 
credit? Fieldwork evidences that this type of farmer does have a demand for private credit, and 
that this demand is not being met. One reason why small farmers prefer private credit, is that 
it offers benefits in terms of the timing of approval. While private banks approve credits in less 
than two weeks, the public banks usually takes more than a month. Farmers report the timing 
of credit to be a determinant issue for their credit decisions, as investments in agricultural 
activity have set times based on production and weather cycles. Indeed, farmers reported being 
willing to request informal loans (microfinance or money lenders) because of the quick 
approval, even if interest rates can be 10 times higher than those of formal sources.  
Big farmers 
The results in Table 2.A3 and 2.A4 indicate that for big farmers, the effect of collective action 
acts only via increases in the demand (the effect of RPO membership does not increase the 
likelihood of credit approval, but does increase the likelihood of credit request). The null 
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supply-side effect is likely due to big farmers de facto experiencing loose credit constraints, so 
that the potential of collective action in farther loosening these is not relevant. This contrasts 
with the existence of a demand-side effect.  We find that a big farmer who is part of an RPO, 
is 8 times more likely to access credit than a big farmer who is not. Our fieldwork results 
suggest that the increase in the demand for credit stems from collective action enabling big 
farmers to engage in considerably large collective projects (for example a joint fruit processing 
unit), which require large investments they cannot self-finance. For regular-sized investments, 
big farmers do opt for self-finance: census data shows that their rate of access to credit is 
actually lower than that of small or medium farmers. Once big farmers organise and engage in 
large-scale collective projects they demand credit. And due to the large size of investments, 
this demand is only met by private banks (the public bank has a cap on the size of farmers to 
which it can provide credit). Indeed, for big farmers, the average size of a private credit is 6,4 
times larger than that of public credit. The above results imply that CA replicates the structural 
segmentation of private credit in favour of large operations, what further raises the levels of 
inequality in the rural financial market (in which big farmers constitute 1,2% of all farmers, 
but receive 43% of total credit resources and 67% of total private credit resources).  
Medium farmers 
The municipality level estimations show that for medium farmers, there are no general 
equilibrium effects. The analysis at the individual level (Tables 2.A3 and 2.A4) does evidence 
a positive demand-side effect. This effect is strongest for cooperative credit (i.e. granted by 
financial/credit cooperatives). However, we are not able to test whether there is a general 
equilibrium effect on cooperative credit, as this information is not reported at the municipality 
level.  
That medium farmers prefer to demand cooperative credit is likely the result of transaction 
costs. While the public bank has loose requirements for small farmers, it has stringent 
requirements for medium ones, who need to present certified productive projects, financial 
states and have to pay for the cost of issuing a mortgage. Private banks also request the above. 
Our fieldwork results evidence that these costs can add up to US 200. Financial cooperatives 
do not require any of the above.  
Supply-side effects also sort medium farmers away from public and private credit. As 
mentioned previously, the public bank favours credit for small farmers due to normative 
reasons, while private banks favour large credits due to incentive, cost and risk considerations. 
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Under these conditions, medium-scale farmers are left financially underserved by both sources. 
Indeed, Figure 2.1 in Section 3 evidenced that contrary to credit for small and big farmers, 
credit for medium farmers did not increase significantly between 2002 and 2015. 
Under a developmental perspective, the sorting of medium farmers away from private and 
public credit has negative consequences. First, there is a limited supply of cooperative credit: 
in Colombia it only represents 10% of all credits (CNA, 2016) and only 13% of municipality 
have financial cooperatives (Misión Rural, 2014). Second, cooperative credit is generally not 
granted under regulated preferential (Finagro) conditions, so interest rates are higher and it 
does not offer additional incentives (like the Rural Capitalization Incentive - ICR), or guarantee 
schemes (FAG). The results imply that the effect of CA is not sufficient to counteract this 
structural sorting of farmers across sources of credit.  
2.7 Robustness Checks 
We now test the robustness of the results to different specifications and estimation strategies. 
First, we test for robustness to omitted variables bias. To this end, we estimate a cross section 
in which we include 23 different control variables reported in the agrarian census for the year 
2013. Table 2.A5 in the Annex present the results, evidencing their robustness to the inclusion 
of different sets of controls, both for the number of credits allocated and for the value of credits 
allocated. 
We also check for the robustness of the results to alternative measures of collective action. We 
estimate the results employing a measure of associational density (number of RPO members 
over rural population)93, rather than total number of RPOs. The results are robust to this 
measure 94.  
                                                             
93 Note that census data corresponds to self-reported participation in RPOs, not necessarily in formal ones, what 
can generate differences with our RPO data, which corresponds solely to formal RPOs. 
94 Available upon request 
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To address for further endogeneity concerns not accounted for in the Fixed Effects model95, 
we estimate a differences-in-differences model with multiple treatment groups and periods96. 
We analyse increases in collective action (an increase in the number of RPOs in a municipality) 
as the treatment indicator (which switches on at different times for different municipalities). 
We focus on a subsample of 532 municipalities (48% of all municipalities) which start with no 
treatment (i.e. no increase in the number of RPOs)97. This strategy compares municipalities in 
which the level of collective action increased, with similar municipalities where it could have 
increased, but it did not98.  We show that by 2015 basically all municipalities have switched on 
the treatment (Figure 2.A1), that the municipalities in this subsample are scattered throughout 
the country (Map 2.A5) and that these municipalities are in general similar to the average 
Colombian municipality (Table 2.A6). 
The reduced form equation of this model is: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜑𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡    (2.2) 
Where 𝛽2 is the coefficient of interest and 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is the treatment indicator (which varies across 
municipality and year). As in the fixed effect model, we include observable controls, as well 
as municipality, time and department-year fixed effects. The municipality fixed effect captures 
the ex-ante differences in collective action levels. In a model with multiple treatment groups 
and multiple periods, the underlying assumption for identification is that counterfactual 
outcomes in the absence of the treatment are independent of treatment. For DD with multiple 
treatment and control groups, this is tested running regressions of leads and lags of treatment 
take on (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). These are formalized as:  
                                                             
95 Controlling for time varying observables and including municipality, year and department-year fixed effects 
contributes to solving for endogeneity related to omitted variable bias; however, these controls do not account 
for endogeneity caused by municipality and time-varying unobserved variables that can affect access to credit. 
There could also be endogeneity due to reverse causality: For example, Fischer and Qaim (2012) find that access 
to credit has a positive effect on participation in farmer organizations, and Shoji et al. (2012) show that 
households who face credit constraints reduce their investment in social capital. However, our fieldwork 
revealed that credit dynamics do not explain the decision to constitute or join RPOs.  
96 We tried to estimate a regular DD employing as treatment a legal shock that affected RPO dynamics. 
However, this national level legal change affected all municipalities, and thus we cannot define a sole treatment 
and control group.   
97 Ideally we would define the subsample as those municipalities with zero RPOs. However, these (123) 
municipalities are statistically different to the rest of the municipalities in the country in several socioeconomic 
dimensions, making them a non-representative subsample. Furthermore, the sample size would reduce the 
power of the estimations.  
98 Note that although possible contagion effects from treatment to control municipalities cannot be ruled out, 
Benson (2019) documents how the majority of RPOs operate solely at the municipality level, suggesting that 
contagion effects should not be a major threat. 
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𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽
𝑞
𝑗=−𝑚 𝑗
𝑇𝑖,𝑡(𝑡 = 𝑘 + 𝑗) +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡    (2.3) 
Where k is the time at which the treatment is switched on in municipality i. The test for the DD 
assumption is that 𝛽𝑗 = 0 for all j<0.  
The Differences in Differences (DD) estimations yield consistent results to the FE model. Table 
2.4, shows that increases in the number of RPOs generate increases in access to credit. 
Although the coefficients at both margins are positive, the effect at the intensive margin is not 
significant at conventional levels. Figure 2.A2 in the Annex plots the coefficients and 
confidence intervals of the test of leads and lags of treatment adoption on both outcome 
variables. They show that the indicator variables for periods prior to the adoption of treatment 
are not significant, providing evidence of the adequacy of the DD estimations.  
Table 2.4 Differences in Differences – Total number and value of credits 
Dependent variable:  Number of Credits 
(per capita) 
Value of Credits 
(per capita) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Increase in RPOs 𝑖,𝑡 3.100*** 2.994*** 2.384** 1.697* 0.192 0.215 0.207 0.117 
 [1.113] [1.071] [1.084] [1.018] [0.199] [0.223] [0.201] [0.187] 
Rain shock (cms)  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005***  0.000* 0.000** 0.000*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Lag Local fiscal revenue (per capita)   -3.797***    1.850*  
   [1.032]    [0.987]  
Lag National transfers (per capita)   7.098***    -0.042  
   [2.501]    [0.185]  
Constant 5.486*** 3.054*** 2.786*** -2.838** 0.068 0.012 -0.045 0.035 
 [0.693] [1.059] [1.068] [1.281] [0.043] [0.067] [0.089] [0.067] 
Observations 7,416 6,783 6,739 6,763 7,416 6,783 6,739 6,763 
R-squared 0.302 0.329 0.339 0.376 0.095 0.098 0.146 0.178 
Number of municipalities 532 528 526 526 532 528 526 526 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Region-year FE    YES    YES 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All 
monetary variables in real terms. Estimations exclude the five principal cities in the country. We include Region-
year fixed effects instead of Department-year FE as the sample is smaller and in around a third of departments it 
includes less than 5 municipalities. We do not include homicides in the set of socioeconomic controls due to 
missing values which reduce the number of observations by more than half.  
 
The Differences in Differences results for the heterogeneous effects (Table 2.5) are also largely 
consistent with the FE model. The increase on access to credit for small farmers is explained 
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by increases in access to public credit, and that there are no significant effects on either source 
for medium farmers. The results for big farmers are positive, but lose statistical significance. 
Figures 2.A3 and 2.A4 in the Annex present the results for the lead and lags test, and evidence 
the adequacy of the estimation, as the lags of the treatment are not statistically significant.  
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Table 2.5 Differences in Differences – Number and value of credits by producer type and source 
 
Number of credits (per capita) Value of credits (per capita) 
  
Public credit Private credit Public credit Private credit 
 Big  Medium Small Big  Medium Small Big  Medium Small Big  Medium Small 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Increase in RPOs 𝑖,𝑡 -0.015 0.012 3.054*** 0.039 -0.077 0.014 -0.007 0.009 0.064*** 0.177 -0.025* -0.002 
 [0.041] [0.174] [1.020] [0.041] [0.049] [0.081] [0.005] [0.014] [0.019] [0.221] [0.014] [0.001] 
Rain shock (cms) -0.000 0.000 0.004*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 1.400*** -0.011 1.082 0.345*** 0.160*** 0.082 0.017** 0.002 -0.012 -0.004 0.007 0.002 
 [0.093] [0.148] [0.999] [0.041] [0.053] [0.110] [0.007] [0.010] [0.013] [0.057] [0.013] [0.001] 
             
Observations 6,783 6,783 6,783 6,783 6,783 6,783 6,783 6,783 6,783 6,783 6,783 6,783 
R-squared 0.258 0.184 0.303 0.028 0.072 0.155 0.006 0.232 0.489 0.010 0.107 0.076 
No. Municipalities 528 528 528 528 528 528 528 528 528 528 528 528 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
             
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the municipality level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All monetary variables in real terms. Estimations exclude the five 
principal cities in the country. Results are robust to the inclusion of controls. In this table we present our preferred specification, just including the rain shock.
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 2.8 The mechanisms 
In this section we briefly discuss the demand and supply side mechanisms through which 
collective action increases access to credit. Benson (2020) offers a detailed discussion of these 
mechanisms, as well as a description of the mixed methods methodology through which they 
were identified.  
Our quantitative results showing that banks are 1,2 times more likely to approve individual 
credit to RPO members, relative to non-members, evidence a supply-side effect. On this regard, 
Benson (2020) finds that the supply of credit increases through several mechanisms. Banks 
perceive RPO members to be more creditworthy and thus are more likely to approve a credit 
request. The author discusses how RPO membership provides signals of farmer quality 
(through financial and commercial references provided by the organization) and project 
quality. For instance, banks are aware that through these organizations, farmers access inputs 
at lower prices (as they buy inputs without intermediaries and at scale quantities), access 
technology and technical assistance (mainly through public programs targeted at the 
organizations), access markets more easily (through joint direct commercialization) and have 
projects with lower risks (among others, as there is monitoring and a lower price volatility via 
output contracts). The preference for organized farmers holds at the aggregate level. For 
example, one of the bank directors interviewed mentioned that banks are more likely to offer 
credit in areas that are more organized, as this lowers the overall risk of granting credit. Overall, 
RPO membership reduces problems of imperfect and asymmetric information, increasing the 
likelihood of credit supply. They supply of credit increases not only through this mechanism, 
but more generally, as RPOs grant in-house credit to their members, and as banks grant 
associative credits directed solely towards RPOs. 
With respect to the demand-side effect, our quantitative results show that RPO members are 
2,5 times more likely to request agricultural credit than non-members. Benson (2020) finds that 
increases in the demand stem from RPO members engaging in new, larger and more profitable 
productive projects, which require investment. New projects emerge through access to public 
programs (granting resources for new projects), through social imitation effects and through 
peer leadership. Projects become larger and more profitable as a result of the previously 
discussed improved access to inputs, technology and output markets stemming from horizontal 
and vertical integration of farmers.  
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Another demand-side mechanism identified in Benson (2020) is collective action lowering 
transaction costs. This occurs as RPOs constitute a social network through which information 
flows, lowering the cost of accessing information about credit opportunities and about the 
credit application process. Finally, RPOs reduce risk credit constraints, as they constitute a 
safety net, among others, granting informal credit for emergencies, such as liquidity problems 
for meeting formal credit obligations.  
2.9 Conclusion  
This paper analyses the relation between collective action in the form of Rural Producer 
Organizations (RPOs) and access to agricultural credit. We find evidence of a positive effect 
at both the individual and local level. Our results show that RPOs not only ease access to input 
and output markets, as previous studies have found (Desai and Joshi, 2014; Verhofstadt and 
Maertens, 2014; Vandeplas et al. 2013), but they also increase access to the credit market. We 
find evidence of positive general equilibrium effects. This implies that rather than collective 
action increasing access to credit for some (RPO members) while crowding-out credit available 
for others (non-members), it generates aggregate increases in access to credit, being a novel 
instrument to promote rural financial development.  
Our results also show that the effect of collective action on access to credit is heterogeneous 
according to farmer type and credit source. It is positive for small and big farmers, but null for 
medium ones. Our analysis points towards these differential effects being the result of binding 
contextual conditions, in particular, the existing segmentation of the market across credit 
sources and farmer types. 
On a policy perspective, the effect of CA on access to credit could be enhanced by 
institutionalizing the inputs that CA organizations such as RPOs can provide to the financial 
sector. First, as a source of information. Through these organizations, banks could formally 
and periodically gather information on local conditions (production conditions, 
commercialization opportunities, prevalent risks) and potential clients (RPO members, 
reference letters). Second, RPOs could be used as a mechanism to reduce search and allocation 
costs, by offering information and credit in a block to several farmers (i.e. RPO members) at a 
time. For instance, banks could target RPOs to provide individual credit in a block to several 
of its members. This is particularly relevant as a mechanism enabling banks to allocate small 
credits, which are too costly to allocate one by one, Third, RPOs could be used as diffusers of 
information. Banks could share information on credit opportunities and processes, as well as 
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provide financial education courses through RPOs, profiting from their established networks, 
visibility, leadership and past experience with credits (our analysis shows that RPO members 
are three times more likely to have access to credit than non-members). These networks reach 
not only RPO members, but more broadly, the local community. These mechanisms would be 
especially useful in disperse areas where they have no bank branches and thus credit transaction 
costs are too costly. In general, RPOs should be encouraged to provide in-house credits to their 
members, not only as a way of building credit history among farmers (i.e. financial inclusion) 
but also as these credits are used as a complement for formal credit, specially for providing 
liquidity in emergencies.  
Policy interventions could also rely on CA organizations in order to counteract the existing 
segmentation of the credit market. For instance, private banks could be incentivized to reach 
organized small farmers in a block, offering credit to all RPO members at once, rather than 
going home by home offering credit to individuals (i.e. reducing search costs). These small 
credits could be offered and approved at the same time (in a block), reducing approval costs 
(for instance, by carrying out a joint productive project assessment, as well as joint project 
monitoring). In this sense, RPOs would serve as financial intermediaries, helping to crowd-in 
credit resources that would not be granted through separate small loans. The same approach 
could be used for increasing the supply of credit for medium-scale farmers. 
In all of these cases, RPOs are used as intermediaries that can crowd-in credit resources and 
which reduce problems of imperfect and incomplete information in the credit market. These 
findings and policy recommendations are relevant for any context in which the agricultural 
credit market is imperfect and in which communities have the need and the capacity to act 
collectively.  
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Map 2.A1. Number of credits per capita 
(2002-2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 2.A2. Value of credits per capita 
(2002-2015) 
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Table 2.A1. Characteristics of each credit source 
Category Public credit Private credit Cooperative credit 
Approval time 
 
Interest rate 
 
 
Credit length 
 
 
 
Requirements 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of clients 
 
 
Geographic 
coverage 
 
Cultural 
aspects 
 
 
 
 
 
Additional 
benefits 
 
 
Weeks 
 
Low interest rate (around 
1,2%) 
 
Long term credits (up to 10 
years) 
 
Easy request process for 
small farmers 
 
Subsidized project plan 
(50.000 vs. 300.000 private 
banks) 
 
Small farmers 
 
 
Large territorial presence 
 
Tradition of being the 
agricultural bank (some 
farmers think it is the only 
one that lends for agricultural 
projects or the only one that 
grants incentives) 
 
Incentives (ICR, LEC) and 
restructuring alternatives 
 
Can offer complementary 
public guarantee schemes 
 
Days 
 
Low interest rate (for big 
farmers) 
 
Long term credits (up to 10 
years) 
 
Less stringent mortgage 
requirements for big and 
medium farmers. Some 
allow co-signer to be wife 
 
 
 
Small to big farmers 
 
 
Some territorial presence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incentives (ICR, LEC) and 
restructuring alternatives 
 
 
 
Days 
 
Higher interest rates (3%), 
as these are not regulated. 
 
Short and medium terms 
 
 
Few requirements.  
Lends small amounts 
without co-signer.  
 
 
 
Small and medium farmers 
 
 
Scarce territorial presence 
 
Solidaristic principles, 
community based 
 
 
 
Offers (short) training 
programs, awards 
Lends small amounts even if 
the person is reported in 
credit history database 
Do not carry out ex post 
investment control 
(flexibility in using the 
money) 
 Source: Interviews carried out during research and guidelines of credit processes available online 
 
115 
 
Map 2.A3. Spatial distribution of RPOs (per thousand rural inhabitants)  
(2002- 2015) 
 
Source: Author’s estimations, based on RUES 
 
Map 2.A4 - Spatial distribution of RPO membership  
(Share of producers who are members of RPOs) 
 
Data source: CAN, 2016 
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Table 2.A2. Descriptive Statistics – Municipality Panel Data 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A. Independent variables      
RPO (per thousand rural inhabitants)       15,615  0.206 0.475 0.000 27.972 
B. Dependent variables      
Main      
Value of credits (per capita rural) - COP       15,726  0.789 2.326 0.000 132.845 
Number of credits per thousand rural inhabitants       15,726  22.644 25.235 0.000 221.805 
Farmer type      
Value of Credit (per capita rural) - Big farmers       15,726  0.244 2.023 0.000 130.248 
Value of Credit (per capita rural) - Medium farmers       15,726  0.303 0.633 0.000 11.396 
Value of Credit (per capita rural) - Small farmers       15,726  0.243 0.406 0.000 13.500 
Number of credits - Big farmers       15,615  0.325 1.154 0.000 24.886 
Number of credits - Medium farmers       15,615  3.253 4.599 0.000 51.442 
Number of credits - Small farmers       15,615  19.227 23.483 0.000 206.076 
Credit source      
Value of Credit (per capita rural) - Public       15,726  0.392 0.629 0.000 17.295 
Value of Credit (per capita rural) - Private       15,726  0.394 2.142 0.000 132.490 
Number of credits - Public       15,615  20.928 24.209 0.000 217.419 
Number of credits - Private       15,615  1.818 3.529 0.000 73.070 
Average credit size - Public       14,113  39.117 103.225 0.700 8053.590 
Average credit size - Private       11,811  251.451 772.070 0.570 38821.860 
C. Control variables      
Rain shock (cms)       14,450  637.615 337.045 0.000 4368.792 
Local fiscal revenue (per capita) -COP       13,114  0.180 0.373 0.000 14.198 
National transfers (per capita) - COP       13,112  0.151 0.296 0.000 13.331 
Homicides (per capita) (log)        10,238  -8.070 0.914 -11.998 -4.405 
Note: Data on monetary resources is expressed in Million COP and real terms, using 2002 as base year.   
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Table 2.A3. Logit model – Individual access to credit by producer type 
  
Probability of  
credit demand 
Probability of credit supply  
conditional on demand 
  Big Medium Small Big Medium Small 
VARIABLES       
              
RPO member 0.559*** 0.590*** 0.803*** 0.041 0.022 0.089*** 
 [0.091] [0.036] [0.030] [0.092] [0.042] [0.032] 
Received Technical Assistance 0.069 0.092** 0.838*** -0.422*** -0.470*** 0.444*** 
 [0.108] [0.044] [0.029] [0.114] [0.047] [0.036] 
Commercial activity 2.060*** 1.727*** 0.939*** 1.562*** 0.914*** 0.015 
 [0.284] [0.079] [0.033] [0.384] [0.091] [0.046] 
Owns agricultural machinery 1.656*** 1.122*** 0.275*** 1.313*** 0.851*** -0.472*** 
 [0.083] [0.042] [0.030] [0.091] [0.048] [0.041] 
Community organization member 0.370*** 0.375*** 0.029 0.13 0.281*** -0.253*** 
 [0.114] [0.075] [0.059] [0.120] [0.085] [0.065] 
Male 0.694*** 0.535*** 0.234*** 0.497*** 0.346*** -0.149*** 
 [0.085] [0.033] [0.019] [0.094] [0.030] [0.023] 
Above average age -0.313*** -0.114*** -0.076*** -0.366*** -0.121*** -0.037* 
 [0.060] [0.024] [0.013] [0.063] [0.025] [0.020] 
Finished primary 0.336*** 0.080*** -0.017 0.331*** 0.039 -0.176*** 
 [0.060] [0.026] [0.016] [0.063] [0.027] [0.021] 
Private health  0.930*** 0.022 -0.328*** 1.300*** 0.350*** -0.314*** 
 [0.087] [0.043] [0.025] [0.092] [0.043] [0.032] 
Ethnic background -0.836*** -0.795*** -0.358*** -0.559*** -0.465*** 0.239* 
 [0.173] [0.130] [0.122] [0.170] [0.152] [0.127] 
Constant -10.110*** -6.613*** -3.345*** -7.501*** -3.580*** 1.438*** 
 [0.296] [0.096] [0.046] [0.398] [0.107] [0.053] 
       
Observations 1,068,983 1,068,983 1,068,983 155,910 155,910 155,910 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the municipality level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are based on 
self-report of credit request and access during 2013. A small share of agricultural productive unites (UPA) had more than one 
head (leader), for these, age is the average age, while finished primary and access to private health, were coded as one if the 
individual variables for at least one of the heads took the value of one. We do not report results for the specification including 
the partial set of controls, but the results are very similar.  
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Table 2.A4. Logit model – Individual access to credit by producer type and source 
Dependent variable: Probability of accessing credit by source and type of producer 
  Public bank Private banks Cooperatives 
 Big Medium Small Big Medium Small Big Medium Small 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES          
                    
RPO member 0.332** 0.535*** 0.719*** 0.984*** 0.655*** 0.603*** 0.882*** 1.421*** 1.178*** 
 [0.136] [0.041] [0.031] [0.101] [0.058] [0.057] [0.300] [0.114] [0.080] 
Received Technical Assistance -0.018 0.104** 0.854*** 0.432*** 0.305*** 0.560*** 0.647** 0.356*** 0.889*** 
 [0.160] [0.050] [0.032] [0.130] [0.062] [0.042] [0.323] [0.115] [0.062] 
Commercial activity 2.199*** 1.852*** 0.975*** 2.580*** 1.704*** 0.975*** 2.345*** 1.199*** 0.934*** 
 [0.419] [0.114] [0.037] [0.708] [0.164] [0.051] [0.219] [0.249] [0.072] 
Owns agricultural machinery 1.666*** 1.156*** 0.316*** 1.705*** 1.142*** 0.110** 1.470*** 1.095*** 0.343*** 
 [0.104] [0.048] [0.030] [0.142] [0.055] [0.052] [0.300] [0.093] [0.050] 
Community organization member 0.431*** 0.433*** 0.066 0.005 -0.058 -0.266** -0.149 0.426*** 0.115 
 [0.133] [0.088] [0.059] [0.180] [0.111] [0.113] [0.569] [0.143] [0.102] 
Male 0.542*** 0.537*** 0.248*** 0.792*** 0.483*** 0.194*** 0.223 0.454*** 0.135*** 
 [0.113] [0.035] [0.020] [0.153] [0.060] [0.030] [0.401] [0.107] [0.035] 
Above average age -0.070 -0.060** -0.052*** -0.849*** -0.370*** -0.209*** -0.464* -0.262*** -0.092*** 
 [0.073] [0.026] [0.014] [0.101] [0.043] [0.019] [0.255] [0.067] [0.032] 
Finished primary 0.371*** 0.001 -0.088*** 0.290*** 0.260*** 0.121*** 0.580* -0.100 -0.105*** 
 [0.079] [0.030] [0.017] [0.087] [0.042] [0.029] [0.308] [0.076] [0.035] 
Private health  0.475*** -0.188*** -0.486*** 1.938*** 0.636*** 0.095** 1.236*** 0.439*** -0.239*** 
 [0.101] [0.048] [0.029] [0.117] [0.059] [0.038] [0.280] [0.108] [0.051] 
Ethnic background -0.953*** -0.863*** -0.467*** -0.921*** -0.774*** 0.009 -1.055* -1.234*** -0.551*** 
 [0.187] [0.163] [0.129] [0.228] [0.149] [0.200] [0.606] [0.201] [0.176] 
Constant -10.662*** -7.223*** -3.905*** -12.543*** -8.445*** -4.995*** -11.406*** -9.196*** -5.967*** 
 [0.425] [0.126] [0.052] [0.735] [0.185] [0.079] [0.456] [0.269] [0.091] 
          
Observations 1,068,983 1,068,983 1,068,983 1,068,983 1,068,983 1,068,983 959,107 1,068,983 1,068,983 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the municipality level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results are based on self-report of credit request and access during 2013, for all the rural 
producers in Colombia. We do not present results for the specification including the partial set of controls, but the results are very similar 
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Table 2.A5. Cross section results – Total number and value of credits granted per capita 
  Total number of credits  Total value of credits 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5) (7) (8) 
                  
RPO (per thousand rural inhabitants) 7.625*** 6.898*** 7.462*** 8.396*** 3.570** 3.676** 6.350** 6.218** 
 [2.663] [2.621] [2.878] [2.893] [1.763] [1.820] [2.698] [2.678] 
Rain shock (cms)  -0.001 0.002 0.000  0.001 0.002 0.001 
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Local fiscal revenue (per capita)    -3.229** 5.343***   3.206** 2.562* 
   [1.291] [1.752]   [1.268] [1.374] 
National transfers (per capita)   36.892*** 21.320***   0.523 0.982 
   [8.515] [7.176]   [1.883] [2.205] 
Homicides (per capita)   -0.121 -1.404   0.554** 0.198 
   [0.951] [0.872]   [0.241] [0.236] 
Land quality index    -0.419    0.048 
    [0.679]    [0.137] 
Height     0.001    -0.000 
    [0.001]    [0.000] 
Distance to capital city    -0.023*    -0.004 
    [0.013]    [0.003] 
Distance to market    -0.029**    -0.003 
    [0.012]    [0.002] 
Gini Index    -10.676    0.917 
    [8.903]    [2.287] 
Poverty (UBN)    -0.234***    0.003 
    [0.053]    [0.014] 
Fiscal performance index    -0.162    0.025 
    [0.170]    [0.036] 
Public Investment/ expenditure    0.135    -0.111* 
    [0.174]    [0.061] 
Received Technical Assistance    20.372***    4.574** 
    [6.719]    [2.129] 
Commercial activity    5.428    1.977 
    [6.869]    [2.370] 
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Owns agricultural machinery    11.923    0.254 
    [7.485]    [1.988] 
Community organization member    -3.405    -4.243 
    [7.993]    [2.823] 
Medium farmers share    -22.967***    1.477 
    [7.347]    [1.845] 
Big farmers share    -3.460    10.534** 
    [16.215]    [5.051] 
Male    -5.513    -3.512 
    [11.518]    [2.594] 
Above average age    7.463    -0.717 
    [11.969]    [4.862] 
Finished primary    -69.993***    -3.062 
    [10.364]    [2.827] 
Private health     -41.386***    1.494 
    [7.689]    [2.530] 
Ethnic background    -18.193***    1.116 
    [3.699]    [1.843] 
Constant 32.062*** 33.254*** 21.849** 55.971*** 1.563*** 0.878 3.386 9.611 
 [0.999] [1.915] [8.797] [20.933] [0.334] [0.671] [2.098] [6.029] 
         
Observations 1,117 1,082 820 795 1,117 1,082 820 795 
R-squared 0.014 0.012 0.099 0.407 0.064 0.068 0.194 0.229 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the municipality level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All monetary variables in real terms. Homicides per capita in logs. Gini 
and poverty values correspond to 2005. Estimations exclude the five principal cities in the country
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Figure 2.A1 Number of municipalities without treatment (2002-2015) 
 
 
Map 2.A5. DD subsample municipalities 
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Table 2.A6. Differences in means test – Municipalities in DD sample 
 
Mean 
Not in sample In sample Difference 
Local fiscal revenue (per capita) -COP 0.205 0.185  
National transfers (per capita) - COP 0.108 0.199 *** 
Homicides (per capita) (log) -8.133 -8.053  
GDP per capita (COP) 11.614 10.897  
Rural Poverty (UBN Index) 50.230 53.661 *** 
Distance to Department capital 79.293 79.600  
Total resources of credit pc 0.947 0.641 *** 
Number of credit pc 22.82 23.15  
Municipalities 569 532  
 
Figure 2.A2. Leads and lags of treatment adoption – total number and value of credits 
 
 
The lead and lags regressions plotted in this figure work as placebo tests, analysing whether 
there are significant differences in credit outcomes between treated and controls prior to 
treatment adoption (i.e. whether there are pre-existing parallel trends). They also provide 
information on the ex post dynamics of the effects, showing that in general, the effect treatment 
effect takes a period to act and then dissipates.  
Two years before
One year before
Year of treatment take on
One year after
Two years after
Three years after
-5 0 5 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Total Number of Credits Total Value of Credits
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Figure 2.A3. Leads and lags of treatment adoption – total number of credits by 
producer type and source (Panel A, public credit - Panel B, private credit) 
 
Figure 2.A4. Leads and lags of treatment adoption – total value of credits by producer 
type and source (Panel A, public credit - Panel B, private credit) 
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Chapter 3 
 
More Profitable Projects, Access to Information or a Safety Net? How 
Collective Action reduces credit constraints 
 
Abstract 
Agricultural credit is a key source of investment and thus of productivity growth and poverty reduction 
in the rural world. Despite this, most farmers in developing countries remain credit constrained. This 
evidences the relevance of exploring alternative ways to increase access to agricultural credit. This 
paper analyses how collective action in the form of Rural Producer Organizations (RPOs) loosens 
credit constraints. The demand and supply-side mechanisms are identified through the analysis of over 
60 semi-structured interviews and four municipality case studies in Colombia. The case selection was 
based on a novel combination of nested analysis and stratified random sampling. The results evidence 
that collective action reduces quantity constraints as it increases the supply of credit (through credit 
granted from RPOs to members, and from banks to RPOs). Furthermore, banks are more likely to 
supply individual credit to RPO members, as membership signals farmer quality and project quality, 
screening applicants and reducing problems of imperfect and asymmetric information. Collective 
action also increases the demand for credit, as organized farmers engage in new, larger and more 
profitable projects, by accessing quality inputs, technology, markets and government support. Lastly, 
CA reduces transaction cost constraints, through the sharing of information about credit opportunities, 
and reduces risk constraints, as RPOs constitute a safety net. 
 
Key words: Credit constraints, agricultural credit, collective action, rural producer 
organizations, Colombia, nested analysis, mixed methods 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Increasing access to agricultural credit is crucial for rural development as credit constitutes a 
main source of investment, growth and poverty reduction (Deininger and Duponchel 2014; 
Conning and Udry, 2007; Burgess and Pande, 2005; Carter and Olinto, 2003). Despite the 
above, most farmers in developing countries continue to face stringent credit constraints which 
reduce their ability to carry out profit-maximizing investments (Guirkinger and Boucher, 
2008). There is evidence, for instance, that credit constrained farmers in Rwanda have 
significantly lower yields than unconstrained farmers, and that their use of good fertilizers and 
improved seeds is lower (Ayalew, Deininger and Duponchel, 2014) These authors estimate that 
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removing credit constraints would increase the value of agricultural output by 17%. Similar 
evidence for the case of Colombia shows that access to credit doubles agricultural income 
(Leibovich et al., 2013) and increases land productivity (Gáfaro, Ibáñez, and Zarruk, 2012). 
Diverse policy interventions have been designed to reduce credit constraints. These include 
titling property rights so that land can be used as collateral, granting direct public credit, 
regulating and subsidizing interest rates, promoting bank branch expansion and offering public 
loan guarantees (de Soto, 1989; Giné, 2011; Burgess and Pande, 2005; Besley, Burchardi and 
Ghatak, 2012; Conning and Udry, 2005). These alternatives have proven insufficient. In the 
case of Colombia, for instance, only 11% of farmers report accessing credit in a given year 
(CNA, 2016).  
New alternatives for reducing credit constraints are to be identified. The study by Benson et al. 
(2019) identifies one of these alternatives: collective action99 in the form of Rural Producer 
Organizations (RPOs). RPOs include agricultural cooperatives, associations and similar 
organization through which farmers integrate horizontally and vertically, to gain easier access 
to input, technology and output markets (Valentinov, 2007; Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014; 
Bebbington, 1997; Narrod et al. 2009). Relying on data on access to credit for 2,3 million 
agricultural producers, and on credit allocations and RPOs for 1.100 municipalities in 
Colombia during a 15-year period, the authors find that CA increases access to credit not only 
at the individual level, but also at the local level, generating positive general equilibrium effects 
and thus constituting an instrument for rural financial development.  
This paper builds on the quantitative results of Benson et al. (2019) and carries out a Small-N 
qualitative analysis to provide a more comprehensive picture of the relation between collective 
action and access to credit. It identifies the demand and supply side mechanisms through which 
collective action reduces credit constraints. The analysis is based on four case studies (four 
municipalities in Colombia) in which a total of 60 semi-structured interviews were carried out 
to organized and unorganized farmers, local banks and policy actors. I propose a novel 
methodology for case selection, which combines Lieberman´s (2005) approach for nested 
analysis with Fearon and Laitin´s (2008) stratified random case selection. The procedure relies 
                                                             
99 There are various definitions of collective action, all of which refer to the involvement of a group of people 
with shared interests, and voluntary action to pursue those shared interests (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004). 
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on the econometric results of Benson et al. (2019). I estimate the residuals of the main model100, 
and divide the units of analysis (municipalities) according to deciles of residuals. I then semi-
randomly101 select two cases from the decile of lowest residuals (or the on-the-regression-line 
cases); and two from the decile of highest residuals (or the off-the-regression-line cases). 
Profiting from the availability of quantitative subnational data for a large set of socioeconomic 
characteristics, I carry out differences-in-means tests in order to discard the existence of 
systematic or extreme differences between the selected cases and the average municipality.  
This step-to-step case selection strategy constitutes a first contribution of the paper, in 
particular, to the methodological literature on case selection (Gerring, 2005; Fearon and Laitin, 
2008) and on mixed methods research design (Lieberman, 2005; Brady and Collier, 2004). The 
proposed structured case selection methodology relying on quantitative data reduces concerns 
of selection bias and is particularly relevant for studies in which there is a large number of 
potential cases (e.g. subnational analyses). In addition to this, the synergistic integration of 
Large-N Analysis (LNA) and Small-N Analysis allows to obtain analytical leverage and 
stronger causal inference from general causal relations, as well as from in-depth and 
contextually-based inferences. Through the proposed nested analysis approach, I evidence that 
Small-N Analyses profit from relying on both on-the-line cases (to carry out further analysis, 
in particular, to identify underlying mechanisms) and on off-the-line cases (to structurally 
search for heterogeneity which can explain the low fit of the LNA). 
Through the qualitative analysis I identify the demand and supply-side mechanism through 
which collective action in the form of RPOs reduces credit constraints. I classify the 
mechanisms according to whether they loosen price, quantity, transaction cost or risk credit 
constraints, following the categorization of constraints proposed in the literature (Guirkinger 
and Boucher, 2008). The results show that collective action reduces quantity credit constraints 
102through increases in the supply of credit. This occurs, first, as RPOs grant credit to their 
members; second, as farmers are able to access associative credit lines offered by banks 
specifically to organizations; and third, as collective action increases the likelihood of banks 
supplying individual credit. The latter stems from RPOs increasing the creditworthiness of 
farmers through the screening of applicants, as RPO membership provides signals of project 
                                                             
100 The Fixed Effects model estimating the relation between RPOs in a municipality and the total number of 
credits allocated.  
 
101 Combining random and purposing sampling, as detailed in the methodology section. 
102 Constraints that make the supply of credit lower than the effective demand for credit 
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and farmer quality. In this way, RPO membership lessens problems of imperfect and 
asymmetric information. 
I also find that CA increases the demand for credit as through RPOs farmers engage in new, 
larger and more profitable projects which require investment. The profitability of productive 
projects increases as RPOs enable farmers to access inputs at lower prices though economies 
of scale and the skipping of intermediaries. They also ease access to technology, technical 
assistance and government support. Furthermore, RPOs enable farmers to access markets under 
better conditions, through joint direct commercialization and contracts.  
There are additional mechanisms through which this form of collective action increases the 
demand for credit. One is the reduction of self-rationing from transaction costs. This occurs as 
RPOs constitute information hubs through which information on credit opportunities and on 
the application process flows. Finally, RPOs reduce self-rationing from risk credit constraints, 
as they constitute a safety net and provide emergency informal loans which can be used to meet 
formal credit obligations in cases of low liquidity.  
The qualitative analysis provided in depth evidence of how different types of credit constraints 
operate, and on the mechanisms through which each is loosened through collective action 
organizations. I also provide evidence on the heterogeneity of credit constraints within formal 
credit sources (public vs. private credit). The above constitute contributions to the literature on 
rural financial development (Ali, Deininger and Duponchel, 2014; Guirkinger and Boucher, 
2008; Ayalew, Deininger and Duponchel, 2014; Boucher and Guirkinger, 2007; Carter and 
Olinto, 2003; Conning and Udry, 2005).   
The demand and supply-side mechanisms were identified mainly from the on–the-regression-
line case studies. In the off-the-line cases, the mechanisms were found to be weaker. The 
evidence points towards this being the result of the structural weakness of RPOs in the off-the-
line municipalities. In turn, I find that the weakness stems from the way in which the 
organizations emerge. I find that while in the on-the-line municipalities RPOs tend to emerge 
organically, as a bottom-up initiatives seeking collective, productive and long-term benefits, in 
the off-the-line municipalities, RPOs tend to be created non-organically, as a result of top down 
external stimulus offering short term benefits to organized farmers (e.g. receiving resources 
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from a targeted public program)103. These non-organic RPOs are constituted lacking common 
objectives and collective action rules. The above makes the organizations weak, limiting the 
potential benefits they can offer, including the potential benefits for reducing credit constraints. 
As such, these weak RPOs are not able to increase the quality of productive projects or the 
demand for credit, they do not lower transaction cost constraints through the effective sharing 
of information, and they do not constitute a safety net that can reduce risk constraints.  
The findings highlighting the heterogeneity in the nature and potential impact of RPOs 
constitute a contribution to the literature on collective action (Ostrom, 1990; Uphoff, N. and 
Wijayaratna, 2000) and on rural collective action organizations (Desai and Joshi, 2014; 
Vandeplas et al. 2013; Abebaw and Hail, 2013; Markussen and Tarp, 2014; Bebbington, 1997). 
These findings also contribute to the literature on sociological organizational theory (Andrews, 
et al. 2010; McPherson and Rotolo, 1996; Hannan and Freeman; 1977; Scott and Meyer; 1991), 
by providing micro level evidence on how environments and internal organizational feautres 
(e.g. incentives and rules) condition the structure and functioning of organizations, shaping 
organizational types and organizational success. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section discusses the literature 
on credit constraints and on collective action organizations. Section three describes the context; 
in particular, the way in which the credit market and RPOs operate in Colombia. The fourth 
section discusses the methodological approach, detailing the case selection strategy and the 
structuring of the interviews. In section five I present the results of the case studies, and in 
section six, I discuss the results building an analytical framework explaining the demand and 
supply side mechanisms through which collective action reduces credit constraints. The last 
section concludes. 
3.2 Credit constraints and collective action 
Credit constraints take different forms, categorized as price, quantity, transaction cost and risk 
constraints (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008). Price constraints refer to the price of credit (i.e. 
the interest rate) being too high, making potential investments through credit unattractive. 
Quantity constraints refer to those that make the supply of credit lower than its effective 
                                                             
103 Note that I do not argue that it is a fixed underlying municipality characteristic what determines the strength 
of collective action in the municipality, but rather that the type of RPO relates to the way in which they emerge. 
In the off-the-line cases, one type of emergence (externally induced) was more common than the other.  
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demand104. The supply of agricultural credit tends to be low as banks consider agricultural 
activity to be too risky, and because approval costs are too high. This is especially so in 
developing countries in which the agricultural insurance market is weak or non-existent, 
connectivity is limited and in which most farmers are small and have low access to technology 
and commercialization opportunities. 
Transaction cost constraints refer to non-interest monetary and time costs that reduce the 
effective demand for credit: they lead to self-rationing. These refer to demands side costs105 
such as the cost of traveling to a bank branch, preparing the application, obtaining the required 
documentation, and waiting for the credit to be approved. The work of Ayalew, Deininger and 
Duponchel (2014) evidences how prevalent transaction cost constraints are: while 69% of 
farmers in Rwanda report being transaction cost constrained, only 6% report constraints due to 
lack of collateral. Transaction cost constraints are particularly salient in developing countries 
where levels of human capital are low. Limited literacy and financial literacy are often cited as 
a significant constraint on credit demand (United Nations, 2006). In contexts such as a 
Colombia, in which 17% of farmers are illiterate and 57% have only primary education, 
farmers often have to restore to hiring someone to carry out the credit application (e.g. 
tramitadores de crédito), which further increases transaction costs. Another factor that 
increases transaction costs in developing countries is low connectivity (transport and ICTs), 
which increases the cost of accessing information and of traveling to a bank branch. For 
instance, in the department of Tolima in Colombia, over 70% of farmers report taking more 
than an hour to travel to the bank. These costs are estimated to represent 20 additional points 
of interest rate (Dube et al., 2006).   
Analogous to transaction cost constraints, risk constraints reduce the effective demand for 
credit. In this case, farmers refrain from accessing credit not because of costs, but because of 
the risk of not being able to repay the debt, potentially losing the asset employed as collateral. 
Risk constraints are a major obstacle for financial access. For instance, Guirkinger and Boucher 
(2008) find that 50% of credit constrained households in Perú are risk constrained. This type 
of constraint is aggravated by the inherent risk of agricultural activity, which is highly 
vulnerable to weather shocks, pests, fluctuations in commodity prices and exchange rates. In 
                                                             
104 The demand after considering transaction costs and risk 
105 Note that supply side transaction costs (i.e. approval costs for the bank) are rather understood as quantity 
constraints, as they reduce the supply of credit. These generate unmet credit demands, as individuals are 
involuntarily rationed from credit (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008). In contrast, demand-side transaction costs 
reduce the effective demand for credit (i.e. the individual refrains himself from borrowing). 
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the case of Colombia for example, 72% of farmers’ report having experienced an adverse 
shock, while almost none reports access to agricultural insurance (CNA, 2016).  
Loosening credit constraints requires increasing the willingness of banks to approve credit 
requests, as well as increasing the willingness of farmers to demand credit. In the next sections 
I describe how collective action does such. CA refers to joint action taken by individuals 
pursuing a common objective. In rural areas, a key and common materialization of collective 
action are Rural Producer Organizations. These include agricultural cooperatives and 
associations which farmers create and join, among others, because though them they can 
increase their scale of production (Desai and Joshi, 2014; Valentinov, 2007) adopt new 
technologies and the use improved inputs (Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014; Conley and Udry, 
2010). RPOs also ease access to information and good agricultural practices (Abebaw  & Hail, 
2013), and offer benefits in terms of commercialization, easing access to output markets at 
better prices and through products with added value (Bebbington, 1997; Narrod et al., 2009). 
The potential impact of collective action is however, heterogeneous. Its success depends on the 
rules established among members, on their incentives and their capacity to cooperate rather 
than free ride (Ostrom, 1990). This relates to the broader discussion in literature on 
organizational theory regarding how the success of organizations in general, depends on their 
relation with the environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Scott and Meyer, 1991), as well as 
on internal organizational factors like leadership (Andrews et al. 2010) and technology 
(Perrow, 1967). The contextual and organizational conditions affecting organization type and 
performance will be further discussed in section six.  
3.3 The Context: Agricultural credit and Rural Producer Organizations in 
Colombia 
Agricultural credit refers to credit employed for productive purposes. In Colombia, agricultural 
credit is granted principally by the public bank and is allocated mainly to small farmers (the 
majority of farmers are small). Some private banks also supply agricultural credit, but in 
smaller numbers and larger values, targeting large-scale producers. Credit conditions including 
interest rates and payment structures are similar across both sources, partly as these are 
regulated by the Government. Financial and credit cooperatives also grant agricultural credit, 
but at a lower scale (around 10% of all credits). More recently, rural microcredit has become a 
relevant source, as despite being significantly more expensive, it is easy to access.  
131 
 
The number of credits allocated in Colombia significantly increased during the last decade (a 
6-fold increase between 2002 and 2015). Despite this, the access rate remains low: according 
to the Agrarian Census of 2013, only 11% of farmers access credit in a given year. Credit 
constraints include risk self-rationing and high transaction costs (DNP, 2014). 
In order to request a credit, a farmer has to file a credit request in a bank, specifying the 
productive project on which he will use the resources. The farmer must also certify a good 
credit history and a strong paying capacity (having sufficient income and assets). Additional 
requirements are certifying access to land and, in some cases, having a co-signer. The request 
and approval process can take between a week and several months (being longer in the public 
bank)106.  
In Colombia, there is more information on the dynamics of agricultural credit than on those of 
collective action organizations. In fact, Benson et al. (2019) are the first to estimate the number 
of RPOs across municipalities. These authors find that between 2002 and 2015, over 27.000 
organizations were created throughout the country. RPOs are the most common form of 
collective action in the rural sector, although CA also materializes in other forms, including 
women’s unions or social organizations (CNA, 2016). The census data also reports that despite 
the large number of RPOs, less than 10,5% of farmers participate in these.  
The interviews carried out for this paper reveal that in general, farmers acknowledge the 
benefits that RPOs can generate. However, some choose not to participate because they 
consider participation costs to be too high. Some of these costs are monetary (e.g. paying a 
membership fee) while others are non-monetary (e.g. establishing rules, monitoring 
compliance, making collective decisions). There are additional non-monetary costs, including 
the cost of investing time and effort, as well as investing in production practices and quality 
inputs in order to meet standards established by RPOs. Among the reasons reported for RPO 
participation, I found increasing production scale and commercialization opportunities, as well 
as gaining access to government support (as many programs require beneficiaries to be 
organized).  
                                                             
106 Among the farmers interviewed for this paper, most had requested credit more than once, usually to the 
public bank. Credit sizes ranged from $2 million COP (USD 700) and $30 million COP (USD 10.400). Those who 
had accessed credit considered the request process to be relatively simple, but considered troublesome to pay 
the quotas, especially due to variability in weather and market conditions.  
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Among the ten RPOs interviewed, there was a high heterogeneity in terms of size, age and 
nature of activity. For instance, one of the RPOs had over 100 members, a couple had under 
20, and the rest around 30. The age of RPOs ranged from 26 to two. Three of the RPOs 
interviewed were women´s organizations, while the rest had both male and female members. 
Another relevant finding is that RPO members tend to be similar: they live nearby, most are 
small farmers producing for commercial purposes rather than for subsistence, and they produce 
the same products.  
The interviews also revealed some of the main problems that RPO face. Some have to do with 
the weakness of collective action. For instance, in several organizations there was a lack of 
clarity in the long term and collective purpose of the RPO, as well as on the rules needed to 
ensure compromise and joint collaboration. Another common problem was scarce 
commercialization opportunities: even when commercializing jointly, finding 
commercialization agreements or stable buyers was reported to be difficult. I also found some 
RPOs are dependent on the support of the Government (receiving resources from specific 
programs). In periods of low public support, the organizations become passive actors. 
3.4 Methodology 
The Small-N Analysis is based on four case studies (four municipalities in rural Colombia), in 
which a total of 60 semi-structured interviews were conducted to RPO members, non-organized 
farmers, credit analysts and local policy actors. The data was gathered during a six-week period 
of fieldwork between September and October of 2017. The SNA is aimed at identifying the 
mechanisms that explain the relation between CA and access to credit estimated through the 
Large-N Analysis in Benson et al. (2019).  
Municipality selection 
The case selection is based on a novel methodology which exploits the availability of 
quantitative data and the existence of a large number of potential cases. The methodology 
builds on the econometric model of Benson et al. (2019), specifically on the fixed effect model 
estimating the relation between collective action (measured as the number of Rural Producer 
Organizations per capita in a municipality) and access to credit (measured as the number of 
credits granted in a municipality). I estimate the residuals (ŷi − yi)107 of this model, and then 
                                                             
107 The differences between the estimated value of the outcome variable and its observed value. 
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stratify the units of observation (1.100 municipalities) in deciles of residuals108. I focus on two 
decile groups: the decile of lowest residuals (i.e. on-the-regression-line municipalities), and the 
decile of highest residuals (i.e. off-the-regression-line municipalities)109.  
I select two cases from each of the decile groups. The cases were selected using a combination 
of random and purposive sampling, reducing the concerns of investigator bias110. More 
specifically, I randomly ordered the municipalities in each decile, and selected the first two to 
comply with the following criteria:  
i) The security conditions would not represent a risk during fieldwork. These were 
identified as municipalities with a homicide rate lower than the national mean. 
ii) The municipality was not a department capital, and was located at least an hour away 
from one. This, so that urban dynamics would not interfere with the rural-based 
analysis.  
iii) Agricultural credit was granted throughout the study period by both public and private 
banks, including credits to small, medium and big farmers. The objective of this criteria 
was to allow for variation in the analysis. 
iv) There were sufficient RPOs to contact for the interviews (at least 12) 
v) The second municipality was from a different region of the country111 relative to the 
first one. This aimed for a larger generalizability of results. 
The on-the-line cases selected were Sapuyes in the department of Nariño, and Betulia in the 
department of Santander. I then selected the two off-the-line municipalities, following the same 
criteria plus an additional one: being located in the same departments as the two on-the-line 
municipalities. The above, with the objective of reducing potential differences (observed and 
unobserved) between the on and off-the-line cases. The two selected off-the-line cases were 
Guaitarilla in Nariño and Guadalupe in Santander. Figure 3.1 illustrates the geographic location 
of the four cases: 
                                                             
108 By relying on residuals of an econometric model, the selection procedure is dependent on the adequacy of 
the specification of the model. Benson et al. (2019) carry out several robustness tests to prove that the model 
specification is adequate.  
109 For a graphic explanation of on and off-the-regression line observations, see Figure 3.A1 in the Annex. 
110 The relevance of meeting this set of criteria was considered more important than the benefits of carrying out 
a pure random selection. Purposive sampling is necessary to overcome practical investigator limitations.  
111 The five regions are: Atlantic, Pacific, Orinoquia, Amazonia, Andina. I do not stratify by region, I just rely on 
information on the region to validate whether the second municipality complies with criteria V, in the same 
manner as I validate compliance with the previous criteria. 
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Figure 3.1 Geographic location of the case studies 
 
This case selection methodology is a combination of the nested analysis approach proposed by 
Lieberman (2005), in which on-the-line cases are selected for model testing Small-N 
Analysis112, and the approach proposed by Fearon and Laitin (2008) on stratified random case 
selection not restricted to well predicted cases. The proposed approach can also be understood 
as a mixture of typical and deviant cases (Gerring, 2005), in which the on-the-line 
municipalities are typical cases of the causal relation, while the off-the-line cases are deviant 
ones (i.e. the relation between the independent and dependent variables is not well predicted 
by the econometric model).  
Qualitative data is analysed both within and across cases, as described in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Cross case analysis 
Municipality type Analysis type 
On-the -line  On-the line 
Identify common mechanisms, processes, contextual characteristics that explain how 
X leads to Y.  
 
The existence of common factors would allow for some generalizability among on-
the-line municipalities, as they are found in municipalities from different regions of 
the country.  
                                                             
112 Lieberman (2005) advises to select only on-the-line cases for “model testing SNA”. However, I also choose 
cases from the off-the-line subgroup, as the aim of the SNA is not only model testing (i.e. testing the strength of 
the LNA), but also building an analytical framework. Moreover, studying cases which are not well predicted by 
the model yields valuable information for understanding the nature of collective action and the nature of its 
relation with access to credit. 
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Off-the-line 
 
Off-the-line 
 
Identify common mechanisms, processes, contextual characteristics that explain why 
X does not lead to Y
113.  
 
Again, the existence of common factors would allow for some generalizability among 
off-the-line municipalities, as they are found in municipalities from different regions 
of the country. 
On-the -line  Off-the-line 
Comparing the on-the-line municipality with the off-the-line municipality within the 
same department allows to identify why in relatively similar contexts, the relation 
between X and Y can be stronger or weaker than predicted by the model. 
Adequacy of the selected cases 
Because the cases were not selected based on a pure random manner, they could be 
systematically different from the average municipality, introducing potential biases to the 
analysis. In order to address this, I run differences-in-means tests on a large set of 
socioeconomic characteristics at the municipality level and assess whether each case has 
statistically significant differences with respect to: i) the average Colombian municipality; and 
ii) the average decile municipality (on or off-the-line groups).  
The objective of this test is not to claim that the selected municipalities are fully representative 
of the whole country, nor of the subgroup, but to discard the existence of systematic or extreme 
differences between them which could complicate generalizations or could make them 
inappropriate for analysing the mechanisms, as systematic differences can increase the 
likelihood of identifying mechanisms that only operate in a particular setting. In addition to the 
above tests, I analyse whether there are systematic differences between the two municipalities 
selected within each department. Again, this is aimed at discarding potential systematic or 
extreme differences, not at claiming that the municipalities are directly comparable, as would 
be required in a “most similar” case selection approach in standard cross-case comparisons. 
Table 3.2 presents the results of the differences-in-means tests. It indicates whether there is a 
statistically significant difference (positive + or negative -) between each municipality and each 
reference group114. Information is averaged between 2002 and 2015, and comes from various 
sources (Panel municipal CEDE, Finagro, RUES, DANE, IGAC, DNP, the Ministry of 
Defence and municipality reports).  
                                                             
113 The reasons that make the municipality an outlier might be idiosyncratic or might be generalizable to other 
municipalities.  
114 For ease of understanding, I do not show means and p-values, but signs (+ and -) indicating statistical 
significance and the direction of the difference. 
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The results show that while some differences are statistically significant (for instance 
population and poverty levels), overall, the municipalities are statistically similar to both the 
average Colombian municipality, and the average subgroup municipality. This is reassuring, 
as despite the existence of some divergences, none of the cases (not even the off-the-line ones) 
are systematically more or less developed than average.  
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Table 3.2 Differences-in-means test 
  
On-the-line Off-the-line 
Sapuyes, Nariño Betulia, Santander Guaitarilla, Nariño Guadalupe, Santander 
Mean 
Statistically  
significant difference 
Mean 
Statistically  
significant difference 
Mean 
Statistically  
significant difference 
Mean 
Statistically  
significant difference 
Colombia 
Decile 
subgroup 
Off-the-line 
department 
municipality 
 Colombia 
Decile 
subgroup 
Off-the-line 
department 
municipality 
 Colombia 
Decile 
subgroup 
 Colombia 
Decile 
subgroup 
Rural population 5505  - - 4116 - - + 9228  + 3663 -   
Poverty (UBN Index) 36.2   - 43.1   +   54.2  + 32.08     
Gini Index 0.467    0.429       0.465   0.433     
GDP per capita (COP) 6.127    14.7       10.34   26.397 +   
Agricultural GDP per capital 
(million COP) 2.702    6.4 +     4.889   3.81     
Local fiscal revenue (per 
capita) -COP 0.074    0.537 +   + 0.064   0.208     
National transfers (per 
capita) - COP 0.164    0.238 +     0.136   0.197     
Homicides (per hundred 
thousand inhabitants) 4.7 - - - 25.2       20.89   12.639 -   
Share of population that 
finished primary school 15.20%    16.9%       6.30%   10%     
Share of ethnic population 9.00%    0       0.60%   0.4     
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Share of small farmers 94.50%    49%       99%   94%     
RPOs per thousand rural 
inhabitants. 0.254    0.247    0.315   0.235     
Total resources of credit pc 0.519    0.526    0.819   0.820     
Number of credit pc 12.31  - - 23.39     - 62.949 +  58.857 +   
Main agricultural products 
Potatoes, carrots, wheat, maize, milk. 
Livestock, plantains, maize, coffee, yuca, 
cocoa, fruits 
Wheat, potatoes, maize, milk 
Livestock, coffee, cocoa, guava, 
sugar cane, maize, yuca, plantain 
Travel time to department 
capital 
2h 
3h 
1,5h 
4,5h 
Comments 
Located in the southern mountains of 
the country. 7km south from 
Tuquerres, where private banks and 
financial cooperatives are located. 
Located in the northeast region of the 
country, nearest private bank located in 
Zapatoca, 24 kms away 
Located in the southern 
mountains of the country, 16 kms 
north from Tuquerres, where 
private banks and financial 
cooperatives are located. 
Located in the northeast region, 
nearest private bank located in 
Oiba, 23 km away 
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Informant selection and interview content 
Over 60 semi-structured interviews were carried out, around 15 in each municipality. Key 
informants included: 
- (6) RPO members, from two RPOs. In each organization, I interviewed three 
members: the RPO leader, one member who had accessed credit, and one member 
who had not accessed credit. The interviews were aimed at understanding the 
nature of RPOs and how they reduce credit constraints.  
- (1) Farmer who has accessed credit but is not an RPO member. These interviews 
were aimed at gaining an outsider perspective on why farmers do not join 
collective action organizations, and how they are able to access credit without the 
advantages that CA offers.  
- (1) Branch manager or credit analyst of the local public bank. These interviews 
were focused on identifying supply side mechanisms determining access to credit, 
and how this relates with collective action. They also aimed at identifying 
particularities of public credit provision. 
-  (1) Branch manager or credit analyst of the local private bank. These interviews 
were aimed at identifying supply side mechanisms and particular perspectives of 
private banks.   
-  (1) Branch manager or credit analyst of the local financial/credit cooperative. 
These interviews focused on identifying supply side mechanisms and particular 
perspectives of financial cooperatives.  
- (1) Secretary of Agriculture of the municipal government. The objective of these 
interviews was understanding the perspectives of local policy makers and gaining 
insights on the local agricultural sector.  
- (1) Mayor, with the objective of gathering information on the general context of 
the municipality and the particularities of the agricultural sector.  
- (1) Priest, to gather an independent perspective on local conditions. 
- In addition to these interviews, I carried out national level interviews to the 
associativity director of Finagro (Fund for Agricultural Finance), the president of 
Asomicrofinanzas (Association of Microfinances of Colombia) and the advisor of 
the director of the Agrarian Bank. These interviews focused on the macro level 
conditions of the agricultural credit market and on the potential of collective 
action for enhancing local financial development.  
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In order to select the RPOs to be interviewed, I relied on information from the unique 
registry of social organizations (RUES). Registered RPOs in each municipality were 
randomly ordered, and the first two to answer my call were selected115. Members of each 
RPO were also selected semi-randomly from the contacts provided by the leader116. This 
semi-random procedure aimed at reducing snowball sampling concerns. 
To select the non RPO member interviewee, I relied on information provided by the 
agricultural input store or the farmer´s market, directly requesting the contact details of 
farmers who were not part of an RPO, and interviewing the first person I could contact. 
Finally, I directly contacted the local banks and asked to speak with the branch manager 
or the credit analyst who managed the agricultural credit line.  
Some general issues about the interviews are worth discussing. First, the wording and 
sequencing of the guiding questions evolved little throughout the research and did not 
vary significantly among interviewees (of the same type)117. Second, RPO members and 
bank staff interviewed included diverse profiles (e.g. men and women, young and senior), 
providing useful variation in the analysis. Third, all interviewees were informed about the 
nature of the research and of how the information gathered in the interviews would be 
employed. Each of them granted oral informed consent for participating in the research. 
Fourth, considering the nature of the questions, which are mainly descriptive and do not 
touch sensitive issues (e.g. power relations within RPOs, manipulation of credit 
allocation), I do not believe there were relevant issues of self-selection in who agreed to 
be interviewed (indeed, basically all of the people contacted agreed to be interviewed). 
The non-sensitive nature of the questions also reduces concerns of misreporting or 
particular biases in the responses. Additional methodological considerations are included 
in Annex A.  
3.5 Case Study results 
This section presents the results of the case studies. It describes the dynamics of collective 
action and credit in each case studied. The findings are then systematized and discussed 
                                                             
115 I obtained the contact information (telephone number) of RPO leaders through the Secretary of 
Agriculture, and in a couple of cases, through local social leaders or NGOs. 
116 I intended to randomly select the members to be interviewed. In practice, random selection was difficult 
as some leaders did not have an electronic version of the list of members or their cell phone numbers to 
send me beforehand. Ultimately, the selection was quasi random as I often ended up speaking to a member 
who happened to be in the town centre that day (e.g. doing an errand).  
117  Interview guidelines available upon request 
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analytically in section six (the discussion section), organized around the demand and 
supply mechanisms through which collective action loosens credit constraints. For 
detailed municipality profiles, see Annex B. 
3.5.1 Betulia, Santander (on-the-line) 
Betulia is a small municipality in the department of Santander. It has a population of 
5.200, 50% of which are poor based on Unsatisfied Basic Needs. The municipality 
experienced violence due to the armed conflict, but the current security situation is stable. 
Agriculture is the main economic activity, around products such as coffee, tomatoes, 
fruits, maize and livestock. Despite being a predominantly agricultural municipality (its 
agricultural GDP per capita is significantly higher than the average Colombian 
municipality), local public investment in agriculture is low.  
The number of per capita credits in Betulia is similar to the country average. Credit is 
mainly granted by the public bank, and more recently, by a financial cooperative 
(Coomultrasan). Although access to credit has increased during the last decade (partly 
due to improvements in the security conditions), credit constraints persist. One of the 
salient constraints is travel costs to the bank branch, as road conditions in the municipality 
are quite bad118.  
The number of RPOs per capita in Betulia is also similar to the national average. Local 
RPOs were reported to emerge as bottom-up initiatives of the communities. Some of the 
organizations were created with the objective of producing and commercializing 
greenhouse tomatoes, a product that has become quite successful in the area. Some RPOs 
emerged as a mechanism to demand change, in particular, after the building of a 
hydroelectric plant that destabilized the environment, while offering scarce economic 
benefits to the population119. This generated a general sense of discontent which 
motivated the community to organize in order to have a stronger voice for making 
demands; and also, in order to collectively overcome local economic barriers. The 
interviews evidenced that social capital in Betulia is strong: there is a sense of community 
and cooperation. This can relate to the impact of the Peace and Development Projects 
                                                             
118 The municipality head is 90 km away from the department capital (Bucaramanga), but it takes more 
than three hours to travel them on an unpaved road. 
119 To build the ISAGEN hydroelectric plant part of the municipality had to be flooded; farmers lost 
productive land because of this. Farmers reported the plant increasing humidity levels, killing fish and 
causing the collapse of a newly built road due to topographic changes. All of this, without generating 
employment or growth.  
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(implemented by the EU during the first years of the 2000s), which invested considerable 
resources in developing productive projects and in the reconstruction of social cohesion.  
I interviewed four RPOs in Betulia. All of them were created as bottom-up initiatives, 
mainly for productive purposes. The RPOs were quite successful despite differing in size, 
age, gender composition and location. One of the organizations was Aprob, created 26 
years ago, with 100 active members, most producing tomatoes. Members mentioned they 
started cultivating tomatoes through the RPO, while before this, they produced less 
profitable products. In addition to starting to cultivate a new product, they also started to 
use a new technology: greenhouses. To build these greenhouses, members had to carry 
out an initial investment, for what several requested agricultural credit. That is, the 
demand for credit increased after joining the RPO and starting the new productive project. 
Peer support among members of Aprob was reported to be important for the process of 
starting the new crop, as well as for sustaining it efficiently. For instance, members 
regularly share information and advice on how to cope with pests.  As one of interviewees 
mentioned: “let’s say that the crop of someone has a disease, then the others say, look, 
that is solved with this or that. In this sense there is collaboration”. The sharing of 
information in this RPO takes place both in person and though a Whatsapp group. 
Aprob also offers its members technical assistance, and sells inputs in its own input store. 
The inputs are bought at scale and skipping intermediaries, so they are offered at a lower 
price and at credit. In addition to offering credit for inputs, the RPO offers credits for 
other productive purposes. These credits are small, as they depend on the contributions 
made by members (or external donors). The RPO leader highlighted that one of the 
advantages of accessing in-house credit is that this allows farmers to build their credit 
history, which they can then use as reference for accessing formal agricultural credit: 
“banks request a financial certificate, so if they [RPO members] have had credit here for 
microcredit or for inputs, we [the RPO] give them the certificate that serves as support 
for their credit application”.  
Credit analysts interviewed corroborated the relevance of this screening mechanism. 
They also mentioned that in addition to requesting financial references, they request 
certificates of RPO membership, as these provide additional information on farmer´s 
experience and knowledge (i.e. a signal of farmer type). Membership also provides them 
with valuable information on commercialization opportunities and production techniques 
(i.e. a signal of project type). As mentioned by one of the analysts: "we request a 
certificate of RPO membership and annex it to the credit request to certify experience, 
143 
 
that he is with the organization, and that gives support to the application, it is very 
important (…) it shows that he is part of a group, that he has a defined market, that he has 
good cropping practices”. Another analyst similarly stated that “it is super good that he is 
an RPO member, because I already know he knows about the activity, and he has become 
a member so that his costs are lower, or so that he can sell. So it generates more trust 
relative to the one who is not associated. For the one who is not associated, one has to 
look into him a bit more”.   
The director of the public bank branch highlighted another relevant aspect of the relation 
between banks and RPOs. He said that because inadequate road conditions increase travel 
costs for potential clients, he chooses to visit different areas of the municipality to directly 
search for clients. In these visits, he contacts RPOs, as it is easier to search for clients 
through the organizations, rather than contacting farmers one by one. The analyst of the 
private bank corroborated this. He reported contacting RPOs to offer them either 
associative credit (for the RPO), or individual credits in a block (i.e. several similar 
individual credits at once). He mentioned the example of a recent meeting with an RPO, 
during which he negotiated 25 individual credits at once (25 of the 45 members requested 
a credit that day). Because these credits were granted in a block, their approval costs were 
lower. For instance, the cost of revising the documentation (which has to be paid by the 
client) was offered at a discounted rate, given that the revision process was similar (and 
thus easier) for all of the credits. In an interview to another credit analyst he stressed that 
information flowing among peers can also increase credit demands and reduce the cost of 
accessing information on credit opportunities and on the application process, what she 
termed the “voice to voice mechanism”.  
Another of the RPOs interviewed was Asocopa, created in 2005 with 40 members. This 
organization bought and rented land for cultivating fruits. As in the case of Aprob, 
members of Asocopa engaged in a new productive activity after joining the RPO. The 
organization sold the produce through commercial contracts negotiated with different 
markets in cities throughout the country. Again, as in Aprob, members reported 
information and knowledge flowing throughout the organization. The leader mentioned 
he constantly attends technical assistance workshops, after which he meets with the rest 
of the members to pass on what he learned. Part of the information that flows throughout 
this network has to do with credit opportunities. As the leader put it “I told them [the RPO 
members], look, what you need to do [to apply for credit], is this and this, go there [to the 
bank], and I can reference you".  
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Some interviewees in this municipality referred to other forms of peer influence in 
relation to credit dynamics: a social imitation effect. An analyst from the local financial 
cooperative mentioned for instance, that credit demands multiply thanks to the influence 
of peers, especially among RPOs "you see yourself as a mirror of the other RPO members, 
if you see things are going well for one, you look for a way to be equally good, or better. 
And when looking for this, one seeks resources, and credit increases".  
This credit analyst also mentioned that farmers who are members of RPOs might have a 
higher demand for credit due to a complementarity effect with resources received through 
public programs targeted towards RPOs. He specifically mentioned receiving several 
credit demands from organized farmers who had accessed resources from the Coffee 
Federation: “the Federation gives farmers $5 million COP, but they have to find other 
$10 million, so this is a benefit for us [the financial cooperative]".  
The third RPO interviewed in Betulia was Asoperiso. It was created 8 years ago, and has 
65 fishermen members. Some of the members have dropped out because the organization 
is not as successful as they expected. This is partly explained by the nature of the RPO, 
conceived more as a voice mechanism to demand jobs and specific benefits, than as a 
productive organization. Evidence of the above is that members of this RPO have not 
received any training through the organization, they have not commercialized fish jointly, 
or have demanded credit jointly.  
The last RPO interviewed was Asovenplaya, created 8 years ago, with 29 female 
members. The RPO commercializes fish. Members used to commercialize this product 
standing near a highway, with no equipment but Styrofoam refrigerators. After joining 
the RPO, they began to collective demand support from the hydroelectric plant and from 
the local government in order to build proper stands. They received resources for this. 
The RPO members also accessed technical assistance through the organization, in which 
they learned how to process and pack the fish, adding value to their product in order to 
perceive a higher price. Regarding credit dynamics, one of the members mentioned that 
although the public bank has repeatedly offered them credit, they have not yet accepted. 
However, they are now considering to do so, in order to finance part of the installation 
costs required for the new stands. This is another example of how through RPOs, farmers 
access new and more profitable projects which increase their demand for investment, and 
thus for credit.  
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The interviews evidence that RPOs in Betulia are in general strong, and tend to emerge 
as long-term production oriented organizations. These organizations offer advantages for 
accessing new and more rentable projects (e.g. greenhouse tomatoes, fish selling stands). 
They allow access to inputs at a lower cost and ease access to technical assistance 
programs through which they learn how to add value to their products (e.g. packaged 
fish), what not only increases their income, but also their demand for credit. RPOs also 
offer informal credit, building credit history which serves as a financial reference for 
accessing formal credit (serving as a screening mechanism for banks). Furthermore, 
banks report RPO membership to provide valuable information, not only as a signal of 
farmer type but also of project type. Banks also highlighted how they target RPO 
members to offer and approve credits in a block, lowering search and approval costs. This 
case study also illustrates how through RPOs, information and knowledge flows, reducing 
the cost of accessing information, included that related to credit opportunities.  
3.5.2 Sapuyes, Nariño (on-the-line) 
 
Sapuyes is located in the south of Colombia in the department of Nariño, 3.000 meters 
above the sea level. It is 80 km south of the department capital (Pasto). The municipality 
is small, with a population of 7.300, mostly dedicated to agriculture120. Sapuyes has 
traditionally been a peaceful area, despite being in one of the departments most affected 
by the armed conflict. Poverty rates have decreased during the last decade as access to 
social services have improved.  
The number of credits allocated per capita in Sapuyes is similar to the country average. 
Most of the credits (75% during the study period) are granted to small farmers, which 
constitute the majority of farmers in the area. There are no banks in Sapuyes, so farmers 
have to go to Túquerres, a nearby town where they find both public and private banks.  
In general, the interviewees shared the view that the municipality is socially integrated 
and that solidarity networks are strong (i.e. social capital is strong). Collective action 
dynamics in Sapuyes are similar to those of the other on-the-line municipality (Betulia): 
the number of RPOs per capita is similar to the national average. Also as in Betulia, RPOs 
appear to emerge organically as bottom-up and production-oriented initiatives, or as a 
mechanism to demand social change. In this municipality, the number of RPOs increased 
in the midst of the national agrarian riot of 2013, during which local social leaders 
                                                             
120 As in Betulia, the support of the local government to RPOs and to the agricultural sector in general is 
weak, although it has increased with the new mayor.  
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emerged and encouraged the community to organize. The riot was particularly strong in 
Nariño, in part because of its indigenous and farmer mobilization tradition.  
I interviewed two RPOs in Sapuyes, both of which were quite successful. Prolesa was 
created 8 years ago and has 40 members dedicated to producing and commercializing 
milk. The members of this organization contributed monetary resources and jointly 
bought a plot of land. They then received financial resources from the national 
government, and together with their own monetary contributions, they then bought a large 
milk tank. Thanks to this investment they were able to commercialize milk directly (they 
currently commercialize more than 2.600 litres of milk per week), skipping the 
commercial intermediary who had monopsony power and thus paid milk at a lower price. 
Another reason why members of Prolesa receive a higher price for their product, is that 
in order to sell through the RPO, members have to comply with quality standards, which 
are revised twice a day. Although members of Prolesa have very little education, the 
organizations is conceived as a production oriented organization and is managed 
accordingly. An example of this is that members agreed to reinvest profits from the 
commercial activity in order to buy the plot of land. 
While this collective asset (the land plot) could be used as collateral for accessing 
associative credit (the public bank offered credit several times to the RPO), the members 
decided not to request one, as they did not want to risk losing the collateral. Member of 
Prolesa do access credit individually. Furthermore, they access in-house credit through 
the RPO. One of the members highlighted that in-house RPO credits are used in 
emergencies to ease liquidity constraints “For example, if I need money urgently, I find 
money through the RPO (…) it is like an insurance (…) sometimes one asks for it to pay 
for another credit obligation in another place”. In this sense, the credit granted by the RPO 
works not only to increase access to (informal) credit, but also constitutes a safety net, 
mitigating some of the liquidity risks that self-ration farmers out of formal credit.  
Having access to a safety net for informal loans (among peers or through the RPO) is not 
the only way in which RPOs reduce risk. RPO members consider they face lower risk as 
they have access to commercialization agreements, which set prices ex ante, reducing 
price volatility. Banks also consider RPO members to be less risky. For instance, the 
director of the local public bank mentioned being more likely to offer credit in areas that 
are more organized, as this lowers the overall risk of granting credit.  
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The second RPO interviewed in Sapuyes was El Bosque. This organization is young and 
small (2 years, 27 members), but was already considerably successful. Members of the 
RPO drafted a proposal for a new productive project and applied for resources from public 
agencies. With these, they built a chicken shed, and started to sell poultry. The members 
re-invested all of the income obtained from these sales to start another productive project 
(a strawberry plantation). However, the investment requirement was higher than their 
resources, so they decided to request an associative credit from a microfinance institution. 
This was granted directly to the RPO, rather than to its individual members. The leader 
of the RPO mentioned they opted for associative credit from a microfinance institution 
rather than from a formal bank as they needed a relatively small credit (while formal 
associative credits are quite large). Moreover, despite being more expensive, the 
requirements of the microcredit institution were substantially easier to fulfil, so 
transaction costs were lower. 
Both RPOs interviewed evidenced high degrees of collective action. Members were well 
informed about the functioning of the organization. They were committed to their joint 
responsibility and were proactive, meeting frequently and working collectively. For 
instance, regarding RPO meetings, one member of Prolesa mentioned that “everyone has 
to go, or if we have to work one day, everyone goes. Sometimes some work more, but at 
least we are united”. I also found that in both RPOs, members are committed to long term 
productive purposes, and thus they are willing to invest money in the RPO, and to reinvest 
its profits in order to continue growing. The success of RPOs in the municipality does not 
seem limited to these two cases. According to the Secretary of Government, local RPOs 
have in general advanced in their productive projects and “have had a lot of will”. 
The success and relevance of RPOs in the municipality is acknowledged by credit 
analysts. They specially highlighted the commercialization benefits these organizations 
generate. For instance, one of the analysts mentioned that “when the client is associated, 
he has a target market and his product is sold, or is more easily sold, whereas a non-
member, well, it is not as easy”. He also highlighted that through individual credits, RPO 
members are able to access substantive resources required for large productive projects 
“most of our clients which are part of RPOs are small, they would not be able to pay for 
a $200 million credit, but together they can do it: adding individual credits for a large 
project”.  
This case study evidenced that RPOs can be managed quite successfully as collective 
enterprises following production and commercialization objectives. Through these 
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organizations members have been able to start new productive projects (e.g. strawberries), 
to access resources from public programs (e.g. to build the milk tank) and to improve 
their commercialization opportunities (e.g. through collective commercialization 
agreements). This has increased the income of members, allowing them to sell their 
produce at a higher price and with a lower volatility. The case also illustrate how informal 
credit can be used as a complement for formal credit, being an option to pay for formal 
credit obligations in cases of low liquidity. Credit analysts reported to be aware of these 
advantages, and also highlighted how through individual credits, members are able to 
gather resources for larger collective projects. 
3.5.3 Guadalupe, Santander (off-the-line) 
Guadalupe is a small municipality located in the mountains of the south of Santander. It 
has a population of 5.000, and a poverty rate of 61%. The population has decreased by 
40% since 1985, partly due to scarce economic opportunities. The municipality has low 
homicide rates, and was less affected by the armed conflict than other municipalities in 
the department. The participation of agriculture in the GDP is relatively low (14%), while 
tourism has become an important economic activity, receiving both foreign and national 
tourists.  
The number of credits per capita in Guadalupe is significantly higher than the country´s 
average. During the period of study, almost 3.000 credits were granted (twice as much as 
in Betulia, which has a similar population and is located in the same department). An 
agronomist who works in Guadalupe considers that the dynamism of the credit market 
relates with its closeness to Bogotá, the scarce public order problems and the fact that 
most people own their land. The main financial actor in the municipality is the public 
bank, granting 91% of the credits during the period of study, mainly to small farmers. In 
addition to the public and commercial banks in the area, Guadalupe has its own financial 
cooperative, Multicoop. This financial cooperative started as a regular RPO, being an 
example of how collective action organizations evolve, and of how they effectively 
increase the supply of credit at the local level. 
Guadalupe experienced a boom in agricultural credit between 2004 and 2009, while 
provision has decreased since then. The decrease is associated with a preoccupation of 
the public bank with over-indebtedness, what has led it to make credit allocation stricter. 
Changes in credit dynamics do not appear to be explained by changes in RPO creation, 
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consistent with Guadalupe being an off-the-line municipality (i.e. the relation between 
both variables is not as predicted).  
The number of RPOs per capita in Guadalupe is similar to the national average. However, 
as highlighted in its local Development Plan, RPOs tend to be weak. One RPO leader put 
it clearly “as all other RPOs in the area, the only thing that this RPO has achieved is 
maintaining all the paperwork up to date”. This view was shared by other interviewees, 
and was evidenced in the two RPOs studied.   
The first organization interviewed was Asoprocagua. This RPO was created 6 years ago, 
with the explicit objective of accessing resources from a public program (“the cocoa 
rout”) which specifically required beneficiaries to be organized. This program acted as an 
external stimulus for the creation of this and other RPOs. Through the RPO, members 
received cocoa seeds from the government, but some of the members have not cultivated 
them, while others cultivated them at inadequate land conditions. Apart from receiving 
these resources, the organization has achieved little. This is partly due to a lack of 
commitment from its members since the beginning of the RPO. As one of them put it: 
“the link was of a quote-unquote “association”, but we did not establish any compromises, 
no maintenance fee, no follow up, no meetings, we only had a certificate to say “yes, we 
are organized” and then obtain the benefit (…) the aim was not to generate benefits for 
the future, just for the moment (…) that is the problem of the rural sector, the lack of an 
associative culture”. From the 18 members of this RPO, only 8 are active. The lack of 
interest might result from members being dedicated to other activities, not principally 
agriculture, what reduces their incentives to invest time and effort in the RPO. The leader 
of this organization stated that he has tried to find projects and technical assistance, but 
members do not even attend meetings. Related to credit, he mentioned that he once 
proposed getting an associative credit, but the idea was rapidly rejected by the other 
members, arguing it would be too risky, as no one would respond with the joint quotas. 
Some of the members of this organization have requested individual agricultural credit, 
for individual independent projects. 
The second RPO interviewed was Amar. It was created 17 years ago, with 12 female 
members. This RPO also emerged as the result of an external influence, in this case, that 
of a religious organization from another municipality. As Asoprocagua, this RPO did not 
establish clear collective action rules or productive objectives. The leader of this RPO 
complained about the lack of interest and collaboration among members, what she 
considers has to do with receiving top down benefits “when the government started gifting 
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things, the action of people ended, collaboration ended. The world got out of hand. People 
no longer want to work or contribute”.  To what she added “we put our hands out to 
receive, but we do not want to give anything ourselves (…) if there are meetings, people 
do not even come if they are not promised to receive a benefit”.   
Regarding credit, one of the members mentioned they once evaluated requesting one to 
start a collective poultry project. However, they rejected the idea as it required too many 
documents and it was too risky: “we said no, it is too difficult, and there needs to be 
compromise, a sense of belonging. And maybe some of us are hard-working, but not of 
all of us are committed”.  
The weakness of RPOs does not appear exclusive to these two cases. One of the leaders 
interviewed stated that “most of the RPOs in the municipality are all fallen apart”. During 
the interviews examples of other weak RPOs in the municipality were mentioned. One 
was the case of an organizations that was created to receive machinery to roast coffee 
through a public program, but then “the RPO leader started kicking out members, and he 
kept everything”. In another RPO, the organizations requested a credit and then the leader 
took all the money and left. These negative experiences (which were not reported in other 
municipalities) plausibly weaken trust on RPOs and lessen the motivation of people to 
create and join this type of organizations. Indeed, several interviewees highlighted the 
prevalence of individualistic attitudes in the municipality, the lack of trust and the lack of 
experience working in groups. These traits can be categorized as low social capital.  
The interviews with the banks revealed that they are aware of the weakness of RPOs in 
the municipality, and thus they are sceptic of them. For instance, the director of the public 
bank branch said "Guadalupe does not have a culture of associativity, sadly one has to 
say so”. The credit analyst of the local financial cooperative considered that being an RPO 
member does not provide relevant information for the credit analysis as “there can be 
members of for example, Asogasur, which is the livestock association of Guadalupe, that 
anyway have a bad production management. And one person that is not in the association, 
but has a good management. So anyway we analyse this in the visit to the client´s farm. 
The visit is what tells us how the producer is”.  
An agronomist who works analysing productive projects for credit applications in this 
and other municipalities, did have a positive view on collective action reducing credit 
constraints, specifically through lower risk. He stated that RPOs usually “have a 
technician supervising the crop, the adequate fertilizing plans, plague control (…) they 
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have technical assistance guaranteed and have their commercialization better 
programmed. So a farmer that is part of an RPO, will surely have lower risks”. Note that 
his view was more general on RPOs, rather than on the specific ones in Guadalupe.  
The results of this case study reveal that not all RPOs are successful or have a strong 
impact on access to input, output or credit markets. The cases illustrated how 
organizations that emerge inorganically (i.e. from external influences) following short 
term purposes, face structural obstacles and remain weak throughout time. Because the 
organizations are weak, so is the relation between collective action and access to credit. 
This was reported by both RPO members and credit analysts.  
3.5.4 Guaitarilla, Nariño (off-the-line) 
Guaitarilla is located 72 km south of Pasto, the capital of Nariño. It has a population of 
12.011, of which 69% is rural. Guaitarilla is now a peaceful municipality, although there 
was guerrilla and paramilitary presence in the early 2000s. Poverty levels are higher than 
in the other analysed municipalities, although the town has recently grown and access to 
public services has improved. 
The number of agricultural credits granted per capita in Guaitarilla is almost the same as 
in the other off-the-line municipality (Guadalupe), being significantly higher than the 
national average. Most of the credits are granted by the public bank, which is the only 
bank in the municipality. The public bank has been in the municipality for decades, what, 
according to one of the interviewees has “generated a culture of credit”. Farmers 
interviewed reported credit being easy to obtain. One of the credit analysts mentioned that 
people in the municipality are good payers, and that credits are usually granted against 
land: “it is common for farmers to go to the bank and say “how much will you lend me 
with the land I have?” 
The number of RPOs per capita in Guaitarilla is slightly higher than the country average, 
although the difference is not statistically significant. The number of RPOs has increased 
in the last years, especially in 2014, when 15 RPOs were created, constituting an “RPO 
creation shock”. As in Sapuyes, this relates to the 2013 national agrarian riot, which was 
particularly strong in this department. The increase in RPOs in the municipality also 
relates to the arrival of a public technical assistance program which encouraged producers 
to organize. 
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The local government has also incentivized RPO creation. The Secretary of Agriculture 
reported helping farmers to constitute RPOs, and mentioned the local government 
subsidizes the annual fee to renovate the RPO register, helps them prepare tax reports and 
structure projects, and grants them financial resources. The above evidences a top down, 
inorganic approach to the creation of collective action organizations, similar to what I 
found in the other off-the-line municipality (Guadalupe). 
A second and related similarity with Guadalupe is that RPOs tend to be weak, and thus 
the existence of registered RPOs does not necessarily reflect or materialize collective 
action. There are 40 registered RPOs in the municipality, but according to the agronomist 
who works for the local Government and in the agricultural input store, only about 15 are 
doing well, despite the government supporting all of them. The weakness of RPOs in the 
municipality was brought up in other interviews. One person mentioned the particular 
problem of leaders taking advantage of the organizations (this was also mentioned in 
Guadalupe). Another interviewee reported his experience with other farmers in his area: 
they had unsuccessfully tried to constitute an RPO three times, but there was never 
enough commitment. 
I interviewed two RPOs in Guaitarilla. The first was El Sol, created in 2014 with 28 
members. It started as a cooperative to repave two kilometres of road, but then became 
an RPO. The leader mentioned the organization is conceived as a way of protesting 
against the government, and of “looking for any resource from the Government”. The 
RPO received potatoes seeds and inputs through a public program targeted at organized 
farmers. The leader argued they lost all of the production. Nonetheless, one of the 
members interviewed mentioned they did sell the potatoes, but she did not know why the 
members had not yet received money from the sale.  
In general, this RPO did not appear to be very horizontal or open. In fact, the RPO leader 
did not agree to provide the contact details of other members, and only introduced me to 
his son and niece (who were also members). Regarding credit, the RPO leader mentioned 
that their current goal is to become a credit organization, so that members do not have to 
go to banks. Interestingly, the other member interviewed was not aware of this goal. The 
RPO leader also reported receiving several agricultural credits, but individually, and for 
projects not related to the organization. Furthermore, he reported that when requesting 
the individual credits, he did not mention being an RPO member. He added that he did 
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not think this was a relevant issue: “I do not think that [being an RPO member] matters, 
it depends more on the capacity of each client”.  
The interviews with local credit analysts were consistent with the above assessment. 
When asked about whether RPO membership was something banks considered when 
assessing a credit request, one of the credit analysts replied “The truth is that RPOs here 
are not up to date, having their output contracts. The truth is that does not give us much 
information”. Similarly, the manager of the local credit cooperative replied “It does not 
matter, no. What matters is the collateral, the co-signer. Unless the RPO co-signs the 
credit, it is the same”. 
Despite the general view on the weakness of RPOs, some interviewees highlighted the 
case of one successful RPO. I interviewed members from this organization, which was 
created in 2011 with 32 members. The RPO currently produces 28.000 kilograms of 
tomatoes per week. Members produce individually, but receive technical support and 
commercialize through the organization. This RPO differed from others in the 
municipality in that it was clearly a production and long term-oriented organization. 
Farmers created the RPO so they could meet the requirements of a commercialization 
agreement that one of them found, requiring a large amount of production, constantly 
throughout time. This requirement could not be guaranteed unless farmers organized.   
When asked whether they had accessed associative credit, the RPO leader replied “the 
bank has offered us [credit] but we have still not needed it, because we have had the way 
to meet our needs”. Indeed, the RPO has been successful in generating income from its 
sales, and has also been successful at structuring productive projects to receive funds from 
public agencies. These resources have been substitutes for credit needs. The members 
have, however, applied for credit individually, especially when they began to produce 
tomatoes and required resources to finance initial investments. The leader of this RPO 
also highlighted the existence of peer effects (among members) in credit requests. For 
instance, he mentioned he motivates members of the RPO to request credit, stressing his 
example, and more specifically, that he was able to request the credit easily, and to repay 
it after just one crop.  
Another similarity between this and the other off-the-line case is that both municipalities 
have experienced non-agricultural shocks and a declining relevance of agriculture as an 
economic activity. In the case of Guadalupe, the non-agricultural shock was the 
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emergence of tourism. In the case of Guaitarilla, it had to do with resources and projects 
brought along by local politicians and contractors who have become relevant actors at the 
national level. An especially relevant case was that of the Solarte brothers (huge national 
infrastructure contractors), who each year reward their hometown with a project. The 
latest project was an agreement with a large national university to open a local branch in 
Guaitarilla, which includes the building of student housing and other services. The 
interviewees highlighted this ongoing project has significantly changed the town. 
The relation between RPOs and access to credit in this case study was in general weak. 
This appears to be the result of the weakness of RPOs in the municipality, as some 
organizations lack long term productive purposes and cooperative links. This weakness 
seems to be related with the way in which organizations emerge, following an external 
inducement rather than a bottom-up production-oriented initiative. The study of a 
particularly successful RPO in the municipality revealed that RPOs have substitute 
sources of investment, such as their own profits or public resources targeted towards 
organizations.     
3.6 Discussion  
This section discusses the results, and builds an analytical framework explaining the 
demand and supply-side mechanism through which collective action reduces credit 
constraints. These mechanisms were identified mostly from the on-the-line cases (Betulia 
and Sapuyes), being largely consistent in both. Considering that these cases were selected 
semi-randomly, and that the municipalities are located in different areas of the country 
(exhibiting differences in geographic, economic, demographic and social conditions), 
there are no theoretical or empirical reasons why the mechanisms identified would be 
specific or valid only in these cases. Note that the different mechanisms are not 
understood as rival explanations, but rather as complementary channels explaining the 
relation between the dependent and independent variables. 
The second part of the discussion focuses on the off-the-line cases, identifying 
commonalities which appear to explain the low fit of the econometric model, and thus, 
the weakness of the mechanisms. These potential explanations are discussed from a 
theoretical perspective. I then carry out further quantitative analysis in order to test 
whether the findings drawn from the case analysis can be generalized to other cases.  
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Figure 3.2 summarizes the analytical framework. It describes the demand and supply side 
mechanisms through which collective action reduces different types of credit constraints 
(identified through different colours). The diagram also illustrates which mechanisms 
were found to be relatively stronger than others, what is depicted using different colour 
intensities: a higher intensity means the mechanism is stronger. As previously mentioned, 
quantity credit constraints refer to those which make the supply of credit lower than the 
effective demand. In turn, transaction cost and risk constraints refer to demand-side 
constraints which reduce the effective demand for credit121.
                                                             
121 As such, constraints stemming from supply side costs like approval costs or client search costs, are not 
categorized as transaction cost constraints but as quantity constraints.  
156 
 
Figure 3.2. Supply and Demand side mechanisms through which collective action reduces credit constraints 
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3.6.1 Increasing the supply of credit 
Collective action in the form of RPOs increases the supply of credit, and through this, it 
loosens quantity credit constraints. The three main mechanisms through which this occurs 
are: a) RPOs grant credit to their members; b) Banks grant associative credit to RPOs; 
and c) Banks are more likely to grant individual credit to RPO members.   
a. RPOs grant credit to their members 
Several RPOs grant credit to their members through informal group lending schemes, 
increasing the supply of credit. RPO credits tend to be small, mainly because the resources 
available to lend are limited to contributions made by members. They also tend to be more 
expensive than formal credit, which is subject to regulations like interest rate ceilings. 
Credit granted by RPOs acts as a selective incentive (i.e. private goods made available to 
individuals on the basis of whether they contribute to a collective good).  
The case studies revealed that RPO credits are in general demanded for emergency 
needs122, including paying formal credit quotas in periods of financial hardship. As such, 
RPO credit does not only reduces quantity constraints through the provision of informal 
credit, but also reduces risk constraints, acting as an informal insurance for accessing 
formal credit. Furthermore, that RPO credits are small and mostly used for emergencies 
suggests that these are a complement, rather than a substitute of formal credit. This is 
consistent with evidence showing that low-income individuals simultaneously use both 
informal and formal sources of finance (United Nations, 2006).  
b. Banks grant associative credit to RPOs 
Associative credit refers to credit offered by banks to RPOs123. By regulation, this credit 
line offers lower interest rates than standard individual credit, being an incentive for 
farmers to organize. Only when a farmer becomes member of an RPO, he becomes 
eligible to access this special and favourable credit line. This reduces both quantity 
constraints and price constraints.   
Despite the potential of this mechanism to reduce quantity constraints, the case studies 
evidenced this mechanism is rather weak. For instance, while all RPOs interviewed 
                                                             
122 Another type of credit that RPOs can offer (although it is not very common) is credit to purchase 
inputs from the RPO´s input store.  
123 That is, credit granted directly to the legal organization. There was a recent reform stating that 
associative credit conditions also apply for individual credit for RPO members, but this information was 
not known locally.  
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reported banks offering them associative credit, none of them had accessed this credit 
line124. The interviews revealed there is a low demand for this credit line due to its nature: 
associative credits are quite large125, and few RPOs have the capacity or even the need to 
request large credits. The above, as either RPOs are too small and unsuccessful, or they 
are successful and are able to meet their investment requirements re-investing income or 
through resources received from public programs. Moreover, the requirements for 
accessing this type of credit are complex (e.g. all RPO members have to be well reported 
in credit history databases), and there are intrinsic collective action transaction costs (all 
members have to agree to request the credit), and collective risk constraints (members 
fear others will not pay their share of the collective quotas).  
c. RPO membership increases the likelihood of credit supply 
Benson et al.´s (2019) econometric results show that banks are 1,2 times more likely to 
supply a credit to a farmer who is an RPO member relative to one who is not. The case 
studies reveal this stems from RPO membership increasing the creditworthiness of 
farmers. Creditworthiness (or credit scoring) relates to the estimated plausibility of an 
individual defaulting on debt, what is assessed based on project type (i.e. the expected 
return of a productive project) and farmer type (i.e. expertise, commitment, ability). RPO 
membership provides a signal of both project quality and farmer type, making farmers 
more creditworthy and reducing the prevalent problems of imperfect and asymmetric 
information present in rural markets. 
RPOs provide a signal of project quality, for instance, granting commercial references for 
credit applications126. Moreover, banks are aware that through these organizations 
farmers have access to inputs at lower prices, commercialization agreements, technical 
assistance and other forms of government support. The above translates into higher 
expected returns of their productive projects, as will be further discussed in mechanism 
d. Evidence from a recent survey is consistent with the above: credit suppliers state that 
                                                             
124 This is consistent with the fact that associative credit accounts for less than 1% of all agricultural credit 
in Colombia. 
125 In the Colombian case, these credits are of over $200 million COP, whereas the average credit size a 
small farmer requests is $8 million COP. 
126 I found that some credit request forms explicitly ask whether the farmer is an RPO member. In other 
cases, this information is brought up during the application interview or the bank´s visit to the farm. Other 
credit analysts argued they know ex ante which farmers are RPO members, for example, because RPOs 
have savings accounts in the bank, or just because information of this sort flows easily, especially in small 
municipalities.  
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producers with higher access to credit are those who face lower risk, usually being those 
which are more organized and have access to better information, price guaranteed 
schemes and secured output markets (Econometría and M. Consultores, 2014).   
RPO membership also provides a signal of farmer type, not only through commercial 
references, but also through financial ones. Reference signal farmers´ experience 
producing a certain type of product, and show that the farmer has a relevant credit history 
with the organization. RPO references serve as a screening mechanism127 that reduces 
problems of imperfect and asymmetric information.  
While banks did not explicitly report RPOs reducing moral hazard problems (e.g. carrying 
out monitoring tasks which banks cannot overtake), in practice, this does occur. For 
instance, leaders of RPOs monitor the crops of members, as well as the quality of the final 
products, setting quality standards for joint commercialization.   
Another way in which RPOs increase the likelihood of credit supply is through the 
reduction of search and approval costs (i.e. transaction costs from the supply side). Banks 
reported visiting RPOs to offer their members credits in a block, this entails lower search 
costs relative to contacting clients one by one. This also reduces approval costs. For 
example, credit revision costs are offered at lower rates when several similar productive 
projects (e.g. those of members from a certain RPO producing similar products under 
similar conditions) are analysed. That RPO membership reduces search and approval 
supply costs is particularly relevant, as one of the reasons why commercial banks report 
not supplying sufficient agricultural credits is that these tend to be small, making fixed 
approval costs too high. As discussed by the United Nations (2006), increasing access to 
financial services for unbanked and underbanked individuals requires not only innovation 
in products, but also innovation in the means of reaching customers, including achieving 
economies of scale in serving small transaction credits. 
A final way in which RPO membership increases the likelihood of credit approval is by 
helping farmers to meet collateral requirements, for instance, through jointly acquired or 
rented land or other assets. The case studies revealed this mechanism to be weak. First, 
                                                             
127 The work of Markussen and Tarp (2014) shows that the screening applicants, for example, through the 
provision of a letter of recommendation, increases access to credit.  
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as not all RPOs own collective assets; and second, as those that do, consider it too risky 
to use it as a collateral and losing it.  
3.6.2 Increasing the demand for credit 
Collective action also increases the demand for credit, what in a context in which the 
supply is flexible, leads to a reduction in quantity credit constraints. The mechanisms 
through which RPOs increase the demand for credit are: d) increasing access to new, 
larger and more profitable productive projects which require investment; e) social 
imitation effect; f) reducing transaction costs by easing access to information on credit 
opportunities and the application process; and g) reducing risk constraints by constituting 
a safety net.  
d. RPOs increase access to new, larger and more profitable productive projects 
which require investment 
Collective action in the form of RPOs increases the demand for individual credit as it 
allows members to access new, larger and more profitable projects. This goes in line with 
Gine’s (2011) model of investment decisions depending on scale of production and 
ability. RPO members have access to new projects (e.g. proposed by the organization 
leaders, or which arrive through public programs particularly targeted towards RPOs). 
Public programs often require beneficiaries to make a counterpart investment, as such 
public resources act as a complement for credit128. RPOs also increase the demand for 
investment and credit at the intensive margin, by enlarging productive projects (for which 
investment is needed). More generally, RPOs increase the demand for credit by making 
projects more profitable. The above increases the expected return of investments, 
increasing the demand for credit.  
A first channel through which RPOs increase the profitability of projects is that RPO 
members are able to access inputs (from seeds to machinery) at lower prices. This, as the 
organizations buy large quantities directly from suppliers, skipping intermediaries and 
profiting from economies of scale. In some cases, RPOs receive inputs at zero price, 
through targeted public benefits. 
RPOs also receive technical training from public programs, NGOs, multilateral agencies, 
second level RPOs and input suppliers. Through these, members access training in Good 
                                                             
128 Public resources can also act as a supplement for credit, if they are enough to start a project or if 
beneficiaries are not required to make a counterpart investment. 
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Agricultural Practices, book keeping, commercializing strategies, and even leadership 
and human relations. Technical assistance programs also teach members how to process 
and add value to their products, which allows receiving a higher revenue. Sometimes 
technological transfer occurs not through external assistance, but directly among RPO 
peers (e.g. through Whatsapp groups). 
Collective action organizations also ease access to output markets through joint 
commercialization agreements, though these, they skip intermediaries who often have 
monopsony power and thus pay low prices. Also, output contracts (or agreements) can 
include quality standards for the product, for which farmers are paid a higher price. The 
above is in line with previous evidence on the positive impact of collective action 
organizations on commercialization (Markelova et al. 2009; Bernard, Taffesse, and 
Gabre-Madhin, 2008). 
The advantages that RPOs provide for accessing information (e.g. on how to fight a pest), 
technical assistance (e.g. Good Agricultural Practices or risk prevention strategies) and 
commercialization (e.g. setting ex ante commercializing conditions) should reduce the 
risk of productive projects, what in turn, increases their expected return.  
e. The demand for credit increases through a social imitation effect 
The influence that peers exercise on the behaviour of individuals is known as a social 
imitation effect. In the case of credit, it refers to peers influencing the decision of an 
individual to request a credit. In the cases studied, this occurred when RPO leaders 
actively motivate others to follow their experience. The work of Wydick et al. (2011) 
shows, for instance, that when the number of people in a church who access microfinance 
doubles, the probability of an individual accessing credit increases by 14% (the effect on 
formal credit is small although significant). The imitation effect generated by RPOs is 
plausibly larger, being a specialized production-oriented network, which can provide 
more relevant information or role models than informal social networks like churches or 
neighbours. 
f. RPOs reduce transaction costs of credit applications, by easing access to 
information on credit opportunities and the application process  
RPOs also reduce transaction cost credit constraints. This, as the organization constitutes 
a network through which information flows. The diffusion of information about credit 
opportunities operates among RPO peers, constituting what banks call the "voice to 
voice" mechanism. This goes in line with the results of Okten and Osili (2004) showing 
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that social networks (measured as participation in community meetings) increase the 
probability of knowing about credit opportunities, of applying for credit and of receiving 
one. The flow of information among RPO members can be particularly relevant as they 
are engaged in similar activities, with plausibly similar credit needs. This makes 
information more pertinent. 
g. RPOs reduce risk constraints, acting as a safety net 
RPOs also reduce risk credit constraints. This is not only related to RPOs reducing the 
potential risk of productive projects (as discussed in mechanism d), but also to RPOs 
constituting a social network that can act as a safety net. For instance, farmers reported 
that when a member faces an adverse shock and has problems to pay a formal debt, peers 
can provide an informal loan (RPO to peer or peer to peer). Having access to this safety 
net should reduce the risk of defaulting on debt and losing the collateral. The above is 
similar to the argument of Guirkinger and Boucher (2008) on how transfers from families 
or friends reduce risk credit rationing.  
3.6.3 Explaining the low fit of the model in the off-the-line municipalities 
 
The mechanisms through which collective action reduces credit constraints were found 
to be weak in the off-the-line cases. This could be the result of idiosyncratic aspects in 
each of the two cases; alternatively, it could result from common characteristics in the 
way in which RPOs or the credit market operate in these. I found evidence of the latter: 
there are commonalities in both off-the-line cases which appear to explain the low fit of 
the model. I then show these commonalities are generalizable to a larger set of 
municipalities. As such, they explain in a more systematic way why under certain 
conditions the effect of collective action on access to credit is not as strong as predicted 
by the econometric model.  
The principal commonality found was that while in the off-the-line municipalities the 
number of RPOs per capita is not statistically different from the average, de facto, RPOs 
tend to be weak and do not effectively materialize collective action129. As a consequece, 
the relation between CA and credit is weak.  
The above leads to a question: why are RPOs in these municipalities relatively weak? The 
qualitative analysis revealed that the strength and success of RPOs is related to the way 
                                                             
129 This would constitute a sort of “measurement error”. As discussed in the case study section, this was 
especially true for the case of Guadalupe. 
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in which they emerge. Successful RPOs tend to emerge organically: as bottom-up 
initiatives aimed at working jointly towards long term productive purposes. On the 
contrary, unsuccessful RPOs tend to emerge inorganically: following an external, top 
down, short term stimulus, often leading to “RPO creation shocks”. One example of an 
external stimulus was the arrival of a specific public program requiring beneficiaries to 
be organized in order to receive a short term benefit. Incentivized by this stimulus, 
farmers constituted organizations rapidly, without defining clear productive purposes or 
collective action rules. These RPOs are active at the moment of receiving external 
support, and then turn into passive actors. 
These external stimulus leading to “RPO creation shocks” were more common in the two 
off-the-line case studies130 than in the on-the-line ones. Furthermore, I show they were 
more common in the off-the-line subgroup of municipalities. To show this, I estimate the 
number of “RPO creation shocks” 131 experienced in each municipality and then carry out 
a difference-in-means test. I find that the number of shocks in the off-the-line 
municipality subgroup is statistically higher than in the rest of municipalities. 
To more formally test whether this relates to the low fit of the model (of Benson et al. 
2019), I estimate this model on a subsample of municipalities: those with the highest 
number of “RPO creation shocks”132. The results in Table 3.3 show that indeed, the model 
does not fit in this subgroup of municipalities: contrary to the aggregate results, the effect 
of CA on access to credit is not significant in this subsample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
130 In Guadalupe, the external stimulus was the “cocoa route” public program. In Guaitarilla, the external 
stimuli occurred after the agrarian riot of 2013 and with the arrival of a special technical assistance 
program which encouraged producers to organize. 
131 A shock is defined as a case in which the number of RPOs created in a municipality during a given year, 
is more than twice the average number of RPOs created in that municipality annually.  
132 Those in the decile of highest shocks 
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Table 3.3. FE estimations for municipalities in the decile of high RPO shocks 
Dependent variable:  Number of credits (1) Value of credits (2) 
VARIABLES   (1)   (2) 
RPO (per thousand rural inhabitants)   1.570   -0.491 
   [6.285]   [0.281] 
Rain shock (cms)   0.010*   -0.000 
   [0.006]   [0.000] 
Lag Local fiscal revenue (per capita)   0.569   0.733*** 
   [0.903]   [0.093] 
Lag National transfers (per capita)   21.608**   -0.334 
   [10.212]   [0.476] 
Lag Homicides (per capita)   0.597   0.050 
   [1.707]   [0.093] 
Constant   -15.357   0.727 
   [19.358]   [0.936] 
       
Observations   521   521 
R-squared   0.738   0.681 
Number of Municipalities   56   56 
Municipality FE   YES   YES 
Year FE   YES   YES 
Department-year FE   YES   YES 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All 
monetary variables in real terms. Homicides per capita in logs. Estimations exclude the five principal cities 
in the country. Specifications with only municipality fixed effects, with municipality and year fixed effects, 
and with region-year fixed effects generate similar results.  
 
Note that the existence of “RPO creation shocks” is not a fixed underlying municipality 
trait, but rather a dynamic that occurred in one context with a higher frequency than in 
others (for reasons that can be structural as well as random)133.  
Another dynamic that was observed in both off-the-line cases, and which can explain the 
weakness of RPOs, was that these municipalities experienced booms in non-agricultural 
economic activities134. The emergence of alternative sources of income lower the 
relevance of agriculture as an economic activity135 in the municipality. This plausibly 
reduces the incentives of farmers to invest time and effort in making RPOs successful. To 
analyse if this systematically relates to the low fit of the econometric model, I run the 
                                                             
133 Understanding the reasons behind RPO creation shocks are a topic of further research. 
134 In Guadalupe, a boom in tourism. In Guaitarilla, a boom in private investment brought along by the 
Solarte contractor brothers.  
135 The participation of agriculture in the municipality GDP is especially low in Guadalupe, where 
agriculture represents only 14% of GDP, while in the on-the-line municipalities it represents between 30% 
and 50%. 
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main model restricting the sample to the decile of municipalities in which the participation 
of agriculture in the GDP is the lowest136. Table 3.4 shows that consistent with the 
hypothesis, the effect of CA is not significant in this subgroup of municipalities, that is, 
the model does not fit. 
Table 3.4. FE estimations for decile of low share of agriculture on the GDP 
Dependent variable:  
Number of credits 
per capita 
Value of credits 
per capita 
VARIABLES   (1)   (2) 
RPO (per thousand rural inhabitants)   1.473   0.069 
   [1.661]   [0.125] 
Rain shock (cms)   0.001   0.000 
   [0.002]   [0.000] 
Lag Local fiscal revenue (per capita)   -1.648   0.637*** 
   [1.146]   [0.197] 
Lag National transfers (per capita)   9.765   -0.772 
   [11.853]   [0.655] 
Lag Homicides (per capita)   0.634   -0.003 
   [0.749]   [0.057] 
Constant   14.963**   -0.317 
   [6.400]   [0.693] 
       
Observations   1,176   1,176 
R-squared   0.411   0.394 
Number of Municipalities   108   108 
Municipality FE   YES   YES 
Year FE   YES   YES 
Department-year FE   YES   YES 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the municipality level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All 
monetary variables in real terms. Homicides per capita in logs. Estimations exclude the five principal cities 
in the country. Specifications with only municipality fixed effects, with municipality and year fixed effects, 
and with region-year fixed effects generate similar results. Data on agricultural and total GDP only available 
from 2002 to 2009, thus the decile is estimated based on data for this sub period.  
The third commonality identified among the two off-the-line cases does not have to do 
with the way in which RPOs operate, but rather with the way in which agricultural credit 
does. I found that in both off-the-line municipalities, access to credit is particularly high: 
the number of credits per capita is more than three times that of the on-the-line cases or 
the average Colombian municipality. This suggests that in these municipalities, credit 
constraints are not as binding as in others, reducing the potential of CA in loosening them.  
The question that stems from this is: why is access to credit particularly high in these 
municipalities, despite benign located in different regions and climates and exhibiting 
significant differences in population, poverty and GDP levels? A credit analyst in 
                                                             
136 Excluding cities. Data on agriculture and total GDP is only available for a subset of years (before 2009), 
and thus this variable cannot be included as a control in the econometric model.  
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Guadalupe mentioned that one of the explanations for the dynamism of credit in the 
municipality is that most people own their land137. Similarly, in Guaitarilla a credit analyst 
mentioned that farmers usually approach the bank asking how much credit the bank grants 
for the land they have. Formally owning land implies that farmers have assets they can 
use as collateral for credits, what increases their chances of having credit allocated by 
banks. This is known as the collateralization effect or the “de Soto effect” (Besley, 
Burchardi and Ghatak, 2012). In addition to the above, the authors show that having 
formal land property rights increases investment (and thus the demand for credit) through 
the assurance effect, which arises as farmers feel more secure about being able to maintain 
their right over property for a longer term, increasing the return on long term investments. 
To further analyse this, I estimate the levels of land informality in both off-the-line cases. 
I find that indeed, it is significantly low in both: 2% in Guadalupe and 3,2% in Guatarilla, 
compared to an average of 20% at the national level. More broadly, land informality is 
low (12%) in the off-the-line subgroup as a whole. In order to formally analyse whether 
land informality conditions the effect of collective action on access to credit, I run the 
main econometric model on the subgroup of municipalities in the decile of lowest land 
informality rates138. As shown in Table 3.5, the effect of RPOs is not statistically 
significant in this subgroup of municipalities139. The above implies that in contexts in 
which land informality is low140, and thus farmers are more likely to own land and 
experience an assurance and a collateralization effect, the role of CA in further loosening 
credit constraints (e.g. by enabling farmers to collectively access land, or providing a 
network of co-signers of credit) is less relevant. This result is consistent with the view of 
collective action being more important in contexts in which market and state failures (e.g. 
weak property rights) are more salient. Note that this does not imply that some 
municipalities have an underlying and fixed propensity for strong collective action, but 
                                                             
137 He also mentioned being close to Bogotá (but this is captured in the municipality fixed effect) and 
public order being safe (which is captured in the homicide rate control variable). In Nariño, a credit analyst 
mentioned something similar, he argued that the quality of land explained why the credit market was 
better in Sapuyes (on-the-line) and Guaitarilla (off-the-line).  
138 Data on informality rate is not available for every year or every municipality, and thus it cannot be 
included as a control variable in the panel model.  
139 As a robustness test, the model was run for the quintile (not decile) of low informality municipalities. 
The results are consistent. 
140 Land informality can be low for both structural (e.g. historic state presence) or random reasons (e.g. 
the arrival of a land titling campaign). Again, exploring the reasons behind this constitutes further 
research. 
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rather that the context (in time and space) or organizational environment in which an 
organization emerges, affects its nature141.  
Table 3.5. FE estimations for decile of low land informality 
Dependent variable:  
Number of credits  
per capita 
Value of credits  
per capita  
VARIABLES  (1)  (2) 
RPO (per thousand rural inhabitants)   -0.086   1.084 
   [0.786]   [0.672] 
Rain shock (cms)   -0.001   -0.000 
   [0.002]   [0.000] 
Lag Local fiscal revenue (per capita)   -2.501   -0.103 
   [1.758]   [0.177] 
Lag National transfers (per capita)   39.836***   -0.653 
   [12.839]   [2.519] 
Lag Homicides (per capita)   1.091   0.087 
   [0.725]   [0.093] 
Constant   11.867   1.595* 
   [7.415]   [0.896] 
       
Observations   1,063   1,063 
R-squared   0.592   0.280 
Number of Municipalities   96   96 
Municipality FE   YES   YES 
Year FE   YES   YES 
Department-year FE   YES   YES 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the municipality level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All 
monetary variables in real terms. Homicides per capita in logs. Estimations exclude the five principal cities 
in the country. Specifications with only municipality fixed effects, with municipality and year fixed effects, 
and with region-year fixed effects generate similar results. Results run on the decile of municipalities with 
low informality.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Developing the rural financial market is crucial for the agricultural sector to grow and 
achieve its poverty reduction potential. This requires identifying alternative ways in 
which credit constraints can be reduced. As shown by Benson et al. (2019), collective 
action is one of these alternatives. This paper builds on these quantitative findings, and 
through a mixed methods analysis, develops an analytical framework explaining the 
mechanisms through which collective action reduces credit constraints.  
The qualitative analysis consisted of four case studies selected following a novel 
methodological approach. The methodology derives from the estimation of residuals in a 
                                                             
141 The context and the nature of RPOs can vary within municipalities as well. For instance, the tomatoes 
RPO in Guaitarilla (off-the-line) emerged organically and was successful. However, on average, RPOs in 
this municipality tend to be weak. 
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Large-N Analysis, based on which cases are semi-randomly selected to carry out the 
Small-N Analysis. This approach reduces concerns of biases in case selection, and also 
exploits quantitative data to compare cases and to discard the existence of systematic 
differences that can make generalizations more complicated. This methodology can be 
useful for scholars seeking to carry out mixed methods analysis in a more structured way, 
and is particularly useful for when there is a large number of potential cases, such as in 
subnational analysis. Furthermore, the proposed nested analysis methodology evidences 
the value of analysing both on and off-the-regression-line cases.  
The results show that collective action in the form of RPOs reduces quantity credit 
constraints, as it increases the supply of credit. This occurs as RPOs grant credit to their 
members, and as banks grant credit to RPOs. Furthermore, banks are more likely to grant 
individual credit to RPO members as membership signals project quality, farmer quality 
and reduces search and approval costs (i.e. transaction costs from the supply side). 
Collective action also increases the demand for credit, allowing members to engage in 
new, larger and more profitable projects (e.g. they have easier access to low cost inputs, 
technical assistance and output markets) requiring investment. In addition to this, RPOs 
reduce transaction cost constraints through the sharing of information on credit 
opportunities and the credit application process. Finally, these organizations reduce risk 
constraints, constituting a safety net, especially through the provision of emergency loans.  
The mechanisms explaining the relation between collective action and credit constraints 
were largely consistent in both on-the-line cases, but were found to be weak in the off-
the-line ones. The evidence points towards this resulting from RPOs being weak in these 
municipalities, what in turn is associated with the way in which organizations emerge 
(either as an organic bottom up, collective-production-oriented strategy, or as an 
inorganic short term strategy to receive benefits). The identification of the mechanisms, 
the source of heterogeneity and the causes for low model fit was possible through the 
analysis of fine-grained information obtained from the interviews. This evidences the 
usefulness of synergistically integrating Small and Large-N Analysis for gaining causal 
inference. This is especially relevant when studying complex relational variables such as 
collective action.  
Further research is needed in order to more robustly understand the sources of 
heterogeneity in the functioning and emergence of RPOs, providing a better 
understanding of the different shapes that collective action can take in arguably similar 
organizational forms. Further research could consider aspects of organizational structure, 
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organizational environment and network theories of organizations, building links with the 
literature on sociology and organizational theory (Di Maggio and Powel, 1983; Andrews 
et al., 2010; Galaskiewicz, 2007; Perrow, 1967). Further research is also required to 
address whether collective action has the potential of reducing credit constraints in 
contexts in which the formal agricultural market is less developed and credit constraints 
are more stringent (e.g. in African countries). 
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Annex 3 
 
a. Methodological Appendix 
On and off-the-regression line observations  
As Lieberman (2005) explains in this graph, cases B, D, E and F are considered on the-
regression-line (well predicted by the model), while the rest are off-the-regression line 
(not well predicted by the model) 
Figure 3.A1 A graphic explanation (Lieberman, 2005) 
 
 
Statistically significant differences between municipalities 
As shown in Table 1, from the 21 analysed variables, Sapuyes differs statistically from 
the average municipality only in that it has a lower homicide rate. Betulia differs in that 
it has a smaller population, but higher agricultural GDP and fiscal resources. The two off-
the-line municipalities (Guadalupe and Guaitarilla) also exhibit overall similarities to the 
rest of the Colombian municipalities, although both show higher than average number of 
credits per capita, and Guadalupe has a higher than average GDP per capita. 
Regarding the differences between the municipalities and their decile group mean, the 
results show again overall similarities. Moreover, the differences largely resemble those 
with the average Colombian municipality. Finally, comparing the on and off-the-line 
municipalities within each Department, the results show that for the case of Nariño, 
Sapuyes (on-the-line) has a smaller population, less poverty and less violence, and has 
less credit per capita than Guaitarilla. In Santander, Betulia has a higher population and a 
lower number of credits per capita.  
Interview design 
The interviews were semi-structured around the following topics:   
 The nature of collective action and RPOs. This set of questions was directed 
towards RPO members and was aimed at understanding the nature of RPOs and 
of how CA materializes in them. Questions addressed issues like the reasons for 
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joining the organization, how it emerged, how it operates and how it impacts the 
community.  
 The demand side mechanisms explaining the impact of CA on access to 
agricultural credit. These questions were also directed towards RPO members, 
addressing issues like past experience accessing credit (motivations to request it, 
the process, the risks associated) and the potential impact of CA on these.   
 The supply side mechanisms explaining the impact of CA on access to 
agricultural credit. These questions targeted directors or credit analysis of the 
local financial institutions. They covered issues about the credit approval process, 
how contextual characteristics affect the supply of credit, and the relation of RPOs 
and banks. 
 The agricultural credit market and the potential of CA in reducing credit 
constraints. These questions were directed towards national and local level policy 
actors and were aimed at gaining an in-depth understanding of the functioning of 
the agricultural credit market, and of how policy experts perceive CA can 
contribute to increasing access to credit.  
 
b.  Municipality profiles 
BETULIA, SANTANDER 
Betulia is a small municipality in the department of Santander, in the north-eastern area 
of the country. It has a population of 5.200, 75% of which live in the rural area. It 
represents 0,2% of the Department´s population and 4% of its area. The municipality is 
poorly connected to the rest of the Department. It is 90 km. away from the Department 
capital (Bucaramanga), but it takes more than three hours to travel them, on an unpaved 
road.  As a result of its geographical location and lack of infrastructure, Betulia has been 
historically isolated, politically and economically. This affects the livelihoods of farmers, 
for instance as the few intermediaries that arrive to buy agricultural products have 
leverage over prices. 
The municipality produces most of the agricultural products that it consumes, although 
the fruit and vegetable market does not operate anymore, and there are only a couple of 
small stores in the whole town. Some products are taken to a neighbouring municipality, 
but the roads close when weather conditions make it dangerous to transit. Some relevant 
products are coffee, cocoa, cattle, maize, plantain, onions and tomatoes. The case of 
greenhouse tomatoes is worth highlighting. Betulia´s town centre is surrounded by 
greenhouses, which have boomed over the last 5 years, generating some jobs and 
economic growth, but endangering the environment and the health of people who work 
there, due to close contact to pesticides which are poured into water sources. Scarce 
actions have been taken, in part because people in the local government have their own 
greenhouses, thus do not have the incentives to regulate them.  
The diversity of agricultural production in Betulia is the result of varying topographic 
conditions. The municipality town is located in the mountains, and the temperature is 
mild. The other economic centre is vereda La Playa, which houses approximately 200 
families near the highway that connects Bucaramanga and Barrancabermeja, next to the 
Sogamoso river, where the temperature is quite high. There is a marked discontent among 
the population of La Playa and of the municipality in general, as they have suffered from 
the negative consequences of a major project: a hydroelectric plant (Hidrosogamoso), 
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built in 2009, for which a large area of the municipality was flooded, promising to bring 
development and jobs. These expectations have not been fulfilled, people lost the land 
they owned and worked in, but did not find jobs, and many people had to emigrate. 
Moreover, the project brought environmental problems (the fish in the river have become 
scarce, the nearby roads have collapsed because of changing topographical conditions). 
This has united the population around their claims, being active in demonstrations against 
the project and the Government. The population has sued the hydroelectric for breaking 
environmental agreements, but this will take years to settle. Many have their hopes on 
this, although in the area, hopes about the future are not always optimistic. Even the priest 
mentioned that there is low hope. 
The agricultural sector represents over 30% of Betulia´s GDP, and the agricultural GDP 
is higher than in the average Colombian municipality. Half of the rural population is poor 
(under Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index), 15% of the population is illiterate, and access to 
post primary education is low (37%). Nonetheless, since the decentralization reforms of 
the early 1990’s, service provision has improved, even in the rural areas, where 86% of 
households have access to electricity and 23% to water.  
Betulia is a municipality of small (49%) and medium farmers, and although land 
inequality is high, the landed elite has not been as powerful as in other areas of the 
country. Regarding the impact of violence, Betulia experienced guerrilla presence starting 
in the 1990s and paramilitary presence after 2000. Betulia's proximity to the Magdalena 
Medio made it beneficiary of a Peace and Development Project during the first years of 
the 2000s, which invested considerable resources in productive projects and the 
reconstruction of social cohesion. Despite this, the insecurity at the time, combined with 
scarce economic opportunities, led to high levels of displacement and migration. The 
municipality has traditionally experienced high migration of young people to cities like 
Bucaramanga, Barrancabermeja, and Bogota. As a result, the population has not grown 
much during the past six decades.  
The inhabitants of Betulia are friendly and hard-working, and the town feels safe and 
calm, with only a couple of cars transiting during the day. There are few people in the 
streets after dawn, when the last mass ends, and people go to their houses. Religion is an 
important part of daily life, and the priest is argued to be more of a leader than the mayor 
(who is considered by many to be self-interested and to have done little for the 
development of the municipality). The current security situation is stable, during 2015 
there was one homicide and eight cases of robbery to people; these rates are lower than 
the national average.  
Turning now to public finances, it is worth noting that investment increased between 2012 
and 2015, as local fiscal revenue and national transfers increased, and has remained stable 
for the past two years. Most of the investment goes to infrastructure, health, culture and 
sports. Despite being a predominantly agricultural municipality, the current government 
has not prioritized this sector. In fact, it is the sector with the lowest investment. In fact, 
the Secretary of Agriculture was just created. Most of the support granted to RPOs by the 
local government comes from agreements with SENA or the hydroelectric plant, or 
through projects from the Ministry of Agriculture.   
The number of credits per capita allocated in the municipality is not statistically different 
from the average Colombian municipality. Most credit (86%) is granted to small farmers, 
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13% to medium and 1% to big. This is surprising as small farmers constitute only 49% of 
all farmers in Betulia, suggesting that medium and big farmers tend to self-finance their 
productive activity. The average credit size for small farmers is $5 million COP, for 
medium $39 million and for big $89 million. The public bank is the main provider of 
credit (91% of all credits), granting most credits to small farmers and some to medium 
ones. In contrast, almost all credit granted by banks (4% of the total) goes to medium 
farmers.  
When speaking to the manager of the public bank, he mentioned that one problem for 
accessing credit is the travel costs to the bank branch, as the road conditions in Betulia 
are quite bad. To offset this, he visits different areas of the municipality. He also 
mentioned that there has been increased demand in credit, especially in the lower area of 
the municipality, as security conditions have improved during the last decades. He also 
said that there was an increase in the demand for credit due to the arrival of the greenhouse 
tomatoes projects (around 12 years ago). Another aspect that can impact access to credit 
was the introduction of a public guarantee program by the local government around 2012. 
The increase in credit demand is surprising, especially when considering that there has 
been large emigration and that in general young people are not interested in working in 
the agricultural sector, as the Agriculture Secretary mentioned. 
Another interesting aspect is the relevance of cooperative credit in Betulia, representing 
10% of all credits since 2010, when the first one was granted. The average credit size 
provided by cooperatives is higher than the credits provided by the public bank ($15 
million vs. $11 million), but significantly lower than the credits provided by the private 
banks ($67 million). Cooperative credit is granted by Coomultrasan, located in Zapatoca, 
about an hour and a half away from Betulia. Coomultrasan is the largest cooperative in 
the country and is one of the few that grants credit under Finagro conditions. 
Turning now to the dynamics of Collective Action, although the number of RPOs per 
capita is similar to the country average, 25% of farmers are members of RPOs, a rate 
significantly higher than the average Colombian municipality. This suggests that RPOs 
are big, or remain unregistered. According to the Mayor, not all RPOs are successful, and 
that members become impatient because they want to see results fast, reason why some 
disappear fast.  The Secretary of Agriculture mentioned that several of them have 
organized a federation of RPOs, and that some of the RPOs emerged as a result of the 
hydroelectric, they organized to demand help.  
SAPUYES, NARIÑO 
Sapuyes is located in the department of Nariño, 3.000 meters above the sea level. It is 80 
km south of the department capital (Pasto). Sapuyes is quite small, covering 0,4% of the 
departments geographical area and population. There are 7. 300 people in Sapuyes, of 
which 1.200 are indigenous and 75% live in rural areas. The population has decreased in 
the last two decades, although not as much as in other rural areas of the country. The 
municipality is well connected by roads to the department capital and within a few 
kilometres to Túquerres, a municipality of over 40.000 people, where commercial and 
financial activity takes place, benefiting Sapuyes but also limiting its growth (for 
example, there are no commercial banks in the municipality, as people can travel to 
Túquerres). As a consequence, Sapuyes remains to be a small municipality with only a 
couple of stores, no hotels nor restaurants.  
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Sapuyes has been traditionally peaceful, and the homicide rate is among the lowest in the 
country, despite being in one of the departments most affected by the internal conflict. 
There are no records of captures or attacks by guerrilla or paramilitary groups, although 
the municipality experienced internal displacement, especially before 2009. The priest 
mentioned that it is a socially integrated and peaceful municipality and "that people have 
a lot of solidarity, if there is any situation, there are early alarms”.  
Poverty rates have diminished drastically in Sapuyes (and Nariño) during the last decade, 
reaching 36% by Unsatisfied Basic Needs measurements. The reduction in poverty rates 
is related with improvements in the provision of public services: access to energy is 
around 95% even in rural areas, and 88,7% of the population has access to water services. 
There is however a high qualitative housing deficit (40%), and land Gini is high despite 
the fact that over 94% of rural producers are small.  
Sapuyes is an agricultural municipality, 56% of the GDP comes from farming and 
livestock and 60% of the municipality land is used for agricultural purposes. There is not 
a lot of topographic variation, which limits the variety of products that can be cultivated. 
The main agricultural products are potatoes, followed by carrots, cereals such as quinua 
and wheat, maize, beans, onion. Livestock is also relevant, mainly for milk production. 
As in other areas of Colombia, including Santander municipalities, the support of the local 
government to the agricultural sector is scarce. Local public investment in agriculture is 
40 times lower than in health. The Secretary of Government explained this is due to the 
construction of a health centre that required a large investment. When asked about the 
support the local government gives to the agricultural sector, the Secretary of Government 
answered "what we have meant to start is with associativity”. The current Mayor 
increased support to RPOs, but recognizes this is nonetheless insufficient. The mayor 
mentioned he sees RPOs as a way to reduce poverty and insecurity (by granting 
opportunities), although he says it has sometimes been difficult to promote RPOs and 
"still people refuse to work as a team”. 
The number of RPOs per capita is similar to the country average, although the rate of 
association (34% of farmers) is high, suggesting that RPOs are large or not registered. 
During the study period 19 RPOs were created, especially following the agrarian riot of 
2013, after which farmers created RPOs encouraged by local social leaders knowing this 
would facilitate accessing public resources promised in the riot agreements. It is worth 
noting that there is a generalized discontent among the population of Nariño towards the 
national Government, as it has not transferred the agreed resources, and because the 
resources that have been transferred have not generated the expected impact. 
The number of credits per capita allocated in Sapuyes is similar to the country average, 
although lower than the subgroup average. 75% of credits granted went to small farmers 
and 25% to medium ones, and 6 credits granted to big farmers. The relatively large share 
of credits for medium farmers is a difference between Sapuyes and the other analysed 
municipalities. This can be due to the existence of medium and big potatoes producers. 
As the Mayor pointed out, potatoes production requires farmers acquiring debt because 
of the high costs of inputs and the variability of price. The average size of credits for small 
farmers in Sapuyes is 6,5 million COP, whereas for medium ones it is 44,4 million and 
for big 215 million. The large share of credits granted to medium farmers is associated 
with a larger share of private credit provision (21% vs. less than 10% in the other studied 
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municipalities). The two analysts of local private banks interviewed agreed that credits in 
Sapuyes are big and good (better than in Guaitarilla), as it is "livestock land” and “very 
good land”. Also, because there is no public bank in Sapuyes, farmers have to go to 
Tuquerres, where they find both public and private banks. It is interesting to note that no 
credits were granted by financial cooperatives (at least with Finagro resources), and that 
there is a lot of microcredit and informal group lending schemes.  
The manager of the public bank mentioned that climate shocks have affected the region, 
but not that often, and that anyway farmers have other alternatives and in general are good 
repaying. This contrasts with the view of the Mayor, who argued that "the truth is that 
people are now scared of credits. People have gotten behind in their quotas; some have 
lost their houses”. I did not gather first hand evidence of this, however.  
GUADALUPE, SANTANDER 
Guadalupe is a small municipality located in the south of Santander, in the north-eastern 
Andean region of Colombia. It has a population of 5.000, covering an area equivalent to 
0.5% of the Department´s area. The total population in Guadalupe has decreased by 40% 
since 1985, partly because of scarce economic opportunities. Indeed, 61% of the rural 
population and 35% of the urban population are poor under Unsatisfied Basic Needs. 
Although the coverage of education is higher than the regional average, 15% of the 
population is illiterate and 27% have no education. Furthermore, only 22% of rural 
inhabitants have access to water services and there is a large housing deficit.  
Guadalupe is a rural municipality, almost 70% of its population lives in the rural areas, 
mainly producing coffee and livestock. Other products include cacao, sugar cane, yuca 
and fruits. Despite agriculture being a main economic activity, the participation of 
agriculture in the GDP is low (14%), while industry is 52%. The current local government 
recognizes the relevance of the agricultural sector but assigns scarce resources to it: while 
42% of investment resources go to health, only 2% go to agriculture. Investment increased 
between 2011 and 2014 due to a surge in national transfers, which account for 83% of 
public income.  
Tourism has recently become an important economic activity in the municipality. There 
are a couple of nice small hostels visited mainly by Europeans. Ecotourists are attracted 
by the landscape of enormous mountains and by a nearby river with unique rock 
formations and coloured plants. It also attracts religious tourists who visit the beautiful 
restored church. Despite the increasing touristic activity, Guadalupe is a calmed 
municipality. The armed conflict did not affect it strongly, although it led to internal 
displacement between 1999 and 2009.  
The number of credits per capita is significantly higher than the country´s average, and 
during the period of study, almost 3.000 credits were granted (twice as much than in 
Betulia, which has a similar population). An agronomist who works in Guadalupe says 
that it is an area with good credit perspectives, as it is close to Bogota, there are no public 
order problems and most people own their land. Indeed, the informality rate of land in 
Guadalupe is starkly low: 2% compared to 20% at the national level. The main financial 
actor is the public bank, which granted 91% of the credits, of which 93% were directed 
towards small farmers (94% of farmers are small). Credit directed towards medium 
farmers remained relatively constant during these years, whereas annual credits granted 
to small farmers increased 543% between 2002 and 2009, compared to an increase of 
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98% at the national level. Credit provision in Guadalupe has decreased since then. It 
seems that this results from the director of the public bank being preoccupied with over-
indebtedness, what has made credit allocation stricter (farmers complained about this). 
Changes in credit dynamics do not appear to be explained by changes in RPO creation. 
There were no RPOs created during the first boom of credit (2004-2005), and annual RPO 
creation remained stable between 2005 and 2015.  
GUAITARILLA, NARIÑO 
Guaitarilla is located 72 km south of Pasto (the department capital), at 2.653 meters above 
the sea level, in the middle of the Andes mountains. Its population is 12.011, of which 
69% is rural, although the rural population has decreased 25% in the last 10 years. 
Guaitarilla is a peaceful municipality, although there is some coca cultivation and in the 
early 2000 there was guerrilla presence (ELN and FARC) as well as paramilitaries, what 
generated internal displacement, though not as high as in other areas of the Department.  
Guaitarilla has higher poverty levels than the other analysed municipalities, being 54,2 
by UBN. However, the town seems to be growing, and there are a couple of large social 
infrastructure projects that show its progress. Access to public services has improved 
during the last years, for example, 80% of rural household have access to water, although 
only 2% have access to sewage systems and the qualitative housing deficit is 47%. 
Most of the commerce in the municipality is related with agriculture, and takes place with 
Pasto and two large nearby municipalities, Tuquerres and Ipiales. There is a large farmer´s 
market on Sundays, when traditional trucks come from different areas of the municipality 
filled with people, animals and agricultural products. The agricultural GDP is 50% of the 
total GDP. The municipality has different topographic conditions. In the high areas, there 
is wheat, beans, potatoes, maize and milk production. In the lower areas, there is coffee, 
panela and some new crops like greenhouse tomatoes and an exotic fruit called granadilla, 
which is already being exported to Europe. 99% of farmers in Guaitarilla are small and 
cultivate for their own consumption as well as for commercializing. As in the other 
municipalities, the agricultural production faces several obstacles, one of which is 
deforestation which has generated erosion and water scarcity. 
The number of credits granted per capita is significantly higher than average. Almost 
8.000 credits were granted during the study period, of which 99% were granted to small 
farmers, by the public bank, which is the only bank in the municipality. Farmers have to 
go to Tuquerres to request from other sources. There is a culture of credit in the 
municipality, as a former credit analyst from the public bank said that "they are indebt all 
the time”. He added that “the portfolio is also high. Credit was granted to everyone, he 
who arrived, have your credit”. This can relate to access to credit being easy, as many 
farmers own their land. Indeed, the informality rate is very low, only 3,2%. The number 
of formal credits allocated has decreased since 2012. According to analysts, because of 
the arrival of competition from microfinance institutions and credit cooperatives, 
knowing that Guaitarilla is a good place to grant credit, as people are good payers.  
The number of RPOs per capita is slightly higher than the national average, but the share 
of farmers that report being members of RPOs is 11%, the same as the national average. 
39 RPOs were created during the study period, 15 of which were created in 2014. This 
relate to the Agrarian riot of 2013, and to the arrival of a special technical assistance 
program which encouraged producers to organize. It is also explained by the engagement 
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of the current and former governments in supporting RPOs. The Secretary of Agriculture 
said he helps farmers to constitute the RPO, and they subsidize the annual fee to renovate 
the RPO register, he also helps them in preparing tax reports and structuring projects, 
giving them financial resources as well. Since 2012, collective action has increased, while 
agricultural credit has decreased, evidencing the low fit of the econometric model in this 
off-the-line municipality.   
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c. List of Interviews 
 
Table 3.A1 List of Interviews in order of occurrence 
Person Location Type of stakeholder Month (2017) 
Maria Clara Hoyos Bogotá Policy expert September 
Lucy Niño Bogotá Policy expert September 
Johnathan Diaz Betulia Local policy expert October 
Sergio Diaz Betulia Local policy expert October 
Carmen Prado Betulia RPO member October 
Graciliano Zapata Betulia RPO member October 
Alexandra León Betulia RPO member October 
Padre Camilo Betulia Priest October 
Robinson Maestre Betulia Bank analyst October 
Luis Alberto Díaz Betulia RPO member October 
Felix Rivero Betulia Bank analyst October 
John Calderón Betulia Bank analyst October 
Antonio Torres Betulia RPO member October 
Vicente Mora Betulia RPO member October 
Daisy Maribel Betulia RPO member October 
Edgar Lizarazo Betulia RPO member October 
Angel David Guadalupe RPO member October 
Jaime Angulo Guadalupe RPO member October 
Freddy Franco Guadalupe Local policy expert October 
Alirio Suarez Guadalupe Bank analyst October 
Mayor Guadalupe Local policy expert October 
Gilma Suarez Guadalupe RPO member October 
Maria Eugenia Diaz Guadalupe RPO member October 
Neyla Gomez Guadalupe RPO member October 
Edberto Pinilla Guadalupe Bank analyst October 
Alex Guadalupe Bank analyst October 
Padre José Guadalupe Priest October 
Lizeth Guadalupe Bank analyst October 
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Wilson Sapuyes Local policy expert November 
Melba Sapuyes Local policy expert November 
Alicia Menayo Sapuyes RPO member November 
Rosalba Roando Sapuyes RPO member November 
Monica Riascos Sapuyes RPO member November 
Alcalde Sapuyes Local policy expert November 
Andrés Sapuyes Non-member November 
Padre Edgar Sapuyes Priest November 
Bernardo Sapuyes RPO member November 
Vicente Argan Sapuyes RPO member November 
Artemio Argan Sapuyes RPO member November 
Henry Salas Sapuyes Bank analyst November 
Jorge Luis Erazo Sapuyes Bank analyst November 
Carlos Sapuyes Bank analyst November 
Cristina Benavides Guaitarilla Bank analyst November 
Gabriel Guaitarilla Local policy expert November 
Zully Vallejo Guaitarilla Bank analyst November 
Padre William Guaitarilla Priest November 
Marco Aurelio Guaitarilla RPO member November 
Bernardo Pantoja Guaitarilla Non-member November 
Jose Burbano Guaitarilla RPO member November 
Alex Suárez Guaitarilla RPO member November 
Estela Guaitarilla RPO member November 
Luis Rosero Guaitarilla RPO member November 
Dario Chamorro Guaitarilla RPO member November 
183 
 
d. RPO characteristics 
 
Table 3.A2 RPO characteristics  
Municipality RPO Age 
(years) 
Number of Members Type of RPO Reasons for 
creating/joining RPO 
Level of 
CA 
Rules Meeting 
frequency 
Betulia 
 
Asocopa 12  14 (only 5 really active; 
a couple from another 
municipality 
Joint Production and 
used to 
commercialize  
Access public programs Medium Initial contribution 
and monthly quota  
On demand  
Aprob 26  100  Sells inputs, grants 
credit, provides TA 
Access public programs, 
represent tomato 
producers. Impulse from 
religious organization 
 High   Affiliation quota of 
5.000 monthly quota 
of 2.500  
Board is named 
every two years by 
vote 
Board once a 
month. 
General 
Assembly 
once a year  
Asovenplaya 8  29  (26 women) Commercialize, 
apply to projects 
Access public programs and 
training 
 High  Decisions taken 
democratically by 
vote. Monthly quota 
of 5.000 COP 
 Once a 
month 
Asoperiso 8  65  Representation Represent their interests 
and raise voice to demand 
support 
 Medium  Decisions taken 
democratically by 
vote.  
  Once a 
month 
 
Guadalupe 
 
Asoprocagua 6  18 members but only 8 
are really active 
Apply to projects Commercialize and access 
public programs. Impulse 
from SENA 
 Low  Only active members 
(have paid quota and 
go to meetings can 
profit from projects)   
 Not often 
Amar 17  25 (women) but only 
12 are really active. 
different areas of the 
municipality 
Apply to projects 
 
Help household 
economically, learn, 
friendship 
 Low  Annual quota of 
15.000 COP and 
affiliation quota of 
15.000 COP. Only 
active members 
(have paid quota and 
Every two 
months, 
although not 
always  
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go to meetings can 
profit from projects)  
Sapuyes 
 
El Bosque 2  24  (22 women) Joint production and 
joint 
commercialization 
Access public programs. 
Impulse from SENA and 
social leader in Paro 
Agrario 
High  Contribute by 
working settled 
shifts. Reinvest 
income from 
commercialization 
 
Decisions are taken 
democratically by 
vote 
When they 
finish selling 
a determined 
quantity  
Prolesa 8  42  Individual 
production and 
commercialization 
 
Commercialize, access 
public program, face 
challenges of free trade.  
 High  Each member has 
contributed around 
2 million COP. Keep 
50 cents per litre to 
pay workers of RPO 
 Once a 
month 
Guaitarilla 
 
Tomate 
Guaitarilla 
7  32 (plus 32 new 
members of a joint 
RPO in a neighbouring 
municipality) 
Individual 
production and joint 
commercialization 
 
Commercialize in larger 
quantities. Accessing public 
programs is secondary. 
 High  Monthly quota of 
5.000. Each member 
has invested over 2 
million. Decisions 
taken democratically 
by vote.    
At least once 
a month. 
20.000 fine 
for not 
assisting.  
El Sol 3  28  Individual 
production and 
credit provision. 
Apply to projects 
 
To access public programs, 
commercialize jointly, offer 
credit to members and 
protest against the 
government 
 Low  Monthly 
contribution of 
10.000 for credit 
fund. 
Once a 
month  
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